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INTRODUCTION 
This Article addresses the issues that are peculiar to claims of mi-
nors in North Carolina.1  Persons who are the age of majority prosecute 
and settle claims that raise numerous substantive and procedural issues.  
These issues can be compounded, however, when the claimant is a mi-
nor. 
The distinct issues that arise with a minor’s claim include: that a 
minor is often held to a different standard of conduct; that other persons 
are held to a higher or different standard of conduct toward a minor; 
that other persons may have a duty to protect the minor; that courts 
generally protect the interests of minors; that minors cannot enter bind-
ing contracts; and that injuries to minors typically create claims in other 
parties, for example, the minor’s parents. 
This Article addresses the settlement and litigation of these claims.  
While this Article focuses on claims arising from a personal injury to the 
minor, many of the same legal issues are also raised in other contexts in 
which the minor’s interests are affected.  As shown by many cases cited 
in this Article, much of the case law in North Carolina addressing the 
procedures for settling and adjudicating minors’ rights has arisen in the 
context of a minor’s interest in an estate or real property. 
North Carolina does not have many statutes addressing the sub-
stance or procedure for minor’s claims; therefore, most of the applicable 
law is common law developed by the courts.  In contrast, many other 
states have statutes setting forth procedures for these claims.2  Most of 
the law from other jurisdictions is, however, similar to North Carolina 
law.  The common law from those jurisdictions is useful in analyzing 
and predicting North Carolina law, and this Article therefore references 
cases from other jurisdictions in areas where North Carolina has no go-
verning authority. 
 
Editorial Note: Campbell Law Review has included parallel citations to the North Carolina 
reporters per the request of the author. 
 1. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48A-2 (2011) (“A minor is any person who has not 
reached the age of 18 years.”).  Note that for purposes of the Uniform Transfers to Mi-
nors Act (UTMA), a minor is defined as any person under twenty-one years old.  N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 33A-1(11).  For a brief discussion of emancipated minors, see infra notes 
614–16 and accompanying text. 
 2. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 744.301(2)(a), (b) (2011); PA. R. CIV. P. 2039 (2011); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 62-5-433 (2011). 
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I. SUBSTANCE OF THE CLAIMS ARISING FROM INJURY TO MINOR 
Minors generally have the same claims, and are subject to the same 
rules and defenses as if they were adults.  Thus, a minor can sue for neg-
ligence, breach of contract, libel, assault etc.; however, there are some 
causes of action where the minor’s claim is different in some respects 
from the same claim brought by an adult.  Further, an injury to the mi-
nor can give rise to claims in her parents.  Additionally, some of the de-
fenses to the claims of the minor and her parents merit special attention.  
Finally, the allocation of the damages arising from an injury to the minor 
raises complicated issues that are not present when an adult is simply 
pursuing his own claim.  These distinctions in the claims of minors are 
discussed below. 
A. Minor’s Claims  
1. Substantive Claims 
When a minor is injured by the negligence of another person, he 
may assert a claim for his damages arising from that negligence.  For the 
most part, the elements of these claims—and the doctrines associated 
with these claims—are the same for a minor as they would be for an 
adult.  Thus, a minor who asserts a claim for medical malpractice must 
show that the doctor breached the standard of care, in the same manner 
that an adult would have to establish the negligence of the doctor.  Simi-
larly, a motorist has a duty to stop his vehicle at a stop sign regardless of 
whether a pedestrian in the intersection is an adult or a minor; the fail-
ure to stop at the stop sign will be evidence of negligence in a claim as-
serted by a minor or by an adult who was injured by that motorist.  
There are, however, some areas of law where the nature of the de-
fendant’s duty or liability is altered by the fact that the claimant is a mi-
nor.  For example, “the presence of children on or near a highway is a 
warning signal to a motorist, who must bear in mind that they have less 
capacity to shun danger than adults and are prone to act on impulse.”3  A 
motorist therefore might have to anticipate that a child will dart in front 
 
 3. Winters v. Burch, 284 N.C. 205, 209–11, 200 S.E.2d 55, 57–59 (1973) (“There-
fore, ‘the presence of children on or near the traveled portion of a highway whom a driv-
er sees, or should see, places him under the duty to use due care to control the speed and 
movement of his vehicle and to keep a vigilant lookout to avoid injury.’” (citation omit-
ted)).  The court noted that the motorist was not liable to the darting child where the 
court could only speculate as to “the time when defendant should have first seen Timmy 
as well as the place and manner of his entrance into the street.”  Id. 
4
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of his car,4 but would not have to anticipate the same of an adult pede-
strian.5  Other areas where the plaintiff’s status as a minor affects the de-
fendant’s duty are premises liability suits and cases against persons hav-
ing a duty to protect the minor.  These are discussed in more detail 
below. 
a.  Landowner Liability  
The duty of owners and operators of businesses, and other persons 
in control of land, to protect visitors on their land depends, in part, on 
the age of the visitors to the property.  For example, “if . . . an [amuse-
ment park] operator invites children who have not reached an age where 
they are to understand and appreciate and avoid danger incident to a de-
vice to which they are thus invited, ordinary care should dictate that he 
must take such steps as are necessary for their protection.”6  The lan-
downer’s duties toward trespassing children are addressed in the next 
section.  For a child lawfully upon the land, “the possessor of the land is 
no less obligated to anticipate and take into account his propensities to 
inquire into or to meddle with conditions which he finds on the land, 
his inattention, and his inability to understand or appreciate the danger, 
or to protect himself against it.”7 
A case decided in 2012 addressed whether the jury should be spe-
cifically instructed that the landowner’s duty to maintain the property 
depends on the age of persons visiting the land.  In Cobb v. Town of 
Blowing Rock, a twelve-year-old girl was injured when she attempted to 
cross a stream on the defendant’s property, which was open to the pub-
lic, and she was swept over a waterfall.8  The jury found that the defen-
dant was not negligent in, inter alia, failing to post warning signs and in 
 
 4. Phillips v. Holland, 107 N.C. App. 688, 693, 421 S.E.2d 608, 611 (1992) (sum-
marizing prior cases addressing “darting children” where evidence was sufficient to show 
that defendant failed to keep a reasonable lookout, and that defendant could have 
stopped vehicle). 
 5. See, e.g., Blake v. Mallard, 262 N.C. 62, 66, 136 S.E.2d 214, 217 (1964) (illustrat-
ing a claim of an adult motorist who entered the roadway in front of defendant that was 
properly nonsuited where “[d]efendants, having the right of way, had the right to as-
sume, until put on notice to the contrary, that the pedestrian would obey the law and 
yield the right of way”). 
 6. Martin v. Amusements of Am., Inc., 38 N.C. App. 130, 136, 247 S.E.2d 639, 644 
(1978) (citations omitted). 
 7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343B cmt. b (1965). 
 8. Cobb v. Town of Blowing Rock, 713 S.E.2d 732, 734, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 
1398, at *3 (2011), rev’d per curiam for reasons stated in the dissent, No. 479PA10 (Jan. 
27, 2012). 
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failing to maintain barriers to keep the public from the stream.9  On ap-
peal, the minor argued that the jury should have been instructed as fol-
lows: 
The law requires every landowner to use ordinary care to keep the pre-
mises in a reasonably safe condition for lawful visitors who use them in a 
reasonable and ordinary manner.  What constitutes a reasonably safe con-
dition of land depends upon the uses to which the owner invites the guests to 
make of the premises, and the uses which the owner should anticipate its 
guests will make of the premises.  It also depends upon the known or reason-
ably foreseeable characteristics of the users of the premises.  A landowner 
owes a higher level of care to a child who is unable to appreciate a potential 
of danger.  In this context, ordinary care means that degree of care which 
a reasonable and prudent person or entity would use under the same or 
similar circumstances to protect a child of the same or similar attributes as 
the plaintiff from injury.10 
The majority of the panel of the Court of Appeals ruled for the mi-
nor, and concluded that “the jury must be instructed to consider the 
known or reasonably foreseeable characteristics of lawful visitors when 
determining whether the defendant has discharged its duty to exercise 
reasonable care in maintaining its property for the protection of the 
plaintiff.”11 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed per curiam, “For the reasons 
stated in the dissenting opinion.”12  The dissenting judge at the Court of 
Appeals opined that there was no error in the jury instructions given.13  
The thrust of the dissent appears to be that the landowner’s duty is de-
termined by the characteristics of visitors to the property,14 including the 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 735–36, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1398, at *8–9 (additions to the pattern jury 
instructions are indicated by italics). 
 11. Id. at 739, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1398, at *22 (ordering a new trial). 
 12. Cobb v. Town of Blowing Rock, No. 479PA10 (Jan. 27, 2012) (per curiam). 
 13. Cobb, 713 S.E.2d at 740, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1398, at *25 (Stroud, J., dissent-
ing). 
 14. Id. at 740, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1398, at *26–27 (“[A] jury makes the determi-
nation of the standard of care required by a reasonable landowner by considering . . . 
even the foreseeable characteristics of lawful visitors.”); id. at 741, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 
1398, at *28 (“[T]he ‘reasonably foreseeable characteristics’ of lawful visitors are an im-
portant consideration in the jury’s determination of reasonableness of a landowner’s ac-
tions in maintaining a property in safe condition.”); id. at 742, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 
1398, at *32 (“[T]he characteristics of persons who might foreseeably be injured by a 
negligent act are . . . relevant to the jury’s determination of what would constitute ‘rea-
sonable care.’”). 
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age of the visitors to the property, but that the jury should not be given a 
specific instruction about this point.  The dissenting Judge wrote: 
[I]t [the defendant] owed its lawful visitors the duty to exercise reasona-
ble care in the maintenance of the premises and to warn visitors of hid-
den or concealed dangers of which it was aware or should have been 
aware.  Certainly these visitors might include both adults and children of 
all ages, but it is the jury’s role to determine if the defendant’s actions or 
omissions were consistent with the duty of “reasonable care” owed to all 
lawful visitors.15 
The case is somewhat puzzling because the majority of the panel of 
the Court of Appeals simply held that “the jury must be instructed to 
consider the known or reasonably foreseeable characteristics of lawful 
visitors when determining whether the defendant has discharged its duty 
to exercise reasonable care in maintaining its property for the protection 
of the plaintiff.”16  The majority opinion did not hold that the landown-
er’s duty depends on the particular plaintiff’s age.  The dissenting judge 
(whose opinion was adopted by the Supreme Court) does not seem to 
disagree with this substantive statement of law in the jury instructions 
set forth by the majority opinion.17  Instead, the dissent states that the 
instruction mandated by the majority opinion 
would create a “higher standard of care” in any case where a plaintiff has 
some sort of “characteristic” which may decrease that person’s ability to 
look out for her own safety, be it her youth, physical disability, mental 
disability, or any other characteristic which might be “reasonably fore-
seeable.”18 
Because the instruction at issue addresses only the characteristics of 
visitors to the property, and not the characteristics of the particular 
plaintiff,19 it is not clear how the proposed instruction would elevate the 
defendant’s duty based on the age of the particular plaintiff.  It is also not 
clear how the proposed instruction would greatly burden landowners,20 
 
 15. Id. at 747, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1398, at *53. 
 16. Id. 739, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1398, at *22 (majority opinion). 
 17. See supra quotes accompanying note 14. 
 18. Id. at 740, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1398, at *26 (Stroud, J., dissenting). 
 19. Although the dissent states that “the majority opinion adopts the broad language 
of the ‘reasonably foreseeable characteristics’ of the lawful visitor,” id. at 746, 2011 N.C. 
App. LEXIS 1398, at *49, the instruction at issue refers to “lawful visitors,” and does not 
refer to “the lawful visitor,” nor does it otherwise refer to the characteristics of the partic-
ular plaintiff in the lawsuit.  See id. at 735–36, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1398, at *8–9 (ma-
jority opinion). 
 20. The dissent expressed concern that, “the practical result of a ‘characteristic’-based 
jury instruction on the standard of care would be to require landowners to ‘babyproof’ 
7
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as it is a correct statement of the law.21  Other portions of the dissent 
seem to express concern that even if the majority’s instruction were giv-
en, it would place an “improper emphasis” on the plaintiff’s age.22  Thus 
the opinion could be interpreted to disagree with the majority on the is-
sue of jury instructions, rather than on a substantive point of law. 
It bears noting that the Court of Appeals panel unanimously re-
jected the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant owed a “higher level of 
care” to a minor.23  Portions of the majority opinion correctly describe 
North Carolina law in this area, for instance, “‘Reasonably safe condi-
tions’ in a preschool would be different from those in a factory, bar, or 
other premises where youthful visitors would not reasonably be foresee-
able.”24  Further, “to the extent children-licensees were owed the duty of 
reasonable care before Nelson [v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615, 507 S.E.2d 
882 (1998)] by virtue of their age, they are now owed that standard by 
virtue of being a lawful visitor.”25 
It also bears noting that the plaintiff requested an instruction stat-
ing, “A warning is adequate when, by placement, size and content, it 
would bring the existence of the dangerous condition to the attention of 
 
every inch of potentially dangerous natural features of land.”  Id. at 746, 2011 N.C. App. 
LEXIS 1398, at *48 (Stroud, J., dissenting).  The opinions address at length the signific-
ance of a natural condition, as opposed to a manmade condition.  The ultimate conclu-
sion was that for persons lawfully upon the property, minors and adults alike, the defen-
dant’s duty is not limited to manmade conditions.  Whether the defective condition is 
natural, however, may be relevant in determining whether the defendant was negligent.  
See id. at 745, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1398, at *42 (Stroud, J., dissenting) (“Therefore, 
the cases cited by defendant in support of its argument that it owes no duty to take addi-
tional precautions in anticipation of minor lawful visitors as to natural conditions of the 
land are inapplicable.”); id. at 739, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1398, at *21–22 (majority 
opinion) (“Whether a natural condition is involved may inform the jury’s determination 
of what is reasonable under the circumstances, but it provides no basis for forcing the 
jury to ignore the known or foreseeable characteristics of lawful visitors.”). 
 21. As noted supra note 14, the dissenting Judge does not appear to disagree with the 
substantive statement of law in the majority’s proposed jury instruction.  The instruc-
tions given by the trial judge did not inform the jury that the defendant’s duty should be 
determined, in part, by the characteristics of persons on the land.  See id. at 735–36, 
2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1398, at *8–9.  The drafters of the pattern jury instructions might 
want to revisit the pattern jury instructions in light of this opinion. 
 22. Id. at 740, 2011 N.C. App. Lexis 1398, at *26 (instruction “would give improper 
emphasis to the age of the plaintiff”); id. at 742, 2011 N.C. App. Lexis 1398, at *32 
(“[I]ncluding a specific instruction as to the ‘reasonably foreseeable characteristics’ of the 
lawful visitor in this case places double emphasis on plaintiff Chelsea’s age.”). 
 23. Id. 736, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1398, at *10. 
 24. Id. at 738, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1398, at *17. 
 25. Id. at 737, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1398, at *13. 
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a reasonably prudent child of the same or similar attributes as the plain-
tiff.”26  The opinions in the case, however, do not expressly address the 
issue of instructing the jury on warning signs.  In view of the ultimate 
ruling in the case regarding the defendant’s duty to maintain its proper-
ty, a fair implication is that the landowner’s duty to place warnings is 
dependent on the characteristics (e.g., age) of visitors to its property, but 
is not dependent on the age of the particular plaintiff at issue in the liti-
gation.  A prior decision from the North Carolina Supreme Court ad-
dressed a similar issue, stating, “A warning sufficient to alert an adult 
professional dancer to the condition of a dance floor may not be suffi-
cient to absolve the proprietor from liability to a 13 year old pupil for a 
fall thereon.”27  Whether this issue warrants a specific instruction is un-
clear. 
These principles apply to minors who are lawfully on the defen-
dant’s property, and who thus are not trespassers.  “[W]ith respect to 
trespassers, a landowner need only refrain from the willful or wanton in-
fliction of injury.”28  A minor who is a trespasser can still recover, how-
ever, in the absence of willful or wanton conduct by the defendant, if she 
can satisfy the attractive nuisance doctrine, discussed below. 
 i. Attractive Nuisance Doctrine 
In a premises liability case, a minor who is a trespasser can receive 
the benefit of the attractive nuisance doctrine.  The “attractive nuisance” 
doctrine allows a minor to recover for negligence even if the minor is a 
trespasser, without proof of willful and wanton conduct.  For actions 
arising on or after October 1, 2011, this issue is now governed by sta-
tute.29  The statute, however, largely codifies the existing common law; 
therefore, the older common law cases should still be persuasive.  One 
court explained the doctrine as follows: 
  At the heart of land owner liability under the doctrine of attractive 
nuisance is the duty to protect children of tender years who ‘because of 
their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk.’  ‘The attrac-
 
 26. Id. at 736, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1398, at *10. 
 27. Hedrick v. Tigniere, 267 N.C. 62, 66, 147 S.E.2d 550, 553 (1966) (“The suffi-
ciency of a warning to the invitee of the existence of a condition upon the premises will 
depend, in part, upon whether the proprietor should know that the invitee, by reason of 
youth, old age or disability, is incapable of understanding the danger and of taking pre-
cautions for his or her own safety under such conditions.”). 
 28. Nelson v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615, 618, 507 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1998) (citing Bell 
v. Page, 271 N.C. 396, 400, 156 S.E.2d 711, 714–15 (1967)). 
 29. 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 283 § 3.2 (applying “to causes of actions arising on or af-
ter” October 1, 2011). 
9
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tive nuisance doctrine is designed to protect ‘small children’ or ‘children 
of tender age.’30 
The effect of this doctrine is to render the minor an invitee (or law-
ful occupant) on the property, such that the landowner owes a duty of 
reasonable care toward the minor.31  The statute enacted in 2011 that 
codifies the attractive nuisance doctrine states: 
  A possessor may be subject to liability for bodily injury or death to a 
child trespasser resulting from an artificial condition on the land if all of 
the following apply: 
a.  The possessor knew or had reason to know that children were likely 
to trespass at the location of the condition. 
b.  The condition is one the possessor knew or reasonably should have 
known involved an unreasonable risk of serious bodily injury or death to 
such children. 
c.  The injured child did not discover the condition or realize the risk 
involved in the condition or in coming within the area made dangerous 
by it.  
d.  The utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the 
burden of eliminating the danger were slight as compared with the risk 
to the child involved. 
e.  The possessor failed to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the dan-
ger or otherwise protect the injured child.32 
This statute is substantially similar to the case law applicable prior 
to this enactment.  These criteria were enunciated in Broadway v. Blythe 
Industries, Inc.33  The only appreciable difference is that the third element 
 
 30. Coleman v. Rudisill, 131 N.C. App. 530, 533, 508 S.E.2d 297, 300 (1998) (cita-
tions omitted). 
 31. Cobb, 713 S.E.2d at 737, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1398, at *13.  The court ex-
plained: 
After Nelson, all lawful visitors are entitled to the higher of the two previous 
standards [i.e., that of an invitee].  In other words, to the extent children-
licensees were owed the duty of reasonable care before Nelson by virtue of their 
age, they are now owed that standard by virtue of being a lawful visitor. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 38B-3 (2011). 
 33. Broadway v. Blythe Indus., Inc., 313 N.C. 150, 154, 326 S.E.2d 266, 269 (1985) 
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965)); accord Leonard v. Lowe’s 
Home Ctrs., Inc., 131 N.C. App. 304, 308–09, 506 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1998) (stating that 
where child used a steep path to ride bikes and collided with a car, defendant’s actions in 
mowing and bush-hogging the property were reasonable steps in maintaining the land 
rather than the negligent maintenance of an artificial condition). 
10
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as stated in Broadway was that “the children because of their youth do not 
discover the condition or realize the risk . . . .”34 
This doctrine applies to a “child trespasser,” which is defined as “[a] 
trespasser who is less than 14 years of age or who has the level of mental 
development found in a person less than 14 years of age.”35  This predo-
minately codifies the common law doctrine, which held that the doctrine 
ordinarily does not apply to minors fourteen and older.36  A few cases 
address whether a minor fourteen or older has a “level of mental devel-
opment” diminished sufficiently to invoke the doctrine.  In one case, a 
fourteen-year-old boy failed the first grade and had grades in the C 
range, and a psychiatrist testified that the minor’s mental development 
was that of a thirteen-year-old.37  On the other hand, his math and 
science grades were a B, and the expert testimony was shaky.38  The 
court held that the attractive nuisance doctrine did not apply due to the 
minor’s age, and that the minor did not establish that he lacked suffi-
cient mental development.39  In another case, a doctor testified that a fif-
teen-year-old boy “hasn’t the mind of a boy over 8 or 10 years old.”40  
The court held that this was sufficient to invoke the doctrine.41 
The doctrine also does not apply to “common dangers.”  “In the 
context of attractive nuisance cases, it is incumbent upon parents to 
warn and guard their children against ‘common dangers, existing in the 
order of nature’ and where they fail to do so, ‘they should not expect to 
hold others responsible for their own want of care.’”42 
 
 34. Broadway, 313 N.C. at 154, 326 S.E.2d at 269 (emphasis added). 
 35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 38B-4(1). 
 36. Dean v. Wilson Constr. Co., 251 N.C. 581, 588, 111 S.E.2d 827, 832–33 (1960) 
(stating attractive nuisance doctrine “cannot be applied to a child of the age of fourteen 
or over, at least in the absence of some showing of a lack of the mental development 
which is ordinarily found in children of that age or of a very exceptional state of facts” 
(citations omitted)). 
 37. Hashtani v. Duke Power Co., 578 F.2d 542, 545 (4th Cir. 1978). 
 38. Id. (noting that the expert met with the minor for only twenty minutes approx-
imately eight years after the incident). 
 39. Id. at 545–46 (determining that a boy who was fourteen years and two months 
old who climbed an electrical tower and sustained an injury was a trespasser). 
 40. Graham v. Sandhill Power Co., 189 N.C. 381, 385, 127 S.E. 429, 431 (1925). 
 41. Id. (noting that a minor playing on a sawdust pile contacted live wire, and that 
the doctor testified that the minor “inherited insanity”); see also Soledad v. Lara, 762 
S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that where a minor was fourteen to six-
teen, was in special education class, was lacking in mental development, was a slow 
learner, and saw a psychologist regularly, the doctrine could apply to him). 
 42. Vares v. Vares, 154 N.C. App. 83, 89, 571 S.E.2d 612, 616 (2002) (citations 
omitted). 
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Many cases have rejected application of the attractive nuisance doc-
trine as a matter of law.  For example, where an eleven-year-old boy 
pulled bricks from the bottom of a chimney at a burned farmhouse, and 
the chimney collapsed upon him, he was deemed “capable of appreciat-
ing the danger” and his claim failed.43  Where a child played on a dump-
ster which fell on her, her claim was rejected because the dumpster did 
not pose an unreasonable risk.44  In one case, a seven-year-old boy 
climbed into the rafters of an abandoned house and was injured, and the 
North Carolina Supreme Court held that the attractive nuisance doctrine 
did not apply because the child’s action was too remote to be foreseen.45  
Numerous other cases reject the doctrine where the children could fore-
see the risk, the object was not dangerous, or the injury was not foresee-
able.46 
 
 43. Griffin v. Woodard, 126 N.C. App. 649, 654, 486 S.E.2d 240, 243 (1997). 
 44. Feagin v. Staton, 72 N.C. App. 678, 680–81, 325 S.E.2d 316, 318 (1985) (em-
phasizing that evidence did not show that dumpster was a dangerous instrumentality or 
created an unreasonable risk, and that evidence did not show that a person of ordinary 
prudence would have foreseen that injury was likely to result). The court also noted that 
it was not customary to secure a dumpster to ground.  Id. at 681, 325 S.E.2d at 318. 
 45. Prather v. Union Nat’l Bank, 211 N.C. 98, 98, 189 S.E.2d 182, 183 (1937). 
 46. See Walker v. Sprinkle, 267 N.C. 626, 629, 148 S.E.2d 631, 633 (1966) (stating 
where three-year-old fell into a pit under an outhouse, “We cannot hold that the ordinary 
outhouse or privy is an attractive nuisance or an inherently dangerous instrumentality”); 
Roberson v. Kinston, 261 N.C. 135, 138, 134 S.E.2d 193, 195–96 (1964).  In Roberson, 
the court explained: 
The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, 
artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artifi-
cial feature other than the mere water and its location. . . . If it should be con-
ceded that a branch or creek is inherently dangerous to children of tender 
years, it must be conceded that such streams cannot be easily guarded and ren-
dered safe. 
Id.  (citations omitted)); see also Herring v. Humphrey, 254 N.C. 741, 746, 119 S.E.2d 
913, 917 (1961).  The Herring court concluded: 
[T]he evidence was insufficient to support a finding that defendant’s bulldozer 
was parked at such place and in such manner that defendant in the exercise of 
due care should have foreseen that a trespassing child would likely get on the 
bulldozer and set it in motion. . . . such an occurrence would seem unlikely, 
improbable and remote. 
Id. (emphasis added)); see also Dean v. Wilson Constr. Co., 251 N.C. 581, 586–87, 111 
S.E.2d 827, 831 (1960) (holding where fourteen-year-old boy operated a crane and 
struck high-tension transmission and was electrocuted, he was conscious of the danger, 
and deliberately risked the consequences of his wrongful conduct). 
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An example of an attractive nuisance was presented in Broadway.47  
In this case, a common carrier (Lisk) delivered a large concrete storm 
drainage pipe to a construction site across the street from the public 
housing project.48  A woman who lived across the street from the con-
struction site asked Lisk’s employees to secure the pipes for the safety of 
children who played in that area.49  A five-year-old boy was playing 
around the pipes and was crushed when the pipe rolled on him.50  The 
Court held that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment, 
stating:  
[The] evidence tends to show, inter alia, that Lisk placed the pipes on an 
incline within the construction site some five to fifteen feet from the 
edge of a street on which, on the other side, stands a housing project; 
that Lisk was warned that there were children nearby and that they 
would likely play on the pipes; that unsecured pipes of the size and 
weight left at the site by Lisk involved an unreasonable risk of death or 
serious bodily harm to children who might play on them; that children 
would not realize the risk of becoming hurt by playing on the pipes; that 
the pipes could easily have been secured from playing children; and that 
Lisk failed to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or other-
wise to protect the children.  We hold that this forecast of the evidence 
discloses genuine issues of material facts which require resolution by a 
jury.51 
In another case, a four-year-old child fell into a well on the defen-
dant’s property. 52  The court held that the child’s estate could recover 
because the landowner knew that children played around the well.53 
b. Minor’s Claims Against Caregivers and Other Persons 
Those persons entrusted with the care of minors have a duty to pro-
tect the minor, and can be held liable for a breach of that duty.54  Thus, 
 
 47. Broadway v. Blythe Indus., Inc., 313 N.C. 150, 155–56, 326 S.E.2d 266, 270 
(1985). 
 48. Id. at 151, 326 S.E.2d at 268. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 156, 326 S.E.2d at 271–72 (applying attractive nuisance doctrine to non-
possessors of land if they create the dangerous condition on behalf of the possessor). 
 52. Brannon v. Sprinkle, 207 N.C. 398, 400, 177 S.E.2d 114, 115 (1934) (noting that 
the presence of a well was actionable where a four-year-old child drowned and the owner 
knew that children played around the well). 
 53. Id. at 406, 177 S.E. at 119. 
 54. See, e.g., Wallace v. Der-Ohanian, 18 Cal. Rptr. 892, 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962) 
(“The measure of precaution which must be taken by one having a child in his care, who 
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teachers and day care workers can be held liable for injuries to the mi-
nor.  As the Court of Appeals of North Carolina explained, 
  While North Carolina case law does not specifically address the duty 
owed by day care providers to the children under their supervision, our 
courts have held that the appropriate standard of care for a school teach-
er is that of a person of ordinary prudence under like circumstances.  By 
analogy, we believe that day care providers have a duty to abide by that 
standard of care which a person of ordinary prudence, charged with his 
duties, would exercise under the same circumstances.  The amount of 
care due a student increases with the student’s immaturity, inexperience, 
and relevant physical limitations. Day care providers, however, cannot 
be expected to “anticipate the myriad of unexpected acts which occur 
daily in and about schools, and are not insurers of the safety of the child-
ren in their care.  The foreseeability of harm to pupils in the class or at 
the school is the test of the extent of the day care provider’s duty to safe-
guard her pupils from dangerous acts of fellow pupils.55 
In this case, the owners of the daycare were aware that several 
three-year-old boys had a history of pushing each other, knew of the 
danger created by this, and did not contact the parents of the boys or 
take any actions other than reprimanding the boys.56  The boys eventual-
ly pushed another three-year-old boy and fractured his leg.57  The court 
held that whether the owners of the facility violated their standard of 
care created an issue of fact for the jury.58  On the other hand, a teacher 
was not liable for failing to safeguard a student inadvertently injured 
where students had thrown an eraser and oranges, and would “sword 
fight” with their pencils.59  Persons holding a pool party have a duty to 
 
stands in no relation to the child except that he has undertaken to care for it, is that care 
which a prudent person would exercise under like circumstances.” (citation omitted) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)).  For a discussion of parental immunity and the doc-
trine of in loco parentis, see infra Part I.A.2.c. 
 55. Pruitt v. Powers, 128 N.C. App. 585, 590–91, 495 S.E.2d 743, 747 (1998) (cita-
tions omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 56. Id. at 591, 495 S.E.2d at 747. 
 57. Id. at 587, 495 S.E.2d at 745. 
 58. Id. at 591, 495 S.E.2d at 748.  The court noted that the finding of negligence was 
only against the owners of the facility, and that the teacher in the classroom was not neg-
ligent.  Id. at 588, 495 S.E.2d at 746. 
 59. James v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 60 N.C. App. 642, 648–49, 300 
S.E.2d 21, 25 (1983) (“Elementary school children, while certainly capable of harming 
one another, cannot be expected to be model citizens at all times, and the mild exuber-
ance demonstrated by throwing oranges or portions of oranges at one another is not an 
example of assaultive or dangerous conduct.”). 
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exercise “reasonable care supervising children lawfully using the pool at 
their invitation.”60 
The duty toward younger children is generally greater than it is for 
older children.61  Cases generally recognize that children react to situa-
tions differently, and the law must accommodate a child’s perspective.62 
The Department of Social Services (DSS) can also be liable for fail-
ing to follow statutes which impose duties on the DSS to protect child-
ren.  In Coleman v. Cooper,63 two children were murdered by their father, 
and their estates brought wrongful death actions against an employee of 
the DSS, alleging that she failed to adequately protect the minors.64  The 
court noted that section 7A-544 of the North Carolina General Statutes 
requires the DSS to investigate a report of abuse and to decide whether 
the child should be removed, and authorizes the DSS to file a complaint 
and to take temporary custody of the child.65  The court stated:  
[I]t appears that one of its specific purposes is the protection of minors 
from harm.  Plaintiff’s intestates are within the class intended to be pro-
tected by N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-544 and the harm resulting from Mr. Cole-
 
 60. Royal v. Armstrong, 136 N.C. App. 465, 470, 524 S.E.2d 600, 603 (2000) (not-
ing that, in an action for the drowning of an eight-year-old boy at a pool party, the facts 
showed that the hosts exercised reasonable care in supervising the children, and were 
not negligent in delegating supervision to other adults).  The court explained that “such 
adult hosts or supervisors have a duty to the children to exercise a standard of care that a 
person of ordinary prudence, charged with similar duties, would exercise under similar 
circumstances.”  Id. 471, 524 S.E.2d at 604. 
 61. Pruitt, 128 N.C. App. at 591, 495 S.E.2d at 746 (citing Fowler v. Seaton, 394 
P.2d 697 (Cal. 1964) (noting that preschool nurseries are primarily intended to provide 
supervision of very young children, and should therefore provide a higher degree of care 
than schools); see also Payne v. N.C. Dep’t of Human Res., 95 N.C. App. 309, 314, 382 
S.E.2d 449, 452 (1989) (“[T]he amount of care due a student increases with the student’s 
immaturity, inexperience, and relevant physical limitations”). 
 62. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). The Court stated: 
It is beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to submit to police 
questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave.  
Seeing no reason for police officers or courts to blind themselves to that com-
monsense reality, we hold that a child’s age properly informs the Miranda cus-
tody analysis. 
Id. at 2398–99. 
 63. Coleman v. Cooper, 89 N.C. App. 188, 366 S.E.2d 2 (1988).  Coleman was later 
overturned on procedural, and not substantive, grounds.  Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 
107, 489 S.E.2d 880, 886 (1997) (showing that prior cases—including Coleman—
indicated that claims against a county are to be filed with the Industrial Commission un-
der Tort Claims Act are overruled). 
 64. Coleman, 89 N.C. App. at 189–90, 366 S.E.2d at 4. 
 65. Id. at 196–97, 366 S.E.2d at 7–8 (interpreting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-544 (1985)). 
15
Kirby: Minor's Personal Injury Actions and Settlements in North Carolina
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2012
KIRBY- FINAL 4/12/2012  9:06 AM 
308 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:293 
man’s actions is the specific type of harm which the statute was intended 
to prevent.  We hold that a violation of this statute can give rise to an ac-
tion for negligence.66 
The court noted that the DSS employee was aware that the father 
had physically and sexually abused the minors, and had abused the 
mother.67  The mother told the DSS employee that she was concerned 
about the reaction of the father when he learned about the investigation 
into allegations of his abuse of the children.68  Other than the act of the 
DSS employee in instructing the school that the father was not to be al-
lowed access to the children, “the record is silent with regard to what de-
termination, if any, was made concerning the risk of harm to plaintiff’s 
intestates or whether they should have been provided any type of protec-
tive services.”69  The court thus held that the minors’ claims should have 
survived a motion for summary judgment.70 
2.  Defenses to Minor’s Claim 
There are a few defenses that operate differently when the claimant 
is a minor. 
a.  Contributory Negligence 
Minors are held to a different standard than adults when determin-
ing whether they are contributorily negligent.  The principle has been 
stated as follows: 
 
 66. Id. at 197, 366 S.E.2d at 8. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.  A suit against the DSS and its employee raises issues of governmental and 
perhaps public official immunity, as well as the “public duty doctrine.”  In Coleman, the 
defendants raised governmental immunity, which the court rejected on the basis that the 
county purchased insurance and thereby waived its immunity.  Id. at 192, 366 S.E.2d at 
6.  The immunity doctrines involved in these claims are beyond the scope of this Article.  
See also Smith v. Jackson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 168 N.C. App. 452, 465, 608 S.E.2d 399, 
409 (2005) (indicating that where a minor sued a school based on harm inflicted by a 
teacher, the school’s cross-claim against a resource officer for contribution and indemni-
fication survives a motion to dismiss based on the public duty doctrine, where the cross-
claim alleged that the officer had a “special duty to protect [the minor] from criminal 
acts . . . [t]hese allegations allege a special duty to the school and principal apart from a 
general law enforcement obligation”); Mullis v. Sechrest, 347 N.C. 548, 555, 495 S.E.2d 
721, 725 (1998) (holding that when a minor sustaining injury in shop class sued the 
teacher in his official capacity the teacher shared the school board’s immunity). 
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[C]ontributory negligence on the part of the minor is to be measured by 
his age and his ability to discern and appreciate the circumstances of 
danger.  He is not chargeable with the same degree of care as an expe-
rienced adult, but is only required to exercise such prudence as one of 
his years may be expected to possess. . . . [T]he standard of care thus va-
ries with the age, capacity and experience of the child.71 
“The courts recognize that the love of play is instinctive in child-
hood, and that children may be expected to act as children and upon 
childish impulses.”72  In addressing the contributory negligence of a mi-
nor, the cases recognize three categories of minors, depending on their 
age. 
The first category is for minors under seven-years-old (i.e., six-
years-old and younger).  “As a matter of law, a child under seven years of 
age is incapable of negligence.”73  The second category begins at age sev-
en and ends when the minor becomes fourteen.  The rule for minors 
from seven until fourteen has been stated as follows:  
Between the ages of 7 and 14, a minor is presumed to be incapable of 
contributory negligence.  This presumption, however, may be overcome 
by evidence that the child did not use the care which a child of its age, 
capacity, discretion, knowledge, and experience would ordinarily have 
exercised under the same or similar circumstances.  A child must exer-
cise care and prudence equal to his capacity.  If it fails to exercise such 
care and the failure is one of the proximate causes of the injuries in suit, 
the child cannot recover.74 
Some cases seem to set forth an objective standard—i.e., the minor 
in this age category is required to exercise that degree of care that other 
minors of a similar age and experience would exercise.75  Other cases, 
 
 71. Fry v. S. Pub. Util. Co., 183 N.C. 281, 291, 111 S.E. 354, 360 (1922) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 72. Hollingsworth v. Burns, 210 N.C. 40, 43, 185 S.E. 476, 478 (1936) (holding that 
when a twelve-year-old boy was skating in the street and was struck by a car, “[t]he law 
wisely takes into consideration the fact that a small boy will have only the understanding 
and the thought of a child, not that of a man”). 
 73. State v. Harrington, 260 N.C. 663, 666, 133 S.E.2d 452, 455 (1963); accord Allen 
v. Equity & Investors Mgmt. Corp., 56 N.C. App. 706, 709, 289 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1982) 
(“An infant under 7 years of age is conclusively presumed to be incapable of contributory 
negligence.” (citation omitted)). 
 74. Wooten v. Cagle, 268 N.C. 366, 371–72, 150 S.E.2d 738, 742 (1966) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 75. Watson v. Stallings, 270 N.C. 187, 154 S.E.2d 308 (1967) (holding that contri-
butory negligence of eleven-year-old minor “was to be determined on the basis of wheth-
er on this occasion he exercised the degree of care a reasonably prudent boy of his age, 
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however, seem to apply a subjective standard, and hold that whether the 
child is negligent depends on the minor-plaintiff’s capacity.76  Except as 
noted in the next paragraph, the practical effect of this “presumption” is 
not clear, as the ultimate rule seems to be that such a minor is held to a 
standard commensurate with his age and experience. 
A minor in this age category cannot be held contributorily negligent 
as a matter of law; thus this issue (when supported by the facts) must be 
decided by the jury.  “Under our decisions, a person between the ages of 
seven and fourteen may not be held guilty of contributory negligence as 
a matter of law.  ‘Whether he (is) capable of contributory negligence 
presents an issue for a jury, because there is a rebuttable presumption 
that he (is) incapable.’”77 
The third category starts at fourteen and ends when the minor 
reaches eighteen (i.e., while the minor is age fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, or 
seventeen).  The rule here is that the minor is again held to a standard of 
care commensurate with her age.  “An infant of the age of 14 years is 
presumed to have sufficient capacity to be sensible of danger and to have 
power to avoid it, and this presumption will stand until rebutted by clear 
proof of the absence of such discretion as is usual with infants of that 
age.”78  Again, the practical effect of this presumption is not clear, as the 
net effect of the rule is to simply hold the minor to a standard of care 
commensurate with her capacity to appreciate danger. 
A minor of fourteen years or older can be contributorily negligent 
as a matter of law.  Thus, where a fourteen-year-old girl who did not 
know the depth of the water, and who had been told not to dive into wa-
ter when she did not know its depth, dove into shallow water and broke 
her neck, she was negligent as a matter of law.79  A fourteen-year-old boy 
who jumped off a train moving at thirty miles per hour was similarly 
negligent as a matter of law.80  Other cases find that the issue creates a 
question of fact for the jury.  Thus, whether a fourteen-year-old boy was 
 
experience, capacity and knowledge should and would have exercised under the same or 
similar circumstances”). 
 76. Allen, 56 N.C. App. at 709, 289 S.E.2d at 625 (“Defendants may offer evidence at 
trial to . . . show Tara’s capacity to exercise care for her own safety.”). 
 77. Wooten, 268 N.C. at 372, 150 S.E.2d at 742 (citation omitted); accord Allen, 56 
N.C. App. at 709, 289 S.E.2d at 625. 
 78. Welch v. Jenkins, 271 N.C. 138, 144, 155 S.E.2d 763, 768 (1967) (holding that a 
fourteen-year-old is “presumptively chargeable with the same standard of care for his 
own safety as if he were an adult”). 
 79. Davies ex rel. Hardy v. Lewis, 133 N.C. App. 167, 170–71, 514 S.E.2d 742, 744 
(1999). 
 80. Baker v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 150 N.C. 562, 568, 64 S.E. 506, 509 (1909). 
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negligent in dismounting from a trampoline was held to create a jury is-
sue.81  And where a seventeen-year-old operated a crane so as to contact 
a power line, his contributory negligence also created a jury issue.82   
The origin of these rules is somewhat murky, but appears to be 
grounded in common law, criminal law, and marital laws:  
The responsibilities of infants are clearly defined by text-writers and 
courts.  At common law, fourteen was the age of discretion in males and 
twelve in females.  At fourteen an infant could choose a guardian and 
contract a valid marriage.  After seven, an infant may commit a felony, 
although there is a presumption in his favor which may, however, be re-
butted.  But after fourteen an infant is held to the same responsibility for 
crime as an adult.83 
The jury should be instructed on the applicable rule for the minor’s 
contributory negligence.84  Minor passengers in a motor vehicle general-
ly are not negligent as they do not control the operation of the vehicle.85 
 
 81. Bryant v. Adams, 116 N.C. App. 448, 472, 448 S.E.2d 832, 845 (1994) (holding 
that whether a fourteen year old was contributorily negligent for jumping off a trampo-
line creates jury issue; “[h]owever, if the instructions themselves were not adequate or if 
the plaintiff did not read the instructions but the jury determined that the plaintiff still 
exercised reasonable care, a plaintiff should not be found contributorily negligent.”); see 
Ford v. Nairn, 717 N.E.2d 525, 530 (Ill. App. 1999) (rejecting Bryant and other cases, on 
the basis that they applied a subjective standard and noting that “a reasonable 14 year old 
would appreciate the open and obvious danger of jumping on a trampoline, and we find 
no duty to warn on the part of either the Nairns or Jumpking”). 
 82. Bowen v. Constructors Equip. Rental Co., 283 N.C. 395, 411, 196 S.E.2d 789, 
800 (1973) (noting that a minor had been given only general warnings of danger of 
working near power lines and that he was directly under lines). 
 83. Brown v. S. Ry. Co., 195 N.C. 699, 702, 143 S.E. 536, 537 (1928) (“We find in 
the books many cases where children of various ages, from seven years upward, have 
been denied a recovery because of their own negligence.”); accord Baker, 150 N.C. at 
565, 64 S.E. at 508 (“Inasmuch as an infant, after 14, may select a guardian, contract 
marriage, is capable of harboring malice and of committing murder, it is no great imposi-
tion on him to hold him responsible for his own negligence.”); see also Walston v. 
Greene, 247 N.C. 693, 697, 102 S.E.2d 124, 127 (1958) (Rodman, J., dissenting) (“I dis-
sent because I am unable to agree with the conclusion reached by the majority that a 
child who has passed his sixth but has not reached his seventh birthday is so lacking in 
mental capacity and judgment that under no circumstances can he be held responsible 
for his conduct.”). 
 84. Hoots v. Beeson, 272 N.C. 644, 650, 159 S.E.2d 16, 21 (1968) (“We are of opi-
nion, and so decide, that, upon the trial of an issue relating to the alleged contributory 
negligence of a child between the ages of seven and fourteen, the rebuttable presumption 
that such child is incapable of contributory negligence is a substantial feature of the case, 
and that it is incumbent upon the trial judge to instruct the jury as to its significance.”). 
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One Court of Appeals case—that is currently being reviewed by the 
North Carolina Supreme Court—holds that the manufacturer of an alle-
gedly defective product cannot raise as a defense that a minor under the 
age of seven misused the product.86  While the manufacturer in a prod-
uct liability suit can raise as a defense the plaintiff’s misuse of the prod-
uct,87 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that this defense does 
not apply where the plaintiff is less than seven years old.88  In this case, 
the court ruled that, as a matter of law, a five year-old child’s claim 
against a car manufacturer was not barred by her misuse of the seatbelt.89  
The court wrote, “because Cheyenne was a child under seven years of 
age at the time of the alleged alteration or modification, Defendant is un-
able, as a matter of law, to prove the requisite element of foreseeability 
inherent in the proximate cause portion of its N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 de-
fense.”90 
There is no authority in North Carolina as to whether a minor’s 
claim can be barred by the doctrine of “assumption of the risk.”91  It 
should be noted that in North Carolina, this doctrine applies only where 
the parties have a contractual relationship.92 
 
 85. Price v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 274 N.C. 32, 43, 161 S.E.2d 590, 598 (1968) 
(noting that minor plaintiffs, age fifteen and twelve, “were passengers in the automobile 
driven by their mother, and had no control over the driving of the automobile”). 
 86. Stark v. Ford Motor Co., 204 N.C. App. 1, 13, 693 S.E.2d 253, 260 (2010), disc. 
review allowed, 365 N.C. 74, 705 S.E.2d 741 (2011) (holding that the father’s misuse of a 
seatbelt was not a valid defense in a suit against an automobile manufacturer for the inju-
ries of a minor under the age of seven because the father was not a “party” as required by 
statute). 
 87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-3 (2011). 
 88. Stark, 204 N.C. App. at 8, 693 S.E.2d at 258. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. In Howard v. Jackson, 120 N.C. App. 243, 461 S.E.2d 793 (1995), an eleven-year-
old minor entered a pool and drowned.  Her estate sued the homeowner and an adult 
who was at the pool.  Id. at 244, 461 S.E.2d at 795.  The court held that the homeowner 
would be liable only if he was willful or wanton.  Id. at 247, 461 S.E.2d at 796.  In its dis-
cussion, the court held that the defendant’s conduct was not willful or wanton, and also 
stated, “[t]he girl entered the swimming pool at her own risk and assumed the dangers of 
a pool with no ladder at the deep end, no underwater lighting, and no trained lifeguard,” 
and “[a]s a licensee who was old enough to know she was a poor swimmer, the decedent 
assumed the risk of jumping into a pool not equipped with certain safety devices.”  Id. at 
248, 461 S.E.2d at 797.  This case could be viewed as authority that a minor can assume 
the risk of injury, but that issue was not directly before the court. 
 92. Allred v. Capital Area Soccer League, Inc., 194 N.C. App. 280, 290, 669 S.E.2d 
777, 783 (2008) (“In North Carolina, the doctrine of assumption of risk has been gener-
ally limited to cases where there was a contractual relationship between the parties.”). 
20
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss2/3
KIRBY- FINAL 4/12/2012  9:06 AM 
2012] MINOR’S PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS  313 
The parent’s negligence does not bar the child’s claim against a 
third person.  “[T]he negligence of a parent, guardian, or other custodian 
of a child non sui juris in permitting the child to be exposed to danger 
cannot be imputed to the child . . . .”93  Similarly, a parent’s assumption 
of a risk does not bar the minor’s claim.94 
b.  Statute of Limitations 
The statute of limitations and statute of repose for a minor’s claim 
are tolled until the minor reaches the age of majority, at which time his 
statute of limitations begins to run.95 
If the guardian ad litem (GAL)96 has been appointed, the statute be-
gins to run.97  Where the minor does not have a general guardian or a 
GAL, however, the statute of limitations does not begin to run; his par-
ent’s assertion of a claim, without proper appointment as a GAL, will not 
commence the statute of limitations.98 
 
 93. Martin v. Amusements of Am., Inc., 38 N.C. App. 130, 137, 247 S.E.2d 639, 
644 (1978) (citing Davis v. R.R. Co., 136 N.C. 115, 48 S.E. 591 (1904)); accord Bottoms 
v. Seaboard & R.R., 114 N.C. 699, 708, 19 S.E. 730, 731 (1894) (stating that negligence 
of a parent is not “imputed to the child as to defeat an action, when brought in its own 
behalf”). 
 94. Coole v. Haskins, 135 P.2d 176, 178–79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943) (“[A]ssumption of 
risk by parents should not be held to preclude a recovery by a minor child on his own 
behalf.”). 
 95. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-17(a)(2009) (“A person entitled to commence an action who 
is under a disability at the time the cause of action accrued may bring his or her action 
within the time limited in this Subchapter, after the disability is removed . . . .”). 
 96. As noted infra notes 278–86 and accompanying text, the cases decided prior to 
the current Rules of Civil Procedure typically referred to the plaintiff’s representative in a 
court proceeding as the “next friend,” which is roughly the equivalent of a GAL.  For 
simplicity, this Article often refers to a next friend as a GAL. 
 97. Jefferys v. Tolin, 90 N.C. App. 233, 235, 368 S.E.2d 201, 202 (1988) (noting that 
if a GAL is appointed for a minor, the limitation period runs from the time of appoint-
ment).  The court also noted that the time for notifying an Estate of a claim under North 
Carolina’s intestacy statute is tolled by section 1-17 of North Carolina’s General Statutes.  
Id. 
 98. Simmons v. Justice, 87 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (noting that even 
though the caption was “Thomas Simmons, guardian for Omar Rhasheen Simmons,” and 
even though the complaint alleged that the father was the minor’s “biological father, legal 
custodian and guardian,” the father was not the general guardian and was not the GAL, 
and hence the statute of limitations did not expire); see also Genesco, Inc. v. Cone Mills 
Corp., 604 F.2d 281, 285 (4th Cir. 1979) (stating that where a minor’s mother 
represented the child as next friend in an action filed in West Virginia, pursuant to local 
procedures, which did not entail appointment by court, said action was not sufficient to 
21
Kirby: Minor's Personal Injury Actions and Settlements in North Carolina
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2012
KIRBY- FINAL 4/12/2012  9:06 AM 
314 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:293 
It should be noted, however, that the parent’s claim for medical ex-
penses is not tolled during the minority of the child.99  Further, even if 
the parent assigns his claim to the minor, the statute of limitations on 
the claim for medical expenses continues to run (and is not tolled simply 
because the claim is transferred to the minor).100 
Where a GAL has been appointed, the statute of limitations runs 
only as to those claims that the GAL has been appointed to pursue.101  
Thus, if the complaint clearly shows an intent to sue only one party, the 
appointment of a GAL will not commence the statute of limitations 
against other parties.102  Further, the GAL generally does not have a duty 
to pursue execution of the judgment, and thus the minor’s statute of li-
mitations for collecting the judgment does not run by the mere ap-
pointment of a GAL.103  
Once a GAL is appointed to prosecute the minor’s claim, the statute 
of limitations begins to run as to that claim, and it is not stopped even if 
the case is dismissed.104  Where the minor has a general guardian (and 
not merely a GAL), the minor’s claims are not tolled.105 
Even though the statute of limitations does not begin to run against 
the minor’s claims during his minority, the minor can nevertheless lose 
his rights where they are contingent on the claim of another person, 
whose statute of limitations is not tolled.  Thus, where a minor is a bene-
 
cause the statute of limitations to run on a claim against other persons under North Car-
olina law). 
 99. Vaughan v. Moore, 89 N.C. App. 566, 568, 366 S.E.2d 518, 520 (1988). 
 100. Id.; see also Ellington v. Bradford, 242 N.C. 159, 162, 86 S.E.2d 925, 927 (1955) 
(“Conceivably, the defendant might have a defense in an action brought by the parent 
which would not be available if the action is brought by the infant.”). 
 101. See Genesco, 604 F.2d at 286–87. 
 102. See id. (“Therefore, the filing of the complaint did not impose upon [the minor] a 
duty, sufficient to invoke the doctrine, to seek relief from all persons who might be liable 
to [the GAL] for the injuries sustained from the burning of her nightgown.”). 
 103. Teele v. Kerr, 261 N.C. 148, 152, 134 S.E.2d 126, 129 (1964) (“We hold that the 
authority of plaintiff’s next friend in the personal injury case ended on April 19, 1948 
[the date on which the minor obtained a judgment] . . . .”). 
 104. Rowland v. Beauchamp, 253 N.C. 231, 235, 116 S.E.2d 720, 723 (“The present 
action was instituted after plaintiff’s first action was nonsuited and more than three years 
after the appointment of plaintiff’s mother as his next friend [in the first action], and is 
barred by the three-year statute of limitations, unless it is saved by [the rule allowing for 
the re-filing of a suit within one year].”); accord Frederick v. Williams, 103 N.C. 189, 9 
S.E. 298 (1889) (“It is well settled that, when the statute of limitations begins to run 
nothing stops it.”). 
 105. Johnson v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 217 N.C. 139, 144, 7 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1940) (“[I]t 
is the duty of the guardian to bring suit, when necessary, upon the choses in action be-
longing to the ward’s estate.”). 
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ficiary of a wrongful death claim, the statute of limitations for the 
wrongful death claim runs against the administrator of the estate even 
though a beneficiary of the claim is a minor.106 
Malpractice actions have a different tolling rule.  Subject to the ca-
veat noted at the end of this subsection, a claim arising from “profession-
al services” (other than medical malpractice) can always be brought until 
the minor is nineteen years old.107  The claim can be brought after this 
time only if the claim complies with the general statute of limitations for 
such actions.108  Under a newly enacted statute for medical malprac-
tice,109 if the minor’s claim is otherwise barred by the statute of limita-
tions, it survives only if the minor is less than ten years old.110  Thus, af-
ter a minor attains ten years of age, he is subject to the same statute of 
limitations against a health care provider as an adult.111 
In a product liability case, there is a statute of repose that precludes 
an action from being filed more than twelve years after the “initial pur-
chase for use or consumption.”112  In a case addressing the prior statute 
of repose, which was six years, the Court of Appeals addressed the inter-
play between the statute of repose (now at section 1-46.1, formerly at 
section 1-50(6)) and the tolling provision of section 1-17 of the North 
Carolina General Statutes, stating:  
 
 106. Boomer v. Caraway, 116 N.C. App. 723, 726, 449 S.E.2d 215, 217–18 (1994) 
(“[I]f the statute of limitation has run against the administratrix, it has also run against 
the minor beneficiaries of a wrongful death settlement or recovery.”). 
 107. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-17(b)(2009) (“[A]n action on behalf of a minor for malprac-
tice arising out of the performance of or failure to perform professional services shall be 
commenced within the limitations of time specified in [section] 1-15(c), except that if 
those time limitations expire before the minor attains the full age of 19 years, the action 
may be brought before the minor attains the full age of 19 years.”). 
 108. Id. 
 109. 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 400 § 9 (applying to actions arising on and after October 1, 
2011).  The statute also contains provisions providing more time for abused and neg-
lected children, and children in the custody of the State.  See id. 
 110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-17(c) (“[A]n action on behalf of a minor for injuries alleged 
to have resulted from malpractice arising out of a health care provider’s performance of 
or failure to perform professional services shall be commenced within the limitations of 
time specified in [section] 1-15(c), except as follows: (1) If the time limitations specified 
in [section] 1-15(c) expire before the minor attains the full age of 10 years, the action 
may be brought any time before the minor attains the full age of 10 years.”). 
 111. Id. 
 112. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-46.1(1) (“No action for the recovery of damages for personal 
injury, death, or damage to property based upon or arising out of any alleged defect or 
any failure in relation to a product shall be brought more than 12 years after the date of 
initial purchase for use or consumption.”); 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 420 § 2 (affecting caus-
es arising on or after October 1, 2009). 
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If a product is over six years old at the time of injury, which would be 
the time that the claim accrues, then the statute of repose operates as a 
total bar on that claim.  However, if a claim accrues before the six year 
statute of repose has expired, [North Carolina General Statutes section] 
1-17 simply operates to extend the time period within which a minor or 
other with disability may bring suit under Chapter 99B [for a product 
liability action].  Therefore, claims accruing after six years will still be 
barred.113 
It is not clear if the rationale of this case, which holds that a minor’s 
claim for product liability is barred where the claim did not arise (or ac-
crue) within the statute of repose period, applies to the statute of repose 
for other claims, such as the statute of repose for improvements to real 
property.114 
c. Parent-Child Immunity 
As shown throughout this Article, as a general matter, the defen-
dant’s duties and potential liability are greater where the claimant is a 
minor.  For example, a motorist must sometimes anticipate that children 
will dart into his path; the manufacturer of a product might not be al-
lowed to assert a child’s misuse of the product; and a landowner might 
have to anticipate that children will trespass on his property.  In one area 
of tort law, however, our courts have determined that public policy con-
cerns should actually limit, rather than expand, the child’s claim and the 
tortfeasor’s liability.  A minor’s claim against his parents for negligence is 
generally barred by the parent-child immunity. 
The general rule in North Carolina is that an unemancipated minor child 
cannot maintain a tort action against his parent for personal injuries.  As 
the child’s immunity is considered the reciprocal of the parents’ immuni-
ty, a parent likewise cannot sue an unemancipated minor child for a per-
sonal tort.  The parent-child immunity doctrine does not apply to ac-
tions by an unemancipated minor with respect to contract and property 
rights, actions by an unemancipated minor involving willful and mali-
 
 113. Bryant v. Adams, 116 N.C. App. 448, 458, 448 S.E.2d 832, 837 (1994) (indicat-
ing that a minor’s claim is not time-barred, while a parent’s claim is time-barred unless 
the defendant is estopped from raising the defense); accord Robinson v. Bridges-
tone/Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 703 S.E.2d 883, 887–88, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 86, at 
*12–13 (2011) (affirming dismissal of claim because “[u]nder [section] 1-17, the minor 
plaintiffs had to show that the accident occurred less than six years after the tire was in-
itially sold”). 
 114. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(a)(5) (creating a six year statute of repose for actions 
arising from an unsafe or defective improvement to real property). 
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cious acts, or actions by an emancipated child for torts committed after 
emancipation.115 
This rule is designed to maintain family harmony.116  Even if the 
parent has liability insurance, the parent still retains immunity.117  By 
statute, however, a minor child can sue a parent for injuries arising from 
a motor vehicle accident.118 
The parent is not immune for his willful and malicious acts.119  The 
minor can also sue the parent for mishandling the minor’s property.120  
The parent has authority to control the child’s property for the purposes 
of supervising or disciplining the child.121 
Where the minor is injured by his parent, who is acting in the 
course and scope of his employment, the minor may sue the employer 
notwithstanding that the minor cannot sue his parent, who is the active 
tortfeasor.122 
 
 115. Coffey v. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. 717, 719, 381 S.E.2d 467, 469 (1989) (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 116. Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 579, 118 S.E. 12, 13 (1923) (“The peace of so-
ciety, and of the families composing society, and a sound public policy, designed to sub-
serve the repose of families and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a 
right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries 
suffered at the hands of the parent.”). 
 117. Skinner v. Whitley, 281 N.C. 476, 483–84, 189 S.E.2d 230, 234–35 (1972) 
(“[T]he existence of liability insurance is not a valid reason to abolish the immunity doc-
trine.”). 
 118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (“The relationship of parent and child shall not bar 
the right of action by a person or his estate against his parent or child for wrongful death, 
personal injury, or property damage arising out of operation of a motor vehicle owned or 
operated by the parent or child.”). 
 119. Doe v. Holt, 332 N.C. 90, 96, 418 S.E.2d 511, 514 (1992) (holding parent-child 
immunity does not apply to “injuries resulting from their parent’s willful and malicious 
acts”). 
 120. Small, 185 N.C. at 586, 118 S.E. at 16 (“The law will not permit a parent, or oth-
er, to take the property of a minor child, or any one else, hold it unlawfully, and thus 
profit by his own wrong.  This would be an unjust enrichment which the law cannot 
condone.” (citing Walker v. Crowder, 37 N.C. 478 (1843)). 
 121. See, e.g., Smith v. Simpson, 260 N.C. 601, 615, 133 S.E.2d 474, 485 (1963) 
(Sharp, J., dissenting) (“Because a father could forbid his son to drive the son’s car on a 
Saturday night, it does not follow that he could legally require the son to turn the car 
over to another member of the family for the evening.”). 
 122. Wright v. Wright, 229 N.C. 503, 507–08, 50 S.E.2d 540, 544 (1948) (“The per-
sonal immunity from suit because of the domestic relation does not extend to the em-
ployer so as to cancel his liability or defeat recovery on the principle respondeat superior 
when the injury was inflicted by the servant acting as such.”). 
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The parent-child immunity doctrine extends to stepparents, under 
the doctrine of in loco parentis. 123  The doctrine of in loco parentis is used 
in various contexts, and generally means that a person other than the 
true parent acquires the rights or obligations of a parent.124  Thus, “if a 
stepfather voluntarily takes the child into his home or under his care in 
such a manner that he places himself in loco parentis to the child, he as-
sumes a parental obligation to support the child which continues as long 
as the relationship lasts.”125  A person acquires this status if he “has as-
sumed the status and obligations of a parent without formal adoption.”126 
Where, however, persons who are not parents have custody over 
the minor, which is less permanent than that of a parent or stepparent, 
they do not have immunity.  Where the DSS had legal and physical cus-
tody of a child, and placed the child with his aunt for two months, dur-
ing which time the long-term placement plan was to reunite the child 
with his parents, the aunt did not stand in loco parentis with the child 
and was not entitled to immunity from suit from the minor.127  The court 
wrote: 
A person does not stand in loco parentis “from the mere placing of a child 
in the temporary care of other persons by a parent or guardian of such 
child.  This relationship is established only when the person with whom 
the child is placed intends to assume the status of a parent—by taking 
on the obligations incidental to the parental relationship, particularly 
that of support and maintenance.”128 
The court wrote that “defendants did not intend to assume the status of 
Ambra’s parents and did not stand in loco parentis to Ambra,” and con-
cluded that the aunt did not have immunity.129  Similarly, a day care 
worker does not stand in loco parentis with a child.130 
 
 123. Morgan v. Johnson, 24 N.C. App. 307, 309, 210 S.E.2d 503, 504–05 (1974); Ma-
bry v. Bowen, 14 N.C. App. 646, 647, 188 S.E.2d 651, 651–52 (1972). 
 124. See generally 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 9 (“Where one stands in loco pa-
rentis to another, the rights and liabilities arising out of that relation are, as the words 
imply, substantially the same as between parent and child . . . .”). 
 125. Moyer v. Moyer, 122 N.C. App. 723, 724, 471 S.E.2d 676, 678 (1996) (citing In 
re Dunston, 18 N.C. App. 647, 649, 197 S.E.2d 560, 562 (1973)). 
 126. Id. at 724, 471 S.E.2d at 676 (citation omitted). 
 127. Liner v. Brown, 117 N.C. App. 44, 50, 449 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1994). 
 128. Id. at 49, 449 S.E.2d at 907 (quoting State v. Pittard, 45 N.C. App. 701, 703, 263 
S.E.2d 809, 811 (1980)). 
 129. Id. at 50, 449 S.E.2d at 908. 
 130. Pittard, 45 N.C. App. at 703, 263 S.E.2d at 811 (holding day care worker who 
struck two-year-old child did not stand in loco parentis with child because the worker did 
not assume duty of  “support and maintenance,” and rejecting potential defense arising 
from teacher-student relationship because defendant was not a teacher); see also Gasper-
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The child’s parents are not immune to suit from each other.  Thus, 
even though the child cannot sue his mother for injuries negligently in-
flicted, the father can sue the mother to recover for the medical expenses 
incurred for treatment of such injuries.131  The parent’s immunity to a 
suit by his child also bars a tortfeasor who injures the child from assert-
ing a claim against a negligent parent for contribution where the parent 
would be immune from a direct suit by his child.132 
d.  Supervision by Parents or Other Adults 
In some contexts, the minor’s claim against the landowner or 
against another tortfeasor is barred where the minor is supervised by his 
parents, or another adult, at the time of the injury.  Thus, a landowner’s 
duty toward children “does not apply . . . where the minor child is being 
actively supervised by a parent who has full knowledge of the condition 
of the premises and appreciation of the danger thereby presented.”133  In 
this case, the father cut down a tree on the defendant’s property, and the 
tree fell on his six-year-old son’s head, causing serious injuries.134  The 
son sued the owner of the property where the incident occurred, alleging 
that he had a duty to protect him from inherently dangerous activity.135  
The court ruled that the property owner was entitled to summary judg-
ment: “Because the evidence establishes that Justice was injured while 
being actively supervised by his father, who was actually performing the 
activity that plaintiff asserts was inherently dangerous, the duty of care 
 
sohn v. Harnett Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 75 N.C. App. 23, 27, 330 S.E.2d 489, 493 (1985) 
(“[A] teacher has the right to administer corporal punishment to students so long as it is 
done without malice and to further an educational goal.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-390 
(“Except as restricted or prohibited by rules adopted by the local boards of education, 
principals, teachers, substitute teachers, voluntary teachers, and teacher assistants and 
student teachers in the public schools of this State may use reasonable force in the exer-
cise of lawful authority to restrain or correct pupils and maintain order.”). 
 131. Foster v. Foster, 264 N.C. 694, 698, 142 S.E.2d 838, 841 (1965). 
 132. Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., Inc., 316 N.C. 489, 489–90, 342 S.E.2d 882, 883 (1986) 
(holding that where a minor’s father operated a lawnmower and accidentally injured the 
minor, and the minor sued the manufacturer of the lawnmower, the manufacturer’s suit 
against the minor’s father for contribution was barred by parent-child immunity).  The 
court in Lee reasoned that “since a parent is not liable in a direct action for the plaintiff 
child’s injury, the parent cannot be held liable for any contribution for damages awarded 
against another as a result of such injury.”  Id. at 492, 342 S.E.2d at 884 (citing Watson v. 
Nichols, 270 N.C. 733, 735, 155 S.E.2d 154, 156 (1967). 
 133. Vares v. Vares, 154 N.C. App. 83, 88, 571 S.E.2d 612, 616 (2002). 
 134. Id. at 85, 571 S.E.2d at 614. 
 135. Id. at 86, 571 S.E.2d at 614. 
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to protect Justice belonged to [the parent] and not to [the landown-
er].”136 
Where the children are being supervised by an adult who fails to 
exercise ordinary care for the safety of the children, the chain of causa-
tion is broken and the landowner is not liable.  Thus, where five children 
were accompanied by a forty-two-year-old man and they entered the de-
fendant’s land and boarded a four-person boat without life preservers, 
and the boat was defective and capsized, the minors did not have a claim 
against the defendant. 137 
A variation of this principle was presented in Watson v. Nichols.138  
In this case, the defendant was mowing a lawn, and the minor plaintiff 
approached the lawn mower and was injured.139  The minor sued the op-
erator of the lawn mower, who in turn sued the minor’s parents and the 
minor’s ten-year-old brother, alleging that they were negligent in allow-
ing the minor (who was four years old) to approach the lawn mower.140  
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the claims against the-ten-
year old brother were properly dismissed, stating:  
Ordinarily when parents are present, in charge of their children of tender 
years, responsibility for their care and safety falls on the parents.  In this 
case the [minor plaintiff’s] parents were at home.  Both the plaintiff and 
[his ten year old brother] were under their control.  Any promise made 
by [the ten-year-old] to take care of [plaintiff] would not relieve the par-
ents of that responsibility.  The allegations of the cross action are insuffi-
cient to state a cause of action against [the ten-year-old].141 
 
 136. Id. at 89–90, 571 S.E.2d at 616.  Compare Freeze v. Congleton, 276 N.C. 178, 
171 S.E.2d 424 (1970) (holding claim barred where child collided with sliding glass door 
placed by defendant because child’s mother was present in the room with full knowledge 
of the danger), with Mitchell v. K.W.D.S., Inc., 26 N.C. App. 409, 216 S.E.2d 408 (1975) 
(holding claim not barred by minor’s grandmother’s presence on premises where six-
year-old plaintiff collided with a glass panel on defendant’s premises, but the record did 
not show that she was present in the portion of the building where the child was in-
jured). 
 137. The North Carolina Court of Appeals has held: 
When children are harmed by the intervening negligent acts of an adult, the 
harm is not proximately caused by the existence of risks not apparent to them 
due to their tender years, rather, the children are harmed by the negligent acts 
of the adult.  The intervening adult negligence is not a consequence of the neg-
ligent maintenance of a nuisance attractive to children. 
Coleman v. Rudisill, 131 N.C. App. 530, 533, 508 S.E.2d 297, 300 (1998). 
 138. Watson v. Nichols, 270 N.C. 733, 155 S.E.2d 154 (1967). 
 139. Id. at 734, 155 S.E.2d at 156. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 736, 155 S.E.2d at 157. 
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e.  Pre-injury Release 
North Carolina does not have any law addressing whether the child 
or his parents can release persons for injury to the minor which has not 
yet occurred (i.e., the “pre-injury release”).  Adults can generally waive 
their potential future claims against others.142  There are, however, in-
stances where these provisions are deemed invalid.143 
Cases from other jurisdictions are split on the issue of whether the 
parents can waive their child’s prospective claims.  Most jurisdictions 
hold that such an agreement is not binding because the parent lacks the 
capacity to release the minor’s claims.144  Some of these decisions note 
the need to discourage negligence and to protect minors.145  Other cases 
 
 142. See, e.g., Young v. Prancing Horse, Inc., 170 N.C. App. 699, 614 S.E.2d 607 
(2005) (deeming pre-injury release valid); Bertotti v. Charlotte Motor Speedway, Inc., 
893 F. Supp. 565, 568 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (“By signing the Release Agreements, plaintiffs 
expressly assumed the risk for injuries that occurred during the kart race even if those 
risks arose due to negligence on the part of the defendants.”). 
 143. See, e.g., Strawbridge v. Sugar Mountain Resort, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 425, 433 
(W.D.N.C. 2004) (“[A] party cannot protect himself by contracting against liability for 
negligence in the performance of a duty of public service, or where a public duty is 
owed, or public interest is involved, or where public interest requires the performance of 
a private duty.” (citation omitted)). 
 144. J.T. ex rel. Thode v. Monster Mountain, LLC, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1327–28 
(M.D. Ala. 2010) (holding that contracts with minors are voidable) (“[T]he court con-
cludes that, under Alabama law, a parent may not bind a child to a pre-injury liability 
waiver in favor of a for-profit activity sponsor by signing the liability waiver on the 
child’s behalf.”); id. at 1327 (“[T]he only published decisions from other jurisdictions 
that have bound children to pre-injury releases executed by a parent or guardian ad litem 
on the child’s behalf have done so in the context of a ‘minor’s participation in school-run 
or community-sponsored activities.’” (quoting Kirton v. Fields, 997 So. 2d 349, 356 (Fla. 
2008))); Simmons by Grenell v. Parkette Nat. Gymnastic Training Ctr., 670 F. Supp. 
140, 144 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding pre-injury release signed by minor gymnast did not 
bar her claims but mother’s claims were barred by her signature on release); Woodman v. 
Kera, LLC, 760 N.W.2d 641, 655–56 (Mich. App. 2008) (stating “preinjury waivers ef-
fectuated by parents on behalf of their minor children are not presumptively enforcea-
ble”); id. (“Specifically, within the context of our state’s overriding policy, and in the ab-
sence of any specific legislative exceptions permitting the waiver of liability by parents in 
these situations, the release signed on behalf of plaintiff’s son cannot be construed as va-
lid.”). 
 145. Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 901 A.2d 381, 387 (N.J. 2006) (invalidating pre-
injury release because “[a]lthough the Rule governing post-injury settlements is not dis-
positive of our treatment of pre-injury releases, we find that the purposes underlying the 
post-injury settlement rule also apply in the present context.”).  The Hojnowski court 
stated that: 
[I]n view of the protections that our State historically has afforded to a minor’s 
claims and the need to discourage negligent activity on the part of commercial 
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note that a pre-injury release should be treated with more suspicion than 
a post-injury release, which requires court approval.146  However, some 
states hold that the parents can enter a binding pre-injury release.  These 
cases often note the “importance of parental authority,” and the benefits 
to children of activities such as sports.147   
In view of the strong doctrine in North Carolina that protects the 
rights of minors, our courts are more likely to hold that such a pre-
injury release is not valid.  This issue is, however, an open question in 
North Carolina.  To the extent that public policy favors a pre-injury re-
lease in certain contexts (e.g., volunteer work or school activities), this is 
 
enterprises attracting children, we hold that a parent’s execution of a pre-injury 
release of a minor’s future tort claims arising out of the use of a commercial re-
creational facility is unenforceable. 
Id. at 390.  However, the dissent believed that: 
[F]reedom of contract principles lead me to the conclusion that a pre-tort 
waiver entered into by a minor, or ratified by a parent on behalf of a minor, 
should be enforceable when a reviewing court or arbitrator determines that the 
waiver was reasonable and not based on unequal bargaining positions. 
Id. at 397 (LaVecchia, J., dissenting). 
 146. Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062, 1066 (Utah 2001).  On pre-injury release the 
Supreme Court of Utah held that: 
[A] parent does not have the authority to release a child’s claims before an in-
jury. . . . [W]e see little reason to base the validity of a parent’s contractual re-
lease of a minor’s claim on the timing of an injury. . . . [T]he law generally 
treats preinjury releases or indemnity provisions with greater suspicion than 
postinjury releases. 
Id.  Some cases might negate the pre-injury release only for a commercial activity (as op-
posed to, for example, a volunteer activity or a school trip).  See Kirton v. Fields, 997 So. 
2d 349 (Fla. 2008) (holding a pre-injury release is invalid as to tort action arising from 
participation in a commercial activity). 
 147. See, e.g., Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ohio 1998).  
In Zivich, the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: 
[W]e believe that public policy justifies giving parents authority to enter into 
these types of binding agreements on behalf of their minor children.  We also 
believe that the enforcement of these agreements may well promote more active 
involvement by participants and their families, which, in turn, promotes the 
overall quality and safety of these activities. 
Id. at 205.  The court further distinguished a post-injury release because “[a] parent who 
contemplates signing a release as a prerequisite to her child’s participation in some ac-
tivity faces none of the emotional trauma and financial pressures that may arise with an 
existing claim.”  Id. at 206 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  See 
also Jordan A. Dresnick, The Minefield of Liability for Minors: Running Afoul of Corporate 
Risk Management in Florida, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1031 (2010) (analyzing Kirton, 997 So. 
2d 349, which rejected a pre-injury release, and addressing cases nationwide). 
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probably better addressed by legislation, which has occurred else-
where.148 
3. Minor’s Damages 
When an adult is injured, he may assert a claim for all losses in-
curred by him arising from the tortfeasor’s negligence, which typically 
consists of past and future medical expenses, past and future lost earn-
ings (or lost earning capacity), scarring, disability, and pain and suffer-
ing.  The injured person’s spouse might also have a derivative claim for 
loss of consortium.149 
When a child is injured, however, some elements of damage are 
held by the parents, and other elements of damage are held by the child.  
The minor can recover “damages for pain and suffering, for permanent 
injury, and for impairment of earning capacity after attaining majori-
ty.”150  The minor can also recover for future medical expenses to be in-
curred after the age of majority.151  The allocation of these damages can 
have a significant impact on the parents’ and minor’s claims.  An error in 
the jury instructions on this allocation of damages between the parent 
and child warrants a new trial.152  The minor’s recovery of medical bills 
incurred during minority is complicated, and requires further analysis.  
The minor’s claim for future earnings likewise requires some discussion, 
as do the potential liens against the minor’s recovery. 
 
 148. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-107(3) (2011) (“A parent of a child may, on behalf 
of the child, release or waive the child’s prospective claim for negligence.”). 
 149. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 437, 447, 346 S.E.2d 430, 436 (1986) 
(listing damages for injury to married adult as “(1) those compensating the injured 
spouse for pain and suffering, disability, disfigurement, or lost limbs; (2) those compen-
sating for lost wages, lost earning capacity, and medical and hospital expenses; and (3) 
those compensating the non-injured spouse for loss of services or loss of consortium”). 
 150. Ellington v. Bradford, 242 N.C. 159, 160–61, 86 S.E.2d 925, 926 (1955). 
 151. No North Carolina case expressly supports this proposition.  Because the par-
ent’s claim is dependent on his duty to support the child, as discussed supra Part I.D.1.a., 
the parent’s claim should not include losses incurred after the minor attains eighteen 
years, and the child should have that claim.  See also Vaughan v. Moore, 89 N.C. App. 
566, 568, 366 S.E.2d 518, 520 (1988) (“[T]he parents may recover for the child’s lost 
earnings and medical expenses during minority . . . .”). 
 152. Johnson v. Lewis, 251 N.C. 797, 804, 112 S.E.2d 512, 517 (1960) (holding that a 
jury instruction which does not “limit the infant’s recovery to the present worth of a fair 
and reasonable compensation for his mental and physical pain and suffering, and for his 
permanent injuries, if any, resulting in the impairment of his power or ability to earn 
money after reaching his majority” is error that requires a new trial). 
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a.  Medical Bills 
The general rule is that a minor is not liable for his medical ex-
penses.153  Thus, the child normally cannot recover those damages in her 
claim against the tortfeasor.  The child also cannot recover for these ex-
penses (incurred during minority) after the child attains the age of ma-
jority.154 
Notwithstanding the general rule that only the parent is liable for 
the minor’s medical expenses,155 there are several situations where the 
minor is liable for those expenses, and thus he can assert a claim for 
them; these situations are addressed below. It should be noted that some 
jurisdictions have rejected the common law rule and have simply held 
that both the minor and his parents have a right to claim damages for the 
minor’s pre-majority medical expenses.156  These courts reach this result 
in part because, as shown below, the minor is sometimes liable for his 
medical expenses.  The reasoning of these cases is fairly persuasive, and 
the North Carolina Supreme Court could adopt this view as well. 
 i. Necessaries 
Under the doctrine of “necessaries,” the minor can be liable for his 
medical expenses.  The doctrine of necessaries renders an express con-
tract by a minor enforceable against the minor.157  Further, the doctrine 
 
 153. Price v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 274 N.C. 32, 42, 161 S.E.2d 590, 598 (1968) 
(ruling that “medical expenses incurred by [father] in the necessary treatment of his two 
minor, unemancipated children injured in the collision . . . [results in] the liability of the 
father, and not of his two minor children.”). 
 154. See generally Vaughan, 89 N.C. App. 566, 366 S.E.2d 518. 
 155. See infra Part I.B.1.a. for a discussion of the parents’ claim for these expenses. 
 156. St. Packard v. Perry, 655 S.E.2d 548, 560–61 (W. Va. 2007) (“[I]t is difficult for 
us to fathom a legal system in which a child could be responsible for his or her pre-
majority medical expenses, but that he or she, simply by reason of infancy, is unable to 
pursue such damages in his or her lawsuit . . . under no circumstances will double recov-
ery be allowed.”); see also Stephen J. Cosentino, Note, Boley v. Knowles: Child’s Pay—
Child May Recover Medical Expenses Independently of the Parent, 64 UMKC L. REV. 431 
(1995) (discussing child’s right to assert claim for medical expenses). 
 157. See N.C. Baptist Hosps. v. Franklin, 103 N.C. App. 446, 405 S.E.2d 814 (1991) 
(“Under the doctrine an infant who contracts for or obtains necessaries that are not being 
supplied by his parents or guardian may not disavow the agreement and can be held lia-
ble for their fair value.”).  For a discussion of the minor’s lack of capacity to enter a con-
tract, see infra text accompanying notes 607–12. 
32
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss2/3
KIRBY- FINAL 4/12/2012  9:06 AM 
2012] MINOR’S PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS  325 
can be used to support a claim against the minor for services based on an 
implied contract.158 
The necessaries doctrine applies only to a good or service that is a 
“necessary.”159  Necessaries include medical services “‘reasonably re-
quired by the infant.’”160  Thus, the minor is liable for emergency service 
to save his life.161  A minor “without parent, or one whose parent is fi-
nancially unable to pay for the [medical] treatment, may be liable as for 
other necessities.”162 
The doctrine applies where the parent is unable or unwilling to pay 
for the expenses.  “[A] child living with its parents cannot be held liable 
even for necessaries ‘unless it be proved that the parent was unable or 
unwilling to furnish the child with such clothes, [etc.], as the parent 
considers necessary.’”163 
No North Carolina case holds that a minor who is liable for his 
medical expenses can recover them from the tortfeasor,164 but he should 
be able to do so, as the fundamental purpose of damages is to make the 
plaintiff whole.165  There is authority from other jurisdictions that the 
minor may sue the tortfeasor to recover these expenses under these cir-
cumstances.166  If the minor is liable to the health care provider for the 
 
 158. Hyman v. Cain, 48 N.C. 111 (1855) (holding that “the law will imply a promise 
on the part of an infant to pay a reasonable price for necessaries furnished to him”). 
 159. Necessaries include necessary “meat, drink, apparel, boarding, schooling, and 
nursing.”  Freeman v. Bridger, 49 N.C. 1, 2 (1856). 
 160. Cole v. Wagner, 197 N.C. 692, 695, 150 S.E. 339, 340 (1929) (citation omitted). 
 161. In re Peacock, 261 N.C. 749, 753, 136 S.E.2d 91, 9495 (1964) (noting that his 
father can also be liable for these expenses). 
 162. Ellington v. Bradford, 242 N.C. 159, 161, 86 S.E.2d 925, 927 (1955); accord Pea-
cock, 261 N.C. at 753, 136 S.E.2d at 9495 (“Certainly, when a minor has no parent, as 
in the instant case, who is able to provide medical services necessary to be rendered in an 
effort to save his life, such services will be classed as necessaries.”). 
 163. N.C. Baptist Hosps., Inc. v. Franklin, 103 N.C. App. 446, 449, 405 S.E.2d 814, 
816 (1991) (quoting Freeman v. Bridger, 49 N.C. 1, 4 (1856)). 
 164. One case held that the converse is true; i.e., where the minor recovers medical 
bills for necessary treatment in the tort action, the health care provider can sue the minor 
for these expenses.  Cole, 197 N.C. at 699, 150 S.E. at 341 (deciding that where minor 
obtained judgment, which included hospital bills, hospital can sue minor to recover bills 
because “[t]o allow the defendant infant to recover upon this theory and then deny the 
plaintiff in the present action the right to recover on the same theory of necessary ex-
penses, would be blowing hot and cold in the same breath”). 
 165. Cavin’s, Inc. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 27 N.C. App. 698, 702, 220 S.E.2d 403, 406 
(1975) (“Compensatory damages, which are awarded to compensate and make whole the 
injured party . . . .”). 
 166. Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Pepper, 697 A.2d 1358, 1368 (Md. 1997) (holding that 
minor made sufficient showing to have pre-majority medical expenses and deciding that 
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medical bills, then logically he should be able to recover them from the 
tortfeasor.167  In some jurisdictions the minor may sue to recover these 
expenses, even where the claim of his parents has expired.168   
One case in North Carolina holds that the necessaries doctrine does 
not apply where the hospital, in providing services to the minor, relies 
on the parents’, and not the minor’s, credit, and obtained a judgment 
against the parents.169  This case also indicates that an express contract 
between the parents and the provider will preclude recovery by the hos-
pital against the minor, because an express contract generally negates an 
implied contract.170 
 
a minor is required to show that parents “are financially incapable of providing medical 
necessaries”); Garay v. Overholtzer, 631 A.2d 429 (Md. 1993) (a negligently-injured mi-
nor child may make a claim for medical expenses in his or her own name if, inter alia, 
the parents of the child are unable to meet those expenses). 
 167. See Betz v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Agency of Kansas, Inc., 8 P.3d 756 (Kan. 
2000) (“The parents’ cause of action for medical expenses can be shifted to the minor if: 
(1) the minor child has paid or agreed to pay the expenses; (2) the minor child is legally 
responsible for payment (emancipation, death or incompetency of the parents); (3) if the 
parents waive or assign their right to recovery in favor of the minor; or (4) when recov-
ery of expenses is permitted by statute.”). 
 168. See, e.g., Estate of DeSela v. Prescott Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 249 P.3d 767 (Ariz. 
2011) (deciding that both minor and mother can recover pre-majority medical expenses 
as long as there is no double recovery and the minor’s statute of limitation was tolled 
during minority); Garay, 631 A.2d at 44546 (Md. 1993) (holding that minor was en-
titled to claim medical expenses, limitations period on minor’s claim was tolled during 
his minority, and that minor’s liability for medical expenses pursuant to necessaries doc-
trine “will, in turn, give a minor the right to claim medical expenses on his or her own 
behalf”); Pepper v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 680 A.2d 532, 539 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996), 
aff’d, 697 A.2d 1358 (Md. 1997) (“[I]f the minor child meets his burden of showing that 
his parents are unable or unwilling to pay his medical expenses, and that he has paid or 
will be responsible for paying such expenses, he may make a claim for them,” even if 
parent’s claim is time-barred).  The Pepper court decided that the lower court erred in 
excluding from trial evidence of pre-majority medical expenses, where plaintiff produced 
evidence supporting necessaries doctrine. See id. 
 169. See generally N.C. Baptist Hosps., Inc. v. Franklin, 103 N.C. App. 446, 405 
S.E.2d 814, (1991) (overturning a ruling that awarded $5,000 of minor’s $25,000 settle-
ment to be distributed pro rata to the health care providers through a judgment obtained 
against a minor’s parents when the health care providers sued the minor for the parents’ 
debt). The court ultimately decided that an express contract with parents for payment of 
bills precludes the necessaries doctrine “[s]ince the charges were incurred upon the par-
ents’ credit, the child was not liable for the debt under the necessaries doctrine.”  Id. at 
451, 405 S.E.2d at 818. 
 170. Id. at 44950, 405 S.E.2d at 81617. 
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 ii. Parent’s Waiver of Claim 
Where the parent who is liable for the child’s medical expenses 
serves as the GAL in the minor’s lawsuit, and asserts a claim for the mi-
nor to recover medical expenses, the child can recover these damages.171  
These cases implicitly hold that the claim is assigned or transferred to 
the minor.  In such a case, the parent loses his claim to recover payment 
for the medical bills,172 and thus there is no possibility of a double recov-
ery. 
Where the minor is represented by a GAL who is not liable for 
payment of the minor’s medical bills (i.e., typically a GAL other than a 
parent), the minor cannot recover the medical expenses pursuant to this 
doctrine.173  Even if the parent expressly waives his claim for medical 
expenses, the child cannot assert this claim where the parent does not 
serve as the GAL.174 
It should be noted, however, that under older procedural rules, if 
the defendant objected to the minor’s assertion of the claim for medical 
bills, the child could not assert that claim.175  This result was based on 
the principle that the parent has the claim for medical expenses, and the 
parent cannot join his claim with that of his child because there would 
be a misjoinder.176  Under modern procedural rules, which are more lib-
eral regarding joinder, the parents and the child can jointly file suit 
 
 171. Shields v. McKay, 241 N.C. 37, 40, 84 S.E.2d 286, 288 (1954).  The court ex-
plained that by filing suit in this manner, “[t]he father treats the child as emancipated in 
so far as recovery for such elements of damage are concerned, and cannot claim that he, 
and not the child, is entitled to recover therefor; and, hence, she [the minor] may recov-
er the full amount to which both she and her father would have been entitled if separate 
suits had been brought.”  Id. at 41, 84 S.E.2d at 289.  The father would therefore be es-
topped from making a separate claim for such loss.  Id. at 40, 84 S.E.2d at 288; see also 
Ellington v. Bradford, 242 N.C. 159, 161, 86 S.E.2d 925, 926 (1955). 
 172. Bolkhir v. N.C. St. Univ., 321 N.C. 706, 713, 365 S.E.2d 898, 90203 (1988) 
(“[T]he parents have waived their claim for medical expenses in favor of their son. . . . 
[T]he Commission erred by awarding the medical expenses to the parents.”). 
 173. Brown v. Lyons, 93 N.C. App. 453, 378 S.E.2d 243 (1989). 
 174. Id. at 459, 378 S.E.2d at 247 (holding that neither a grandmother nor a minor 
can recover medical expenses even though the minor’s father waived his claim, where the 
father has custody of minor and there is no evidence that grandmother provides support 
for grandchild).  The lower court did not err in refusing to continue the hearing to allow 
more time to obtain waiver of claim from father because said waiver would not avail 
plaintiffs.  Id.  The result in this case would have been different if the father had not 
merely waived his claim, but had also expressly assigned those claims to the minor. 
 175. Ellington, 242 N.C. at 162, 86 S.E.2d at 927. 
 176. Id. 
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against the tortfeasor.177  Further, as noted below, the parent should be 
able to assign his claims to the minor.  Therefore, the doctrine (that the 
defendant can insist that the minor not assert a claim for medical ex-
penses, and that such allegations should be stricken on the defendant’s 
motion) is not likely to have a practical effect under current procedural 
rules, and would not apply where the parties are consenting to a settle-
ment. 
The parent’s waiver of the claim for medical expenses, effectuated 
by serving as the GAL and allowing the minor to recover these expenses, 
has the effect of transferring, or assigning, this claim to the minor.  
North Carolina does not have a case expressly holding that a parent can 
transfer or assign the claim for medical expenses to the child other than 
by serving as the GAL, but the parent should be able to formally assign 
the claim to the minor without serving as the GAL.178  The statute of li-
mitations for the assigned claim, however, continues to run (and is not 
tolled by the minor’s incapacity).179 
b.  Lost Earnings 
The child can assert a claim for lost earnings that she will incur af-
ter she attains the age of majority.180  Projecting future lost earnings for a 
minor can be very difficult because minors typically do not have a work 
history, often have not decided upon a career, and sometimes do not 
have a significant academic record.  Other jurisdictions have adopted a 
lower standard for minors to prove future lost earnings.  “In cases in-
volving injured infants, in which there is always going to be limited evi-
dence, if any at all, permitting a concrete calculation of future earnings, 
our courts have allowed juries to determine the loss without requiring 
evidence that would permit its specific quantification.”181 
 
 177. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 178. See, e.g., Bauer v. Mem’l Hosp., 879 N.E.2d 478, 502 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (“[T]he 
parents may assign their cause of action for medical expenses to their child . . . .”). 
 179. Vaughan v. Moore, 89 N.C. App. 566, 568, 366 S.E.2d 518, 520 (1988) (noting 
that the claim is not saved by assignment of claim to minor, where suit is not instituted 
within three years). 
 180. Kleibor v. Rogers, 265 N.C. 304, 306, 144 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1965) (noting that a 
minor can bring a cause of action to recover “impairment of earning capacity after attain-
ing majority”). 
 181. Lesniak v. Cnty. of Bergen, 563 A.2d 795, 80203 (N.J. 1989).  The court further 
explained “[w]hen it can be inferred that a child’s ability to be of service to a parent is 
diminished, a court will submit the damage question to the jury.”  Id. at 803.  The court 
explained that it “will not require expert testimony, as a general rule, to establish the 
quantum of earning-capacity loss for a minor.”  Id. at 806. 
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In one case, a child sustained a brain injury when she was almost 
three years old, and claimed a loss of earnings.182  The jury awarded the 
minor $1,675,000, which included a claim for lost earnings.183  The 
child’s economist projected more than $800,000 in lost earnings.184  This 
was based on testimony that she would not be able to complete college 
and that her scars would affect her employability.185  On appeal, the de-
fense argued that the child “was too young for the testimony [about her 
lost earnings] to be anything but speculative.”186  The court rejected this 
argument, stating: 
While we acknowledge that with young children proof of future damages 
involves a significant degree of speculation, we decline to hold that 
young children can not recover for loss of earning capacity because they 
are injured so early in life, where there is sufficient evidence offered so 
that such damages are not unreasonably speculative.  [The child] was 
two years and eleven months old when the accident occurred.  Plaintiffs 
presented sufficient evidence, including testimony and medical records 
pertaining to [the child’s] mental and physical condition prior to her in-
jury, to provide the jury with a reasonable basis upon which to estimate 
damages of [the child’s] lost earnings.187 
The child can also assert his claim for lost earnings which have 
been or will be incurred prior to majority where his father serves as the 
GAL and seeks recovery of these losses for the minor.188 
c. Liens and Subrogation Claims 
Liens arising from the provision of medical services to the minor 
may attach to the minor’s monetary recovery.  The net effect of such a 
lien that attaches to the minor’s recovery (by settlement or judgment) is 
that the minor will pay for his medical expenses, either to the health care 
provider directly, or to a third-party payor (e.g., Medicaid, or private 
health insurance). 
 
 182. Fox-Kirk v. Hannon, 142 N.C. App. 267, 542 S.E.2d 346 (2001). 
 183. Id. at 27172, 542 S.E.2d at 35051. 
 184. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 14, Fox-Kirk, 142 N.C. App. 267, 542 S.E.2d 346 
(No. 99-1168), available at http://www.ncappellatecourts.org/nc_main_1.nsf. 
 185. Fox-Kirk, 142 N.C. App. at 273, 542 S.E.2d at 351. 
 186. Id. at 272, 542 S.E.2d at 351. 
 187. Id. at 27273, 542 S.E.2d at 351 (holding also that expert testimony was proper-
ly allowed as to whether minor “would attend college and the effect of scarring on her 
future employability.”). 
 188. See generally Pascal v. Burke Transit Co., 229 N.C. 435, 50 S.E.2d 534 (1948) 
(noting that father, who served as next friend and prosecuted child’s claim for lost earn-
ings, would be estopped from asserting this claim in a subsequent suit). 
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When the child’s treatment is paid by the Medicaid program, the 
North Carolina Division of Medical Assistance (DMA) has a lien against 
the child’s recovery.189  The DMA has such a lien even if the minor’s re-
covery is clearly allocated for the child’s claims, and where the minor’s 
recovery excludes the claim for medical expenses.190  The Medicaid lien 
upon the minor’s recovery has been held to be constitutional.191 
Health care providers can acquire a lien against a patient’s settle-
ment or judgment pursuant to sections 44-49 and 44-50 of North Caro-
lina’s General Statutes.  The extent to which a health care provider has a 
lien against the minor’s recovery is not clear.  The statute creating the 
lien states, “[w]here damages are recovered for and in behalf of minors 
or persons non compos mentis, the liens shall attach to the sum recov-
ered as fully as if the person were sui juris.”192  The only case addressing 
this provision asserted, “The lien is created only in cases where the bene-
ficiary may be indebted for the expenses incurred.”193  This apparently 
means that the lien is created against the minor’s recovery only if the 
minor is indebted for the medical expense. 
Whether the provider has a lien against the minor’s recovery there-
fore depends on whether the minor is indebted for those expenses.  The 
aforementioned case addressed that issue and stated, “In cases (1) where 
the parent waives his right, or (2) the child has no parent, or (3) the 
child is permitted to recover all elements of damage, the lien likewise at-
 
 189. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-59(a) (2011) (“Notwithstanding any other provisions of 
the law, by accepting medical assistance, the recipient shall be deemed to have made an 
assignment to the State of the right to third party benefits, contractual or otherwise, to 
which he may be entitled.”). 
 190. Payne v. N.C. Dept. of Human Res., 126 N.C. App. 672, 677, 486 S.E.2d 469, 
471 (1997).  The court stated that “by accepting Medicaid benefits, [the minor plaintiff] 
assigned his right to third-party benefits to DMA, and . . . DMA’s lien vested at that 
time.”  Id. at 677, 486 S.E.2d at 471.  In Campbell v. North Carolina Department of Human 
Resources, the court held that Medicaid payments had to be repaid from a minor’s settle-
ment, even though the minor did not receive payment for bills and the minor had no 
standing to sue for bills.  Campbell v. N.C. Dept. of Human Res., 153 N.C. App. 305, 
307, 569 S.E.2d 670, 672 (2002) (deciding that a minor is obligated to repay the Medica-
id payments pursuant to section 108A-57(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes be-
cause the statute “does not restrict defendant’s right of subrogation to a beneficiary’s 
right of recovery only for medical expenses”). 
 191. Armstrong v. Cansler, 722 F. Supp. 2d 653 (W.D.N.C. 2010) (holding that the 
State’s subrogation right to Medicaid reimbursement from a settlement with a third-party 
was consistent with federal Medicaid anti-lien provisions and rejecting the argument that 
the law is unconstitutional on the ground that the statute allows the State to assert a lien 
on compensation for damages other than medical expenses). 
 192. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-49(a). 
 193. Ellington v. Bradford, 242 N.C. 159, 161, 86 S.E.2d 925, 92627 (1955). 
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taches.”194  Where the parent has failed to pay the medical bill, the minor 
is probably liable for the medical expenses under the doctrine of neces-
saries,195 and the minor should be able to recover them from the tortfea-
sor.196  Hence, where the parents fail to pay the medical bill, the lien like-
ly attaches to the minor’s recovery.  Where, however, the doctrine of 
necessaries does not apply, and the child has a parent who does not 
waive his right to recover the medical bills, the provider apparently does 
not have a lien against the minor’s recovery. 
Another potential claim against the minor’s proceeds is a lien as-
serted by a health care plan provided by the parents’ employer and sub-
ject to ERISA.  Such a plan typically provides for a right of subroga-
tion.197  Two federal198 cases in North Carolina have held that such plans, 
which have paid for the minor’s medical treatment, can recoup their 
payments from the minor’s settlement.  These courts have rejected ar-
guments that the minor’s recovery does not include medical bills, and 
that the minor did not enter a subrogation agreement with the employer.  
One court wrote, “[b]y accepting benefits paid by the Plan on the mi-
nors’ behalf, the [minor and parents] obligated themselves to reimburse 
the Plan from any third party recovery.”199  Another case reasoned that to 
 
 194. Id. at 162, 86 S.E.2d at 927. 
 195. See In re Peacock, 261 N.C. 749, 753, 136 S.E.2d 91, 94–95 (1964); Ellington v. 
Bradford, 242 N.C. 159, 161, 86 S.E.2d 925, 927 (1955). 
 196. See discussion supra Part I.A.3.a.i. 
 197. See generally John R. Cella, Jr., The Pursuit of Proceeds by Plans, Participants and 
Plaintiffs’ Lawyers: Dissonant Solutions to an Alliterative Problem, 22 CAMPBELL L. REV. 317 
(2000). 
 198. There is authority that the existence of a subrogation right pursuant to ERISA 
law must be decided in a federal action.  See Turner v. Turner, 672 S.E.2d 242, 24452 
(W. Va. 2008) (discussing employer’s intervention in action to approve settlement and 
holding that employer’s request to enforce subrogation rights—pursuant to ERISA 
plan—against minor’s settlement proceeds must be decided in federal action); see also 
Fravel v. Stankus, 936 F. Supp. 474 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (noting that federal court retained 
the ERISA issue where a minor was sued in state court and an ERISA lienholder removed 
the case to federal court to adjudicate lien, but remanding the underlying personal injury 
action to state court). 
 199. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Cooke, 3 F. Supp. 2d 668, 672 (E.D.N.C. 1997).  
The court held that the defendant’s state court judgment were also subject to ERISA, 
“[o]therwise, defendants would be rewarded for breaching their contractual duty to noti-
fy BCBSA of the suit and to afford BCBSA an opportunity to participate . . . .”  Id.  The 
court noted that employer’s plan specifically applied to “all family members including 
minors,” and rejected the argument that a minor cannot enter into a contract because 
“courts may determine that ERISA preempts state laws relating to ERISA benefit plans 
that have the potential of subjecting plan administrators to conflicting state regulations.”  
Id. 
39
Kirby: Minor's Personal Injury Actions and Settlements in North Carolina
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2012
KIRBY- FINAL 4/12/2012  9:06 AM 
332 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:293 
regard the claim for medical expenses as that of the parents only would, 
under North Carolina law, “prevent seamless administration of nation-
wide or multi-state plans.”200  The safest course is therefore for the mi-
nor’s attorney to address the employer’s subrogation claim at (or prior 
to) the time of the settlement. 
In one case in North Carolina, the father’s employer paid for the 
minor’s medical treatment and the father agreed to reimburse the em-
ployer from a settlement with the tortfeasor.201  The minor later made a 
claim against the tortfeasor, but he did not assert a claim for the medical 
expenses.202  The employer was not allowed to intervene in the tort ac-
tion.203  The employer then sued the parents alleging that they retained 
the benefits of employer’s payments “without asserting, assisting, or coo-
perating in a claim against [tortfeasor] for medical expenses,” that they 
“are primarily liable for these medical expenses because of their obliga-
tion to provide for the support of their minor child.”204  The court held 
that the parents could be liable to the employer under a theory of unjust 
enrichment.205 
B. Parents’ Claims 
An analysis of the parents’ claims requires a discussion of substance 
of the parents’ claims, whether those claims can be asserted by the 
mother or by the father, and the defenses to those claims. 
 
 200. Rhodes, Inc. v. Morrow, 937 F. Supp. 1202, 121112 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (stating 
that pursuant to the terms of the plan, an employer is entitled to funds “in the event of a 
recovery from such third person on account of such injury or illness”).  The court also 
stated that “[t]o accept Defendant’s argument that the children are not directly obligated 
to reimburse the Plan because they were not the true beneficiaries of the Plan would not 
only circumvent the purposes of the Plan and ERISA, but would also require the Court to 
ignore the first sentence of the [terms of] the Master Plan document.”  Id.  But see Kel-
leher v. Hood, 605 N.E.2d 1018, 102426 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (noting that where Illinois 
prohibited health insurers from subrogating against minor’s estate for medical expenses, 
any connection between these laws and an ERISA plan was too tenuous and remote for 
federal law to preempt Illinois law, and holding that the group health plan did not have a 
lien against the minor’s settlement). 
 201. Harris-Teeter Super Mkts., Inc. v. Watts, 98 N.C. App. 684, 685, 392 S.E.2d 123, 
123 (1990). 
 202. Id. at 685, 392 S.E.2d at 124. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 687, 392 S.E.2d at 125. 
 205. Id. at 68788, 392 S.E.2d at 125. 
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1. Substantive Claims 
The parents have several potential claims arising from the injury to 
their child.  The primary claim the parents have is for the child’s medical 
expenses up to the age of majority, as well as a claim for the loss of the 
child’s earnings up to the age of majority.  The general rule for these 
damages has been stated as follows: 
In case of injury to an infant by wrongful act, a cause of action in behalf 
of the parent (the mother if the father is dead) arises, permitting recov-
ery for (1) the loss of earnings of the child during its minority if un-
emancipated, and (2) expenses incurred for necessary medical treat-
ment.206 
In settlement discussions, it is important for both sides to under-
stand clearly whether they are settling the entire claim or only the mi-
nor’s claim.  In a case from another jurisdiction, the insurance adjuster 
thought that she was settling the entire claim, but the court ruled that 
she settled only the minor’s claim and that the parents could still main-
tain their claim for medical expenses.207  The writings between the adjus-
ter and the lawyer tended to indicate that only the minor’s claim was set-
tled.208  In most instances, however, absent an indication to the contrary, 
the settlement of a minor’s clam probably includes the parents’ claims 
for medical expenses.209 
 
 206. Ellington v. Bradford, 242 N.C. 159, 160, 86 S.E.2d 925, 927 (1955). 
 207. Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Kay, 589 S.E.2d 711, 71516 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). 
 208. Id. at 71315 (noting that where a lawyer for a minor and the minor’s parents 
made separate demands for the parents and for the minor, and stated that parents had a 
claim for medical expenses, and the adjuster thereafter wrote to the lawyer confirming 
settlement of “the Bodily Injury claim on your client, Laura Beth Kay [minor,]” the set-
tlement was binding and was only for the minor’s claim, and the parents could still pur-
sue their claim, and that any mistake by adjuster was unilateral). 
 209. See Crane v. Jordan, 475 So. 2d 542, 54345 (Ala. 1985) (holding that where the 
court dismissed the mother’s claim, the parties then settled and obtained approval for the 
minor’s claim, and the mother then attempted an appeal from dismissal of her claims but 
defendants moved for and had the order set aside, the parties clearly intended the settle-
ment to encompass the mother’s claim).  “The appropriate remedy to rectify the situation 
is not to set aside the properly entered order approving the settlement for the minor, but 
to enforce the agreement on behalf of the Plaintiffs’ counsel not to proceed with the 
mother’s case.”  Id. at 545.  Note also that in a jurisdiction where the parent’s claim is de-
rivative, such that the loss of the minor’s claim extinguishes the other claim, the settle-
ment of the minor’s claim will necessarily bar the parent’s claim.  See infra notes 266–68 
and accompanying text for a discussion of whether the parent’s claim is derivative in 
North Carolina. 
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a.  Medical Expenses for Minor’s Injury 
The parents have a claim for the child’s medical expenses incurred 
through the age of majority.  “The parental right to recover for both loss 
of services and medical expenses is . . . tied to the support obligation.”210  
The parents have an obligation to support their children, which they 
cannot contract away, and which adheres even if the parent does not 
have custodial rights.211 
The parent’s obligation to support the child generally ends at the 
age of majority.212  The parent’s duty to support his child can, however, 
continue after the age of majority, where the child is incapable of main-
taining himself.213  Therefore presumably the parent can pursue a claim 
for medical expenses for a child over eighteen where the child cannot 
maintain himself. 
This rule permitting the parent to recover medical expenses has 
broad implications.  For example, in one case, the jury awarded $6,700 
to the minor for her injuries and $4,500 to the parents for medical ex-
penses. 214  The minor’s attorney then sought attorneys fees under sec-
tion 6-21.1 of North Carolina’s General Statutes, which allowed for the 
recovery of fees in a case where the judgment is less than $10,000.215  
The defendant opposed the request for attorneys fees on the basis that 
 
 210. Flippin v. Jarrell, 301 N.C. 108, 121, 270 S.E.2d 482, 490 (1980). 
 211. Alamance Cnty. Hosp., Inc. v. Neighbors, 315 N.C. 362, 36566, 338 S.E.2d 87, 
8990 (1986) (“A father cannot contract away or transfer to another his responsibility to 
support his children.  The obligation survives divorce and continues even though custo-
dy of the children is awarded to the mother.”).  Where parental rights are terminated, the 
parent’s duty to support the child terminates.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1112 (2010) (“An 
order terminating the parental rights completely and permanently terminates all rights 
and obligations of the parent to the juvenile . . . .”). 
 212. See Shoaf v. Shoaf, 282 N.C. 287, 291, 192 S.E.2d 299, 303 (1972) (holding that 
parents’ “duty to support [child] ceased at the time he became of age. . . . Thereafter, he 
was under no obligation to conform his life to the wishes of either parent.  They were 
freed of any legal obligation to support him”). 
 213. Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 61920, 44 S.E.2d 31, 35 (1947) (holding a moth-
er can sue a father to recover necessary expenses for a child after the child’s twenty-first 
birthday, where their son was mentally and physically incapable of earning a livelihood).  
The court described how the mother sued to recover for food, clothing, heat, medical 
attention, nursing and necessary personal attendance, and also apparently for the value 
of her services in tending to the child: “where this presumption [that an adult is capable 
of maintaining himself] is rebutted by the fact of mental or physical incapacity, it no 
longer obtains, and the obligation of the father continues.”  Id. at 620, 44 S.E.2d at 35. 
 214. Moquin v. Hedrick, 163 N.C. App. 345, 345, 593 S.E.2d 435, 436 (2004). 
 215. Id. at 34546, 593 S.E.2d at 436–37. The statute was amended in 2011, and now 
includes cases where damages are under $20,000.  2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 283 § 3.1. 
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the total judgment for the minor and her parents was in excess of 
$10,000.  The Court of Appeals held that the two awards should be 
viewed separately, stating, “plaintiffs’ causes of actions, one for personal 
injuries to the daughter and one for medical expenses incurred by the 
parents, must be categorized as several [i.e., separate].”216  “Because 
plaintiffs’ separate damage awards were less than $10,000.00, application 
of section 6-21.1 was triggered, and the trial court had the discretion to 
award attorney’s fees thereunder.”217 
Several cases have addressed whether the parents’ and the minor’s 
claims are one claim or multiple claims for purposes of insurance cover-
age.  Where a policy of insurance limits recovery to $100,000 “per per-
son,” and a child is injured giving rise to claims by the child and his par-
ents, the insurer is obligated to pay only $100,000, and the two claims 
are not regarded as separate so as to allow for a total recovery of 
$200,000.218  On the other hand, where the insurer issued one policy 
providing $50,000 in uninsured motorist coverage to the minor, and is-
sued another policy for $50,000 to his parents which also provided un-
insured motorist coverage, the insurer was obligated to the parents for 
the medical expenses up to the policy limits, even though it had paid the 
policy limits on the minor’s policy, thus resulting in a total exposure of 
$100,000.219 
Family members of the minor, other than the parents, generally 
cannot sue to recover the medical expenses; thus, a grandmother who 
 
 216. Id. at 349, 593 S.E.2d at 438. 
 217. Id. at 349, 593 S.E.2d at 439; accord West ex rel Farris v. Tilley, 120 N.C. App. 
145, 14751, 461 S.E.2d 1, 24 (1995) (reaching same result where claim was filed by 
minor only, and parties had stipulated that verdict would include medical expenses be-
cause the mother was not a party to the action). 
 218. Holt ex rel Holt v. Atl. Cas. Ins. Co., 141 N.C. App. 139, 14243, 539 S.E.2d 345, 
34748 (2000) (noting that parent’s claim for child’s medical expenses is limited to “per 
person” limits of liability, and not the separate limits for property damage coverage); 
Howard ex rel Sigmon v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 115 N.C. App. 458, 45863, 445 S.E.2d 
6669 (1994) (holding that parents’ claim for minor’s medical expenses was derivative in 
nature, and they had suffered no “bodily injury” in accident such as would entitle them 
to separate $100,000 awards). 
 219. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lankford, 118 N.C. App. 368, 37477, 455 S.E.2d 
484, 48789 (1995).  The court noted that language in the minor’s policy stating that 
$50,000 was Nationwide’s “maximum limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury, 
including damages for care, loss of services or death, sustained by any one person in any 
one auto accident,” did not affect coverage under parents’ policy.  Id. at 377, 455 S.E.2d 
at 489.  “However, we do not perceive the parents’ claim as being ‘derivative’ with respect 
to the provisions and terms of their individual policy,” and the court did not address mi-
nor’s argument that he was also entitled to coverage under his parents’ policy, as this ar-
gument was inconsistent with his other arguments.  Id. 371, 374, 455 S.E.2d at 486, 487. 
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did not have legal custody of her grandchild and was not responsible for 
the medical expenses could not recover those expenses.220  Therefore, if 
a family member other than the parents has legal custody or is responsi-
ble for the minor’s bills, she might be allowed to recover those damages. 
Pursuant to statute, the minor’s grandparents are liable for his sup-
port where the minor’s parents are also minors.221  Because the grandpa-
rents in this situation are liable for the grandchild’s medical expenses, 
they should be able to sue for the medical expenses. 
b. Loss of Services and Earnings of Minor 
The father can also recover for the loss of services of the minor and 
the minor’s lost earnings through the age of majority.222  Although some 
cases regard the child as the “property” of the father,223 this doctrine is 
not used much in modern times.  Absent a waiver by the parent, which 
occurs when the parent serves as the GAL and allows the minor to pur-
sue this claim, it is error to allow the minor to recover these losses.224 
 
 220. Brown v. Lyons, 93 N.C. App. 453, 45860, 378 S.E.2d 243, 24647 (1989). 
 221. Whitman v. Kiger, 139 N.C. App. 44, 48, 533 S.E.2d 807, 809 (2000) (“The plain 
meaning of the above statutory language, coupled with the legislative intent, imposes 
primary responsibility for an infant born to unemancipated minors on the minors’ par-
ents (the infant’s grandparents).” (relying on N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4)). 
 222. Kleibor v. Rogers, 265 N.C. 304, 306, 144 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1965) (stating that a 
parent can recover for “loss of the services and earnings of the child during minority”); 
Smith v. Hewett, 235 N.C. 615, 617, 70 S.E.2d 825, 827 (1952) (“[T]he father is primari-
ly entitled to [the minor’s] services and earnings as long as the minor is legally in his 
custody or under his control.”). 
 223. Foster v. Foster, 264 N.C. 694, 699701, 142 S.E.2d 638, 64243 (1965) (noting 
that a father who incurs medical expense can recover from the mother who negligently 
injured the child).  Foster held that “plaintiff’s action to recover necessary medical ex-
penses expended by him for his infant daughter in the instant case in within the fair in-
tent and meaning of section 52-10.1 of North Carolina’s General Statutes, [which ab-
olished inter-spousal tort immunity] imposing liability for damages sustained to 
property.”  Id. at 699, 142 S.E.2d at 642.  Foster also cites numerous authority from other 
jurisdictions for the proposition that a father’s claim for medical expenses and loss of 
services of child are elements of damage to property.  Id. 
 224. Shipp v. United Stage Lines, 192 N.C. 475, 479, 135 S.E. 339, 341 (1926) (not-
ing that charging the jury to allow a minor to recover for loss of earning capacity during 
minority is error).  “The father is entitled to the services and earnings of his minor child 
so long as the latter is legally in his custody or under his control and not emancipated.”  
Id. 
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The claim for lost earnings appears to consist of the loss of income 
to the minor from employment outside the home.225  In modern times, a 
parent’s claim for the minor’s lost earnings is rarely seen.  This is proba-
bly due in part to the age of majority being lowered from twenty-one to 
eighteen in 1971,226 as well as child labor laws.227  A parent cannot re-
cover these losses if the minor is not in the parent’s custody or if the mi-
nor is emancipated.228 
With regard to the claim for loss of services, the cases do not elabo-
rate on the computation of this claim.  Most cases merely describe this as 
a claim for “loss of services” without further elaboration.229  The father 
must show an actual loss of services of the minor.230  “The father’s right 
of action [for loss of services and other losses] . . . is based not only 
upon the right to services of the child but also upon his duty to care for 
and maintain the child.”231  This claim does not exist if the minor dies 
immediately in the accident, because the claim for loss of services will be 
included in a wrongful death claim.232 
 
 225. See, e.g., Pascal v. Burke Transit Co., 229 N.C. 435, 44041, 50 S.E.2d. 534, 538 
(1948) (affirming award to minor for his lost wages of $25 per week where his father 
waived the claim). 
 226. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48A-1 (“The common-law definition of minor insofar as it per-
tains to the age of the minor is hereby repealed and abrogated.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48A-
2 (establishing age of majority as 18).  Prior to this statute, the age of majority was de-
termined by common law.  E.g., Shoaf v. Shoaf, 282 N.C. 287, 288, 192 S.E.2d 299, 301 
(1972) (“At the time the foregoing judgment was entered, according to the common law 
rule, an infant became emancipated at twenty-one years.”). 
 227. Child labor laws are beyond the scope of this Article.  Prior to reaching age eigh-
teen, there are restrictions on the employment of a person in North Carolina.  N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 95-25.5(a) (“No youth under 18 years of age shall be employed by any employer 
in any occupation without a youth employment certificate unless specifically ex-
empted.”).  Further, the federal Fair Labor Standards Act sets forth rules regarding the 
employment of minors.  See 29 U.S.C. § 212 (2006).  Whether the minor can be em-
ployed depends, inter alia, on his age, whether he works for his parents, and whether the 
work is dangerous. 
 228. Shipp, 192 N.C. at 479, 135 S.E. at 341. 
 229. Foster v. Foster, 264 N.C. 694, 697, 142 S.E.2d 638, 641 (1965) (recognizing 
“the right of the father to recover for loss of services of the infant during minority”); Mu-
sgrove v. Kornegay, 52 N.C. 71, 74 (1859) (“A father is entitled to the services of his 
child until he arrive at the age of twenty-one.”). 
 230. Floyd v. Atl. Coast Line Ry. Co., 167 N.C. 55, 60, 83 S.E. 12, 14 (1914) (adopt-
ing the view that “if there be no actual loss of services, there can be no recovery by the 
parent,” and rejecting the view that “the right of action [is based] upon the right to ser-
vices rather than the actual rendition of services”). 
 231. White v. Holding, 217 N.C. 329, 333, 7 S.E.2d 825, 827 (1940). 
 232. Gibson v. Campbell, 28 N.C. App. 653, 654, 222 S.E.2d 449, 450 (1976) (“How-
ever, if the child dies as a result of such tortious conduct, there can be no recovery for 
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In one case, the court held that the mother did not provide suffi-
cient proof of a claim for loss of services. 233  The court did not, however, 
elaborate on the evidence presented a trial, nor the evidence required to 
support this claim. 
c.  Miscellaneous Claims of Parents 
In addition to claims for medical expenses and lost services and 
earnings, the parents may have claims for miscellaneous losses, and for 
emotional damage.  There is not much authority in North Carolina ad-
dressing those losses, other than medical bills and lost earnings, that the 
parents can recover arising from injury to their minor child.  Where the 
parent incurs an extra expense in caring for the minor due to the minor’s 
injuries, such as a wheelchair ramp, that should be recoverable.234  There 
is authority from other jurisdictions that a parent can be reimbursed for 
his or her time spent in caring for the child;235 however, the parent can-
not recover for care that he or she otherwise would have provided for 
the child.236  One case from North Carolina suggests that the parent can 
recover the value of services in caring for a child.237 
In some instances, the parent may also have an independent claim 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) arising from the in-
 
loss of services for the period following the death, though the parent may still recover 
damages for loss of services of the child for the period intermediate its injury and 
death.”). 
 233. Cates v. Wilson, 83 N.C. App. 448, 458, 350 S.E.2d 898, 904 (1986) (describing 
how a mother sued health care providers for “lost services and earnings” of the minor, 
alleging that doctors failed to diagnose pregnancy and delayed in referring her to an ob-
stetrician, resulting in cerebral palsy and mental retardation in minor; “however . . . de-
spite plaintiff-mother’s contention to the contrary, it appears that plaintiffs did not 
present sufficient evidence of the value of the child’s services during minority to justify a 
verdict for these damages”). 
 234. Floyd, 167 N.C. at 60, 83 S.E. at 14 (1914) (“[I]f the parent is, by the wrong of 
another in injuring the child, put to extra expense in fulfilling his duty, he is entitled to 
recover indemnity from the wrongdoer, without reference to any loss of services result-
ing from the injury.”). 
 235. Worley v. Barger, 807 N.E.2d 1222, 1227 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (“The consequence 
of placing the burden on the defendant to pay the reasonable value of the services ren-
dered to the minor child by the parent is no greater than if the expense had been in-
curred in employing a third person to deliver the service.”). 
 236. Bradford v. Edmands, 30 Cal. Rptr. 185, 191 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) (“Care and 
attendance of a son is a maternal duty and only the special care necessitated by the acci-
dent should be the subject of compensation.”). 
 237. See Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 620, 44 S.E.2d 31, 35 (1947) (noting that 
mother can sue father to recover for the value of her services in tending to a child who 
could not maintain himself, as father has primary obligation to support child). 
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juries to the child.  The seminal case in North Carolina, Johnson v. Ruark 
Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates,238 held that a plaintiff may recover 
for his severe emotional distress arising from injury to another person, if 
the plaintiff can prove that he has sustained severe emotional distress as 
a proximate and foreseeable result of defendant’s negligence.239  Most of 
the cases following Ruark, however, have rejected claims by parents who 
did not witness the incident causing the injury to the child.240  Along 
these lines, where the child’s mother was in the car with the minor at the 
time of the accident, she had a claim for NIED.241 
Some authority holds that a parent can sue for the loss of compa-
nionship of a child who is abducted.242  This doctrine is, however, li-
mited to situations where the defendant abducts the child; where the de-
fendant merely encourages the child to leave the parent, there is no 
action.243 
 
 238. Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 327 N.C. 283, 30405, 395 
S.E.2d 85, 9798 (1990). 
 239. Id. at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98 (“Factors to be considered on the question of fore-
seeability in cases such as this include the plaintiff’s proximity to the negligent act, the 
relationship between the plaintiff and the other person for whose welfare the plaintiff is 
concerned, and whether the plaintiff personally observed the negligent act.”). 
 240. Hickman ex rel Womble v. McKoin, 337 N.C. 460, 461, 446 S.E.2d 80, 81 (1994) 
(rejecting claim when twelve- and fifteen-year-old children learned of automobile acci-
dent and were told their mother was not likely to survive her injuries, and they saw her 
briefly in the ICU, and witnessed her in constant pain and observed her undergo life-
threatening operations); Sorrels v. M.Y.B. Hospitality Ventures of Asheville, 334 N.C. 
669, 672, 435 S.E.2d 320, 322 (1993) (deciding that the possibility that defendant’s neg-
ligence in serving alcohol to son would combine with his driving while intoxicated, 
which would cause parents to suffer severe emotional distress was too remote to be rea-
sonably foreseeable when considering “(1) ‘the plaintiff’s proximity to the negligent act’ 
causing injury to the other person, (2) ‘the relationship between the plaintiff and the 
other person,’ and (3) ‘whether the plaintiff personally observed the negligent act’”); 
Gardner v. Gardner, 334 N.C. 662, 435 S.E.2d 324 (1993) (holding that parent-child re-
lationship was not sufficient to compensate for plaintiff’s lack of close proximity to the 
negligent act and lack of observance of defendant’s negligent act when mother saw son in 
ER undergoing resuscitative efforts after automobile accident but was miles away when 
she learned of his death). 
 241. Fox-Kirk v. Hannon, 42 N.C. App. 267, 275, 542 S.E.2d 346, 352 (1979). 
 242. Little v. Holmes, 181 N.C. 413, 416, 107 S.E. 577, 578 (1921) (“That the parent 
is entitled to such services on the part of the child is sufficient to give him a right of ac-
tion, and having such right on which to base the action, he may recover damages for the 
injury to his feelings, and the loss of the companionship of his child, as well as for the 
loss of the child’s services.”). 
 243. Morris v. Bruney, 78 N.C. App. 668, 672, 338 S.E.2d 561, 564 (1986) (distin-
guishing Little: “In the case at bar, plaintiff Morris alleges only that her son left home, 
with the aid of defendant, after defendant Bruney cast aspersions on plaintiff’s character 
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A parent cannot sue another person, including the other parent, for 
alienating the affections of the child.244  The law does not allow a child to 
recover for loss of consortium of the parent,245 and thus it appears that 
the parent likewise does not have a claim for loss of the injured child’s 
companionship.246 
2.  Whether Claim is Owned by Mother or by Father 
It is not always clear whether the claim for medical expenses, lost 
earnings, and loss of services is held by both parents, or by the father or 
mother separately.  In many cases, of course, this will have no practical 
impact.  There are, however, instances in which this can be significant.  
Under the traditional doctrine, the claim belongs predominately to the 
father.247  Thus, where the father has paid a medical expense for injuries 
to the minor, caused by the mother’s negligence, he may sue the mother 
to recover those losses.248  Further, although the father can transfer the 
 
and fitness as a mother. This is insufficient to support an action for abduction in this 
State.”). 
 244. Edwards v. Edwards, 43 N.C. App. 296, 300, 259 S.E.2d 11, 1415 (1979).  In 
affirming the dismissal of a counterclaim based on plaintiff’s alienation of the affections 
of their son, the court held that “[a]lthough a cause of action exists for one spouse to re-
cover for the alienation of the affections of the other spouse it does not necessarily follow 
that a parent may recover for the lost companionship of a child.”  Id. at 302, 259 S.E.2d 
at 15. 
 245. Vaughn v. Clarkson, 324 N.C. 108, 109, 376 S.E.2d 236, 236 (1989) (“The 
common law of this jurisdiction has refused to recognize a child’s claim for loss of paren-
tal consortium when the parent was negligently injured by another.”); Hill v. Gilmore, 85 
N.C. App. 70, 74, 354 S.E.2d 315, 317 (1987) (“The spousal relationship and the rela-
tionship between parent and child are not the same.  Companionship, service, responsi-
bility, love and affection between spouses differ in both degree and kind from those of a 
parent-child relationship. The law is not constitutionally required to treat these relation-
ships as identical.”); see also Greer v. Parsons, 103 N.C. App. 463, 468, 405 S.E.2d 921, 
924 (1991) (“Damages for loss of a stillborn child’s companionship, services, society and 
the like are too speculative to be recoverable under the Wrongful Death Act.”). 
 246. In a claim for the child’s wrongful death, the estate could of course recover the 
parent’s loss of the child’s companionship, and this would typically inure to the benefit 
of the parents.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b)(4)b (2011) (establishing that an estate 
can recover for loss of “[s]ervices, protection, care and assistance of the decedent, wheth-
er voluntary or obligatory, to the persons entitled to the damages recovered”). 
 247. See Flippin v. Jarrell, 301 N.C. 108, 119, 270 S.E.2d 482, 489 (1980) (“In turn, 
the father ordinarily has been entitled to services of his child during the child’s minority 
and, as between the parents, has alone been afforded the right to bring suit for parental 
losses due to injuries to the child.”). 
 248. Foster v. Foster, 264 N.C. 694, 697, 142 S.E.2d 638, 640 (1965). 
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claim for medical bills to the child by serving as GAL and allowing the 
child to recover them, the mother cannot do so.249 
In Flippin v. Jarrell,250 the mother paid at least one-half of the child’s 
support and paid medical expenses not covered by insurance (which was 
provided by the father).  The Court held that she could sue the tortfea-
sor for medical expenses and loss of services arising from injuries to the 
child.251  The Court noted, “The mother does, however, have an obliga-
tion to support her child when the father fails in whole or in part to do 
so.”252 
Most of the cases also state that the father has the claim for the loss 
of services of the child.253  The mother may, however, acquire this claim, 
as follows: “As between the parents, this right [for services rendered by 
child] belongs, primarily, to the father; but, as a general rule, is given to 
the mother where, by reason of the father’s death or otherwise, the right 
to the custody and services of the child has devolved upon her.”254 
The notion that the father, and not the mother, is primarily respon-
sible for the child’s support is arguably not consistent with the modern 
trend in the law, which is to deem both parents equally responsible for 
the child’s support.  By statute, the parents are both “primarily liable” for 
the support of their child.255  Many of the cases holding that the father is 
primarily liable for the child’s support, or that only the father has the 
claim for medical expenses, were decided prior to the enactment of this 
statute, and our courts could therefore discount or altogether distinguish 
these cases. 
 
 249. See generally Smith v. Hewett, 235 N.C. 615, 70 S.E.2d 825 (1952). 
 250. Flippin, 301 N.C. 108, 270 S.E.2d 482 (1980). 
 251. Id. at 121, 270 S.E.2d at 490. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 120, 270 S.E.2d at 490 (recognizing that injury to child results in “a claim 
by the parent, ordinarily the father, for parental losses caused by . . . loss of services dur-
ing the child’s minority”); Foster, 264 N.C. at 697, 142 S.E.2d at 640 (recognizing “the 
right of the father to recover for loss of services of the infant during minority”). 
 254. Floyd v. Atl. Coast Line Ry. Co., 167 N.C. 55, 59, 83 S.E. 12, 14 (1914) (cita-
tions omitted) (internal quotations omitted) (deciding that only father, and not mother, 
may sue for mental anguish arising from mutilation of son’s body because son’s body be-
longed primarily to father as next of kin). 
 255. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(b) (2011) (“In the absence of pleading and proof that 
the circumstances otherwise warrant, the father and mother shall be primarily liable for 
the support of a minor child.”); Alamance Cnty. Hosp., Inc. v. Neighbors, 315 N.C. 362, 
366, 338 S.E.2d 87, 90 (1986) (discussing how statute “enlarges a mother’s responsibili-
ties by making both parents primarily liable for the support of their children”). 
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3. Defenses to Parents’ Claims 
The parent’s claim is generally subject to the same defenses that 
would apply if the parent were prosecuting an action for the parent’s bo-
dily injury or property damage.  Thus, in an action based on the defen-
dant’s negligence, the parent’s contributory negligence will bar the par-
ent’s claim.256 
The defendant can assert that the minor’s parents were negligent in 
failing to protect their child.  Parents have a duty to protect their child, 
which has been described as follows: 
  At common law, a parent has the duty to protect his child.  In the 
performance of this duty, parents . . . are bound to provide such reason-
able care and protection as an ordinarily prudent person, solicitous for 
the welfare of a child, would deem necessary.  This duty was recognized 
by our Supreme Court in [a case] establishing criminal liability of a par-
ent as an aider and abettor to child abuse.  The General Assembly has al-
so recognized this duty by enacting a criminal statute prohibiting a par-
ent from creating or allowing to be created a substantial risk of physical 
injury to any child under sixteen years of age.  A similar standard is used 
to define an abused juvenile.  
  We can discern no justifiable reason for failing to apply the same du-
ty in civil cases. 
  This is not to say that parents have the legal duty to place themselves 
in danger of death or great bodily harm . . . . To require such, would re-
quire every parent to exhibit courage and heroism which, although 
commendable in the extreme, cannot realistically be expected or re-
quired of all people.  But parents do have the duty to take every step rea-
sonably possible under the circumstances . . . to prevent harm to their 
children. 
  We hold that failure to perform this duty is negligence.257 
 
 256. Price v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 274 N.C. 32, 43, 161 S.E.2d 590, 593 (1968) 
(describing how father’s claim for medical expenses is barred where the father sued to 
recover medical expenses incurred by him for the treatment of two children, and wife’s 
negligence in operating vehicle is imputed to father). 
 257. Coleman v. Cooper, 89 N.C. App. 188, 19899, 366 S.E.2d 2, 89 (1988) (cita-
tions omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (deciding that where mother knew 
that her former husband posed a risk to her children, but she only asked a neighbor to 
watch for the father’s car when the children were alone, whether the mother was contri-
butorily negligent created a jury issue in a claim for wrongful death in which the defense 
asserted mother’s contributory negligence to bar her recovery, despite the fact that the 
defendant DSS worker had informed the mother that adequate police protection would 
be provided if needed), overruled on other grounds by 347 N.C. 97 (1997). 
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In one case, the parents allowed their four-and-one-half-year-old 
child to walk two blocks from her home, under the care of the child’s 
ten-year-old sister.258  The child was struck by a bus while crossing a 
street, and the defendant argued that the parents were contributorily 
negligent in allowing the child to walk from her home.259  The court re-
jected this argument as a matter of law.260 
The father’s claim can be barred by the negligence of the mother, 
where the mother’s negligence is imputed to the father.  This can occur 
when, for example, the children are injured in automobile accident that 
is caused, in part, by the mother’s negligence, where the family purpose 
doctrine operates to impute her negligence to the child’s father.261  The 
ironic result of this is that the father can sue the mother, based on her 
negligence, to recover the child’s medical bills,262 but he cannot sue 
another negligent motorist for this loss. 
The father can lose his claim through waiver, as addressed in Part 
I.A.3.a.ii. of this Article.  The parent can also lose his claim by assigning 
it to his child.263  The parent’s claim is typically also barred by any doc-
 
 258. Reid v. City Coach Co., 215 N.C. 469, 474, 2 S.E.2d 578, 581 (1939). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. (“We cannot see how the parents were negligent and contributed to the injury 
of Dorothy Virginia Reid, who was killed by the defendant.  Her sister, Helen, who had 
her in charge, was ten years old.”). 
 261. Price, 274 N.C. at 4243, 161 S.E.2d at 59798.  In Price, the father’s claim for 
property damage against third person was barred by his wife’s negligence, which was im-
puted to him.  Id.  The court wrote: 
In principle we can see no difference in Brooks M. Price’s action to recover 
damages for the demolition of his automobile and his action to recover medical 
expenses incurred in the necessary treatment of his two minor, unemancipated 
children injured in the collision, and we hold that his action to recover such 
medical expenses incurred in the treatment of the injuries of his two minor, 
unemancipated daughters is barred. 
Id. at 43, 161 S.E.2d at 598.  The parties stipulated that the mother, who was negligent in 
the operation of the vehicle, was the father’s “agent and servant and that on the occasion 
complained of her operation of the automobile was within the scope of such agency as 
this was a family automobile.” Id. at 36–37, 161 S.E.2d at 593. 
 262. Foster v. Foster, 264 N.C. 694, 697, 142 S.E.2d 638, 640 (1965). 
 263. N.C. Baptist Hosps., Inc. v. Mitchell, 323 N.C. 528, 534, 374 S.E.2d 844, 847 
(1988) (“In an assignment of a raw claim or cause of action for personal injuries, the 
claimant loses all control of the conduct of settlement negotiations, the right to bring an 
action against the tort-feasor in his own name, the right to control the litigation, and the 
right to control the settlement of the lawsuit.”). 
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trine that bars the minor’s claim.264  Thus, the parent’s claim is barred by 
the negligence of the minor.265 
Some cases state that the parent’s claim is “derivative” of the child’s 
claim.266  In some contexts, however, the parents’ claim will be deemed a 
separate claim, and not a derivative claim.267  For a true derivative claim, 
the general rule is that the derivative claim must be litigated with the 
main claim, and the loss of the main claim results in the loss of the de-
rivative claim.268  In North Carolina, the parent’s claim does not have to 
be filed with the minor’s claim.269  Further, a prior suit by the minor will 
not impair the parent’s right to bring suit to recover medical expenses.270 
 
 264. W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 125, at 937 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds. 5th 
ed. 1984) (“[I]f the injured spouse or child is barred by a statute of limitations, or be-
cause workers’ compensation represents his exclusive remedy, the derived spouse or par-
ent claim will be barred.”). 
 265. Kleibor v. Rogers, 265 N.C. 304, 306, 144 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1965) (“Unquestiona-
bly, the contributory negligence of his minor son, if established in this action, would 
constitute a bar to plaintiff’s recovery herein.”); see also Townsend v. Frye, 30 N.C. App. 
634, 640, 228 S.E.2d 56, 60 (1976).  The court noted that Kleibor was brought into ques-
tion by subsequent cases, but nevertheless concluded: 
[I]f, at the new trial, the child is found to have been contributorily negligent, 
the child’s contributory negligence will bar the mother’s right to recover for 
loss of the child’s services and medical expenses for the child.  It appears that 
our holding is consistent with that of most of the courts in other jurisdictions 
that have decided the question. 
Id. 
 266. Howard ex rel Sigmon v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 115 N.C. App. 458, 463, 445 S.E.2d 
66, 69 (1994) (“The parents’ claim for the child’s medical expenses is derivative in na-
ture.”). 
 267. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lankford, 118 N.C. App. 368, 374, 455 S.E.2d 484, 
487 (1995) (noting that issuing two policies of insurance does not allow the insurer to 
avoid paying benefits under both policies on argument that parent’s claim is derivative). 
 268. See Desjarlais v. USAA Ins. Co., 824 A.2d 1272 (R.I. 2003).  In Desjarlais, the 
minor’s claim for loss of consortium of parent, and the wife’s claim for loss of consortium 
of husband were barred because the husband settled with the tortfeasor and husband 
failed in arbitration of the underinsured motorist claim.  Id. at 1281.  Because these 
claims were derivative, the court noted that “these claims are not independent of their 
father’s personal-injury claim, but ‘stand[] or fall[]’ with it.”  Id. at 1282 (quoting 
KEETON, supra note 264, § 125, at 938).  Derivative claims must be brought with the 
principal action unless it is not feasible to do so.  Id. at 128082. 
 269. West ex rel Farris v. Tilley, 120 N.C. App. 145, 151, 461 S.E.2d 1, 4 
(1995) (“[T]he interests of plaintiff and her mother were not so united as to require 
joinder of [the mother] under Rule 19(a).”). 
 270. Ellington v. Bradford, 242 N.C. 159, 162, 86 S.E.2d 925, 927 (1955) (holding 
that in an action by a minor, allegations pertaining to medical expenses should be strick-
en upon timely motion by the defendant, seen when the court states that “[t]he decisions 
of this Court recognize the right of the defendant to require that the parent’s cause of 
52
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss2/3
KIRBY- FINAL 4/12/2012  9:06 AM 
2012] MINOR’S PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS  345 
The parent can lose some claims if he fails to support the child.  
“The parental right to the child’s services, being contingent on parental 
fulfillment of support obligations, may be lost when the parent neglects 
or refuses to furnish support.”271  Where a parent abandons his child, it 
is possible that the parent may lose his claim arising from his parental 
relationship.272 
II. PROCEDURES FOR FILING SUIT FOR MINOR 
There are several procedural issues raised when a minor files suit 
that are not present when the plaintiff is an adult. 
A. Guardian ad Litem 
Where there is a civil action or special proceeding, in which the 
minor is the plaintiff, Rule 17(b)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil 
Procedure requires that the minor appear by a GAL, stating, “In actions 
or special proceedings when any of the parties plaintiff are infants or in-
competent persons, whether residents or nonresidents of this State, they 
must appear by general or testamentary guardian, if they have any within 
the State or by guardian ad litem appointed as hereinafter pro-
vided . . . .”273  
Thus, a minor who is a party to an action or proceeding generally 
must have a GAL.274  A GAL should also be appointed for a minor party 
in proceedings that are not subject to the rules of civil procedure, such 
as a workers compensation proceeding in the Industrial Commission.275  
 
action and the infant’s cause of action be separately brought, provided he makes objec-
tion to the joinder in apt time . . .” and the court implicitly recognizes that the father can 
bring a subsequent action for medical expenses); see also discussion infra Parts II.B. and 
II.C., regarding issues pertaining to joinder of the parent’s and minor’s claim, and per-
taining to the res judicata effect of one case on the other case. 
 271. Flippin v. Jarrell, 301 N.C. 108, 120, 270 S.E.2d 482, 490 (1980). 
 272. Williford v. Williford, 288 N.C. 506, 510, 219 S.E.2d 220, 223 (1975) (“It fol-
lows that the plaintiff father, having abandoned the deceased when the latter was a minor 
child, may not now share in the proceeds of the settlement of the claim for wrongful 
death now in the hands of the administratrix.”). 
 273. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 17(b)(1) (2011). 
 274. In re Clark, 303 N.C. 592, 598, 281 S.E.2d 47, 52 (1981) (recognizing that mi-
nors are required to have GAL pursuant to Rule 17, regardless of whether the Termina-
tion of Parental Rights Act requires a GAL). 
 275. See, e.g., Cobb v. E. Clearing & Grading, Inc., 1 N.C. App. 327, 332, 161 S.E.2d 
612, 616 (1968) (deciding that in an industrial commission action, the hearing commis-
sioner properly appointed a next friend for minors asserting a claim for death benefits). 
53
Kirby: Minor's Personal Injury Actions and Settlements in North Carolina
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2012
KIRBY- FINAL 4/12/2012  9:06 AM 
346 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:293 
Under the federal rule, the appointment of a GAL is optional.276  In one 
case, the federal court noted that the minors could be well served by 
having their parents represent them, as that would avoid using settle-
ment funds for the GAL fees.277 
Prior to Rule 17, the action in state court would have been prose-
cuted by the “next friend.”278  Under the older procedure and terminolo-
gy, a minor plaintiff was represented by the “next friend,” and the minor 
defendant was represented by a “guardian ad litem.”279  The use of the 
“next friend” was mandated by statute and rule.280  Even without a codi-
fied rule authorizing the appointment of a GAL, the courts generally 
have the power to appoint a GAL to represent a minor who is a party to 
a proceeding.281  These older cases involving next friends and GALs 
should be highly instructive in modern cases involving GALs under Rule 
 
 276. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c)(2).  Rule 17(c)(2) provides: 
A minor or an incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed repre-
sentative may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem.  The court must 
appoint a guardian ad litem—or issue another appropriate order—to protect a 
minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action. 
Id. 
 277. Seibels, Bruce & Co. v. Nicke, 168 F.R.D. 542, 544 (M.D.N.C. 1996).  The court 
explained, 
[I]t may be presumed that a parent acts in the best interest of the child.  Per-
mitting the parent to act as a guardian saves the expense of appointing a guar-
dian which is also an important policy consideration. . . . Furthermore, a feder-
al court should, as a matter of sound policy, be cautious in attempting to step 
between the parent and his or her child. 
Id. (citations omitted).  See also id. at 546 (deciding, when plaintiff filed an interpleader 
action against minors and moved for appointment of guardians, “that [mother] shall 
show cause within twenty days of the entry of this Order why she should not represent 
the interests of [her children] or should not procure someone to represent those inter-
ests”). 
 278. Sadler v. Purser, 12 N.C. App. 206, 209, 182 S.E.2d 850, 852 (1971) (holding 
that, even though minor appeared by “next friend” and not GAL as required by new 
Rules of Civil Procedure, any error was corrected by stipulation that next friend was 
properly qualified as GAL for said minor). 
 279. Johnston Cnty. v. Ellis, 226 N.C. 268, 278, 38 S.E.2d 31, 38 (1946) (“[A] next 
friend is appointed to bring or prosecute some proceeding in which the infant suitor is 
plaintiff, or at least where some right is positively asserted . . . while a guardian ad litem 
is appointed to defend.”). 
 280. Houser v. W.R. Bonsal & Co., 149 N.C. 51, 54, 62 S.E. 776, 777 (1908) (citing 
statute requiring next friend for minor plaintiff).  The next friend was also appointed by 
the court.  Teele v. Kerr, 261 N.C. 148, 134 S.E.2d 126 (1964). 
 281. Carraway v. Lassiter, 139 N.C. 145, 152, 51 S.E. 968, 971 (1905) (“Certainly the 
superior court has, independently of the Code, the power to appoint a guardian ad litem 
for an infant defendant.”). 
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17.  There is also an important distinction between a “guardian ad litem,” 
and a “general guardian.”282   
A general guardian is responsible for the entirety of one’s person and/or 
estate and maintains such responsibility beyond the context of the cour-
troom. . . . In contrast, a guardian ad litem is appointed by the court to 
appear in a lawsuit on behalf of an incompetent or minor party.  ‘Ad li-
tem’ is a Latin phrase that means [f]or the purposes of the suit[.]283 
If the minor has a general guardian, he can appear for the minor in 
the proceeding; the court may also appoint a GAL.284 
The effect of the failure to appoint a GAL for the minor is not clear.  
In one case, where the father served the functions of a next friend and 
the court regarded the father as the next friend, the Supreme Court held 
that the proceeding was valid.285  Where the minor is not represented by 
a GAL, or its equivalent, there is some authority that the failure to ap-
point a next friend does not render the judgment void.286  Under this au-
thority, such a judgment or settlement is merely voidable.  For a discus-
 
 282. Teele, 261 N.C. at 150, 134 S.E.2d at 128.  The court in Teele explained: 
A guardian is authorized . . . to take possession of all his estate for the use of 
his ward and to bring all necessary actions therefor.  [Section] 1-64 [of the 
North Carolina General Statutes] merely authorizes infant plaintiffs without a 
general guardian to appear by their next friend when it is necessary for them to 
prosecute an action.  The power of a next friend is strictly limited to the per-
formance of the precise duty imposed upon him by the order appointing him, 
that is, the prosecution of the particular action in which he was appointed. 
Id. 
 283. Roberts v. Adventure Holdings, LLC, 703 S.E.2d 784, 787, 2010 N.C. App. 
LEXIS 2417, at *6–7 (2010) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (es-
tablishing venue through GAL’s county of residence is insufficient standing alone). 
 284. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 17(b)(3) (2011). 
 285. Oates v. Texas Co., 203 N.C. 474, 478, 166 S.E. 317, 319 (1932) (deciding that 
even if father was not properly appointed as next friend, “as one appeared in fact, and the 
court so treated him, that was sufficient for the purpose of acquiring complete jurisdic-
tion”). 
 286. Tate v. Mott, 96 N.C. 27, 28, 2 S.E. 176, 180 (1887) (holding that where minors 
filed petition to sell land, court should have appointed next friends for them, but court’s 
ruling requiring sale of property was not void); McRorie v. Shinn, 11 N.C. App. 475, 
481, 181 S.E.2d 773, 777 (1971) (ruling that where minor’s interest in land was lost 
through proceeding decades earlier to pay debts of estate, and minors were not 
represented by GALs in said hearing, “we do not think the failure to provide the [minor] 
Femme plaintiffs with [a GAL] rendered the proceedings fatally defective”); see also 
Maager v. Hoye, 122 F.Supp. 932 (E.D.N.C. 1954) (relying on national treatise although 
controlled by Virginia law, and deciding that prior consent judgment barred instant ac-
tion).  The Maager court noted, “Generally, in absence of fraud or collusion, neither fail-
ure of infant to sue by next friend nor fact that next friend has an adverse interest will 
render judgment void.”  Id. 
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sion of the distinction between a void judgment and a voidable judg-
ment, see Part III.F. of this Article. 
Other cases, however, indicate that the absence of a GAL deprives 
the court of jurisdiction and renders the judgment affecting the minor’s 
rights void.287  Some cases hold that a minor is not bound by a judgment 
entered without a GAL, but do not clearly articulate if the judgment is 
void or voidable.288 
The GAL should be appointed prior to or at the time the lawsuit is 
filed.289  The courts tend to adopt a functional approach in determining 
the effect of a delay in the appointment of a GAL.  Where the court acts 
promptly in appointing a GAL upon realizing that the party is a minor, 
and there is no prejudice resulting from the delay, there is no error.290  
Where a case goes to trial, and the GAL is not appointed until the day of 
 
 287. See, e.g., Johnston Cnty. v. Ellis, 226 N.C. 268, 279, 38 S.E.2d 31, 38 (1946) 
(noting that lower court lacked jurisdiction over foreclosure proceeding, which affected 
minors’ interest in property, where minors did not have a GAL and rejecting the argu-
ment that minor’s challenge to prior order was barred by laches, because the order was 
void); Butler v. Winston, 223 N.C. 421, 425, 27 S.E.2d 124, 12627 (1943) (noting that 
where a clerk enters judgment for a sale of real property, and the minor with interest in 
the property was not appointed a guardian until the next day, the judgment is void, and 
does not operate as an estoppel to deny the minor the ability to claim title to property); 
see also White v. Osborne, 251 N.C. 56, 59, 110 S.E.2d 449, 452 (1959) (deciding 
whether GAL had conflict of interest at minor’s trial, “question arises as to whether [the 
presiding judge] lacked jurisdiction in respect of such conflict on the ground that the 
infant plaintiff was not then represented with reference thereto”). 
 288. See, e.g., Cranford v. Steed, 268 N.C. 595, 59798, 151 S.E.2d 206, 208 (1966) 
(noting that where plaintiff sued minor defendant, and obtained consent judgment, and 
minor was thereafter appointed a guardian and asserted a counter-claim, and plaintiff 
asserted that consent judgment precluded minor’s counter-claim, the fact that minor did 
not have guardian on date of consent judgment “alone would seem sufficient to require 
that the purported consent judgment . . . be vacated as to him”); McIver Park, Inc. v. 
Brinn, 223 N.C. 502, 27 S.E.2d 548 (1943) (holding that service by publication as to mi-
nors was valid, but absence of GAL rendered the judgment not binding against minors; 
also holding that a deed issued pursuant to tax foreclosure proceeding in which minors 
did not have guardian does not terminate minor’s rights to land). 
 289. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 17(c)(1). 
 290. Franklin Cnty. v. Jones, 245 N.C. 272, 279, 95 S.E.2d 863, 868 (1957).  The 
court held that “[w]hen the disability was called to the attention of the court, it acted 
promptly and appointed a guardian ad litem.”  Id.  The court further seemed to hold that 
the lower court did not err where plaintiff sued minors, the clerk entered ruling for 
plaintiff for sale of land, the clerk then learned that some defendants were minors and 
appointed a GAL, the GAL did not deny allegations of complaint and consented to judg-
ment, and the land was thereafter sold.  See generally id. 
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trial, the judgment can be set aside.291  On the other hand, it has been 
held that a GAL could be appointed after the jury verdict where the mi-
nor’s interests were adequately protected at the trial by the minor’s at-
torney.292  The court cannot appoint a GAL nunc pro tunc where the mi-
nor’s interests were not adequately protected in the proceeding.293  An 
error in the appointment of a GAL can be ratified by the minor, if he at-
tains the age of majority and continues prosecuting his case.294 
Pursuant to Rule 17(b)(4) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, a GAL may represent an unborn person in an action involving, 
inter alia, wills, trusts and the distribution of property.295  In the absence 
of such a statute, however, an unborn child cannot have a GAL.296  Rule 
 
 291. In re R.A.H., 171 N.C. App. 427, 43132, 614 S.E.2d 382, 385 (2005) (reversing 
order based on termination of parental rights (“TPR”) hearing where the court did not 
appoint a GAL until three-and-a-half days into the TPR hearing, even though judge of-
fered GAL the option of recalling witnesses and postponing further hearings); Simms v. 
Sampson, 221 N.C. 379, 389, 20 S.E.2d 554, 560 (1942) (denying that a motion to set 
aside the judgment was an error by lower court because “[t]he GAL was appointed the 
day the case was tried.  He accepted service of summons, copies of the pleadings, and 
filed his answer the same day.  No such haste is contemplated under the provisions of 
Consolidated Statutes of North Carolina, Section 451”). 
 292. Tart v. Register, 257 N.C. 161, 171, 125 S.E.2d 754, 761 (1962) (holding that in 
an action against a minor defendant where a GAL was not appointed until after the jury 
rendered the verdict, this irregularity did not render the judgment void, and, further, the 
attorney adequately represented the minor). 
293.Butler v. Winston, 223 N.C. 421, 425–26, 27 S.E.2d 124, 127. The court held that 
judgment for sale of property, made when a minor did not have a GAL, is void: “It no-
where appears that the appointment was made or attempted to be made nunc pro tunc, 
and even if such an appointment had been so made it could not have availed the defen-
dants.”  Id. 
 294. Lovett v. Stone, 239 N.C. 206, 212, 79 S.E.2d 479, 483 (1954) (describing minor 
that ratified earlier proceedings in which he arguably did not have a properly appointed 
GAL by “continuing the prosecution of the cause in his own right”). 
 295. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 17(b)(4) (2011) (“In all actions in rem and quasi in 
rem and in all actions and special proceedings which involve the construction of wills, 
trusts and contracts or any instrument in writing, or which involve the determination of 
the ownership of property or the distribution of property, if there is a possibility that 
some person may thereafter be born who, if then living, would be a necessary or proper 
party to such action or special proceeding, the court in which said action or special pro-
ceeding is pending, upon motion of any of the parties or upon its own motion, may ap-
point some discreet person GAL to defend on behalf of such unborn person.”).  This lan-
guage is almost a verbatim recitation of section 1-65.2 of the North Carolina General 
Statutes, which was repealed in 1967.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-65.2 (repealed 1967).  This 
statute was enacted in 1955, presumably to address the problem created by the McPher-
son case, discussed infra note 296. 
 296. McPherson v. First & Citizens Nat. Bank of Elizabeth City, 240 N.C. 1, 18, 81 
S.E.2d 386, 397 (1954) (holding that the representation of minor defendants by a GAL is 
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17 does not provide for the appointment of a GAL for an unborn person 
in a personal injury suit, and therefore presumably an unborn person 
cannot pursue such a suit. 
The next subsections address several issues that arise with GALs. 
1.  Procedure for Appointment 
The Clerk is authorized to appoint a GAL;297 the court can also ap-
point a GAL.298  Where a GAL has not been appointed and the court be-
comes aware of this fact, the court should appoint a GAL.299  The GAL is 
“subject to judicial supervision.”300  “The next friend is an officer of the 
court, and subject to removal by its order at any time.”301  When the mi-
nor is represented by a GAL with an interest in the proceeding, the court 
should not rule on the merits of the case, but should instead require 
another GAL to be appointed.302 
 
not “sanctioned by law” but instead “[t]he rule is that, in the absence of statute, the ca-
pacity to be sued exists only in persons in being.  With us, in the absence of statute, an 
unborn infant cannot be made a defendant in an action and be represented by a guardian 
ad litem.” (citation omitted)). 
 297. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-103 (1979) (“The clerk of superior court is authorized 
to . . . [a]ppoint and remove guardians and trustees, as provided by law.”); In re Estate of 
Sturman, 93 N.C. App. 473, 475, 378 S.E.2d 204, 205 (1989) (“If the revocation matter is 
an ‘action’ or ‘special proceeding’ under G.S. Rule 17(b), then the Clerk had statutory 
authority to appoint the guardian ad litem.”); accord Carraway v. Lassiter, 139 N.C. 145, 
153, 51 S.E. 968, 971 (“We can see no good reason why the clerk, who acts as and for the 
court, may not do the same [i.e., appoint a GAL] in special proceedings pending before 
him.”). 
 298. Franklin Cnty. v. Jones, 245 N.C. 272, 279, 95 S.E.2d 863, 868 (1957). 
 299. Id. (“When the court acquired knowledge of the disability of some of the parties 
[minors], it was proper for the court to appoint some competent and discreet person to 
act for those under disability.”). 
 300. Tate v. Mott, 96 N.C. 19, 27, 2 S.E. 176, 179–80 (1887) (ruling that a proceed-
ing involving a minor, in the absence of a next friend, was not void, but merely voidable 
where the minor’s legal guardian, who was not appointed as a next friend or GAL, “did 
irregularly what was necessary and proper to be done by a next friend,” and “the court 
recognized him as serving a proper purpose—that of a next friend—and acted upon the 
appearance of the infants by him”). 
 301. Abbott v. Hancock, 123 N.C. 99, 102, 31 S.E. 268, 269 (1898); Tate, 96 N.C. at 
23, 2 S.E. at 178 (noting that the court may remove a next friend if he is unfit for such 
purpose). 
 302. Cobb v. E. Clearing & Grading, Inc., 1 N.C. App. 327, 161 S.E.2d 612 (1968); 
see also infra section II.A.3. regarding the GAL’s conflicts of interest. 
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The minor is not entitled to notice that a proceeding has been filed 
on his behalf to approve a settlement.303  Thus, it would appear that the 
minor is not entitled to notice of the proceeding to appoint a GAL.304 
There is also a presumption that the appointment of a GAL is prop-
er.305  The appointment is not subject to collateral attack,306 and only a 
party with standing may appeal the appointment.307 
2.  Persons who may serve as GAL 
“[T]he court possesses the overriding discretionary power to ap-
point any person whom it considers suitable, whether related or not, to 
act as next friend of an infant plaintiff.”308  The GAL is most commonly a 
family member, such as a parent.  As stated by one court: 
It is . . . usual to appoint his near relation, who it is supposed cares par-
ticularly for his good; but, as it sometimes happens that such relation 
may have some interest some interest adverse to his, or be unfriendly to 
him, the court may, in its sound discretion, designate any discreet and fit 
person to act as next friend.309 
Other authority notes that lawyers also often serve as the minor’s 
GAL.  Our Supreme Court wrote: 
Thus, under the statutory law and traditional practice of this State, the 
minor parties to a civil action or a special proceeding must be 
represented by a guardian ad litem who may defend pro se or employ 
 
 303. Gillikin v. Gillikin (Gillikin II), 252 N.C. 1, 6, 113 S.E.2d 38, 42 (1960) (“It is 
not necessary, however, for such minor to know that an action or special proceeding is 
brought in his behalf.”). 
 304. Hagins v. Redevelopment Comm’n of Greensboro, 275 N.C. 90, 165 S.E.2d 490 
(1969) (indicating that an order appointing a GAL without notice to an incompetent 
person is void).  Where a GAL is appointed to represent an incompetent plaintiff, notice 
must be given to the plaintiff of the appointment of the GAL.  Id. 
 305. Lovett v. Stone, 239 N.C. 206, 212, 79 S.E.2d 479, 483 (1954) (“As the contrary 
does not appear in this case, it must be assumed that the court made the appointment of 
the next friend upon the written application of Campbell because no person closely con-
nected with the plaintiff Billy Stone would apply.”). 
 306. Sumner v. Sessoms, 94 N.C. 371, 376 (1886) (“The presence of a next friend or 
guardian ad litem to represent an infant party, as the case may be, and his recognition by 
the Court, in proceeding with the cause, precludes an inquiry into his authority in a col-
lateral proceeding . . . .”). 
 307. Carroll v. Montgomery, 128 N.C. 278, 279, 38 S.E. 874, 874 (1901) (“[Court’s 
selection of next friend] is not a matter from which the defendant could appeal.  It did 
not concern him.”). 
 308. Lovett, 239 N.C. at 206, 79 S.E.2d at 479 (1954). 
 309. Tate v. Mott, 96 N.C. 19, 23, 2 S.E. 176, 177–78 (1887). 
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counsel.310  A traditional practice has been to appoint licensed attorneys 
as guardians ad litem, and, even then, in the more complicated matters, 
for the guardian ad litem to employ separate counsel.311 
3.  Conflicts of Interest by GAL 
The court and the parties should be wary of a potential conflict of 
interest between the GAL and the minor.  Where the parent and the 
child are competing for assets which are not sufficient to satisfy both of 
their claims, there is a conflict, and the parent cannot serve as GAL.  
Thus, for example, where a judgment in a minor’s action represents the 
father’s claim for medical expenses and also the minor’s separate claim 
for his injuries, and the judgment gives priority to the father for any 
payment on the judgment, the father has a conflict with his child. 312  In 
a proceeding before the clerk for the distribution of funds paid toward 
the judgment, the father cannot serve as the minor’s GAL due to the con-
flict.313   
An ethics opinion from the North Carolina State Bar suggests that 
where the insurance proceeds are insufficient to pay all of the claims of a 
parent and a minor, the parent has a conflict of interest with the child, 
which precludes the parent from serving as the GAL.314  The opinion 
states that an independent GAL must be appointed, and, “To be inde-
pendent, a guardian ad litem should have no separate claim of his or her 
 
 310. This sentence could be interpreted to mean that a non-lawyer could serve as the 
GAL and could defend the minor in the absence of legal counsel.  This raises a question 
as to whether the service of such a guardian would constitute the unauthorized practice 
of law.  This issue is beyond the scope of this Article and is therefore not addressed in 
depth herein.  Some authority indicates that the non-lawyer GAL cannot prosecute a case 
for the minor.  “The necessity of employment of an attorney by a guardian ad litem who 
is not himself a lawyer is . . . that no person who is not an attorney may represent anoth-
er in a legal proceeding.”  Torres v. Friedman, 215 Cal. Rptr. 604, 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1985) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also discussion of Torres 
and another California case infra note 443. 
 311. In re Clark, 303 N.C. 592, 598, 281 S.E.2d 47, 52 (1981).  In other contexts, the 
GAL must be an attorney.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-11.1(b) (regarding appointment of a 
GAL for, e.g., “unknown or unapprehended defendants” in a criminal proceeding). 
 312. White v. Osborne, 251 N.C. 56, 59–60, 110 S.E.2d 449, 452 (1959) (“It is appar-
ent that the pecuniary interests of the father and the pecuniary interests of the infant 
plaintiff were in sharp and irreconcilable conflict in relation to whether the father, indi-
vidually, was entitled to such priority.”)  The case was remanded for further proceedings 
in which the minor was to have a disinterested GAL.  Id. at 60, 110 S.E.2d at 452. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Council of the N.C. State Bar, RPC 251 (1997), available at 
http://www.ncbar.com/ethics/ethics.asp. 
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own to pursue, including a claim for medical expenses for a dependent 
child.”  In a federal case in North Carolina, however, the court held that 
the parents could adequately represent their children’s interests, not-
withstanding a limited source of funds, because “nothing else appearing, 
the Court can presume that the parent will look after the interests of her 
child.”315 
Similarly, if there is a factual issue on which the GAL and minor 
have conflicting interests, the GAL is disqualified.  Thus, in an action be-
fore the Industrial Commission to determine whether a deceased worker 
was the father of two children, which affected whether the children or 
their mother received the death benefits, the mother could not serve as 
the GAL for the minors.316  The GAL also has a conflict where she does 
not want to pursue a claim against a tortfeasor based on familial or other 
ties.317 
Where the GAL has a conflict of interest, the resulting judgment 
can be void or voidable.  The case law on this point is somewhat con-
flicting.  Many of the cases on this issue involve a minor’s interest in 
land.  In one case, the GAL had an impermissible interest and should 
have been disqualified to represent the minor in the proceeding, in 
which the minor’s real property was transferred to pay the debts of an 
estate.318  The court held that the proceeding “is extremely irregular, but 
the judgment is not void—but voidable.”319  The court held that the 
 
 315. Seibels, Bruce & Co v. Nicke, 168 F.R.D. 542, 544 (M.D.N.C. 1996).  In an in-
terpleader action by an insurance company against a minor and her mother for personal 
injuries sustained in an automobile accident and against other passengers in the car, the 
court denied a motion to appoint guardians ad litem for minors, and ordered the mother 
to show cause why she should not represent the interests of her daughter, even though 
“there is a small interpleader fund and many claimants.”  Id. at 544. 
 316. Cobb v. E. Clearing & Grading, Inc., 1 N.C. App. 327, 332, 161 S.E.2d 612, 616 
(1968).  The mother was appointed as next friend for the minors, and the Industrial 
Commission ruled that the minors were not children of the employee: “Obviously, if the 
children were found to be entitled to benefits, the widow’s award would be reduced.  If 
they received no award, the mother and next friend would receive a larger award.  There 
is an obvious conflict of interest.”  Id. at 332–33, 161 S.E.2d at 616.  The court remanded 
for appointment of another next friend who had the right to petition to reopen the mat-
ter within sixty days.  Id. at 333, 161 S.E.2d at 616. 
 317. Council of N.C. State Bar, 2006 Formal Ethics Op. 9 (2006) (addressing situa-
tion where minor’s mother serves as GAL and opposes filing claim against minor’s 
grandmother). 
 318. Graham v. Floyd, 214 N.C. 77, 197 S.E. 873 (1938). 
 319. Id. at 82, 197 S.E. at 876. 
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judgment could not be vacated because the purchasers of the land were 
innocent.320 
Another case, however, held that where the minor’s GAL had a con-
flict, a judgment was void.  In Butler v. Winston,321 the testator died, leav-
ing a will transferring her real property to her minor granddaughter.  
The testator’s daughter filed a caveat proceeding to challenge the will in 
an effort to obtain the land through intestacy.322  The daughter’s husband 
was appointed next friend for the minor in the caveat proceeding, and he 
consented to a judgment declaring the will to be invalid.323  The land was 
thereby transferred to the daughter and was ultimately sold to a third 
party.324  The minor then filed an action to determine ownership of the 
land.325  The lower court ruled for the plaintiff, and the North Carolina 
Supreme Court affirmed. 
The court recognized the “antagonistic interests” between the minor 
and her GAL in the caveat proceeding.326  If the will were declared 
invalid, the GAL would obtain an interest in the property.327  “The man-
ner of thus bringing into court [the minor] was insufficient and unau-
thorized by law and the judgment rendered must be disregarded as 
void.”328  The court noted, “‘If he (the next friend) has any interest at all 
in the suit it must be thoroughly consistent with that of his wards.  Even 
his attorney must be equally disinterested, and a mere colorable interest 
is a sufficient disqualification for either, if at all adverse.’”329  The court 
declared that the judgment rejecting the will was void.330  “[S]uch judg-
ments are subject to collateral attack, and will be treated everywhere as a 
nullity.”331  The court further found that the purchasers were not inno-
 
 320. Id. at 81, 197 S.E. at 876 (noting that the purchaser was innocent, where “one 
examining the title is [not] held to constructive knowledge of so minute details”); see 
also Cobb, 1 N.C. App. 327, 161 S.E.2d 612 (1968) (holding that even though GAL had 
an improper interest, the decision of the Industrial Commission was not reversed; in-
stead, the matter was remanded for appointment of another next friend who had the 
right to petition to reopen the matter within sixty days). 
 321. Butler v. Winston, 223 N.C. 421, 27 S.E.2d 124 (1943). 
 322. Id. at 424, 27 S.E.2d at 125. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. at 423, 27 S.E.2d at 125. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. at 424, 27 S.E.2d at 126. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. (citation omitted). 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. at 426, 27 S.E.2d at 127. 
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cent purchasers because the blemish on the title “appeared on the 
records and were easily discoverable upon examination.”332 
In White v. Osborne,333 the father served as the GAL for his son and 
had antagonistic interests because the funds to pay the minor and to pay 
for medical expenses were limited. The North Carolina Supreme Court, 
in a portion of the opinion that appears to be dicta, stated, “[u]nder the 
circumstances, a question arises as to whether [the presiding judge] 
lacked jurisdiction in respect of such conflict on the ground that the in-
fant plaintiff was not then represented with reference thereto.”334  If the 
trial court lacks jurisdiction, any resulting judgment is generally void.335 
Where the minor’s lawyer believes that the GAL has a conflict and 
is not adequately representing the minor, the lawyer may ask the court 
to remove the GAL.336 
There is some authority that where the minors have conflicting in-
terests, they should have separate GALs.337  In the context of minors 
with personal injury claims, whether a conflict exists between minors 
requiring them to have separate GALs should be decided on a case-by-
case basis.  There is some authority that the family can work together to 
arrive at a reasonable and fair settlement for all of the minors notwith-
standing a conflict of interest,338 and therefore there should not be a per 
se rule prohibiting one GAL from representing several minors.339 
 
 332. Id. at 427, 27 S.E.2d at 128. 
 333. White v. Osborne, 251 N.C. 56, 110 S.E.2d 449 (1959). 
 334. Id. at 59–60, 110 S.E.2d at 452. 
 335. Chadbourn, Inc. v. Katz, 285 N.C. 700, 703, 208 S.E.2d 676, 677 (1974) (“A per-
sonal judgment rendered by a court which has no jurisdiction over a defendant is void.”). 
 336. Council of N.C. State Bar, 2006 Formal Ethics Op. 9 (2006) (addressing situa-
tion where minor’s mother serves as GAL, and opposes filing claim against minor’s 
grandmother, stating that “[a]s an alternative to withdrawal, if Lawyer believes GAL is 
failing to fulfill her fiduciary duties, Lawyer may seek to have GAL removed and replaced 
by an independent guardian ad litem who can evaluate the action against the truck driver 
and the claim against Grandmother objectively and make an unbiased decision about the 
conduct of the litigation”); see also infra Part II.D. for further discussion of this opinion. 
 337. See Riemer v. Riemer, 270 N.W.2d 93, 96 (Wis. 1978) (ruling that one GAL 
could not represent two minors born to the same mother because minors had different 
interests and should have had separate GALs, as younger child would be disinherited 
upon a finding that he was not a child of the father). 
 338. See Seibels, Bruce & Co v. Nicke, 168 F.R.D. 152, 544 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (allow-
ing minor’s parent to represent minor in interpleader action, even though parent also had 
a claim to limited funds by determining “it may be presumed that a parent acts in the 
best interest of the child”); Council of N.C. State Bar, RPC 251 (1997) (noting that a 
lawyer can represent several minors even though the insurance proceeds are insufficient 
to pay all of the claims); Council of N.C. State Bar, RPC 123 (1992) (noting that a lawyer 
can represent parents and a minor notwithstanding a conflict between them as to alloca-
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4. Duties and Powers of GAL 
The duties of the GAL are defined by case law and, to a lesser ex-
tent, by the Rule 17 of North Carolina’s Rules of Civil Procedure.  Other 
than stating that the GAL shall “file and serve . . . pleadings,”340 the rule 
is silent as to the GAL’s duties, and there are no statutes setting forth his 
duties. 
Some authorities set forth the duties of the GAL.  “‘The appointment 
of the guardian ad litem is to protect the interest of the infant defendant 
at every stage of the proceeding.’”341  A case from another jurisdiction de-
scribed the role of the GAL in a personal injury case as follows: 
  After a thorough investigation, the guardian ad litem has a duty to 
evaluate: (i) the damages suffered by the minor, (ii) the adequacy of the 
settlement, (iii) the proposed apportionment of settlement proceeds 
among the interested parties, (iv) the proposed manner of disbursement 
of the settlement proceeds, and (v) the amount of attorneys’ fees charged 
by the minor’s attorney.  Based on the guardian ad litem’s evaluation, the 
ad litem shall make a recommendation to the district court on the mi-
nor’s behalf.  Consequently, a guardian ad litem has a legal obligation to 
be careful and diligent in his representation of the minor’s interests.342 
The GAL must act diligently and in good faith.343  A court in anoth-
er jurisdiction has written, “As a fiduciary, the guardian ad litem shall: (i) 
use the skill and prudence that an ordinary, capable, and careful person 
would use in the conduct of his own affairs, (ii) use diligence and discre-
tion in representing the minor’s interests, and (iii) be loyal to his fidu-
ciary.”344  A recent North Carolina case held that the GAL in a proceed-
ing to terminate parental rights (TPR) is not required to be present at the 
 
tion of a settlement offer, “[g]iven the fact that the attorney’s clients are bound by family 
ties and would have economic interests which would not be necessarily antagonistic, the 
conflict of interest would not automatically disqualify the attorney from continuing the 
joint representation.”). 
 339. See also ATWELL MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE & PROCEDURE IN CIVIL 
CASES § 255 (1929) (“As in the case of next friend, one person may act as guardian ad 
litem for several infants, if there is no conflict in their interests, and he may also be a de-
fendant himself, if the interests are the same.”). 
 340. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 17(2) (2011). 
 341. In re Clark, 303 N.C. 592, 598, 281 S.E.2d 47, 52 (1981). 
 342. Byrd v. Woodruff, 891 S.W.2d 689, 707 (Tex. App. 1994) (citation omitted). 
 343. Franklin Cnty. v. Jones, 245 N.C. 272, 279, 95 S.E.2d 863, 868 (1957) (noting 
that minors’ GAL did not assert defense to action affecting minors’ interest in land, and 
stating, “[i]f . . . the lands were not in fact properly listed, the guardian ad litem should 
have made that defense”). 
 344. Byrd, 891 S.W.2d at 706–07. 
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hearing.345  The GAL “is not required to do the impossible or create a de-
fense where none exists.”346  The GAL should assess the propriety of the 
lawsuit.347  The GAL’s duties generally do not include collection.348 
The GAL’s duties are limited to those purposes for which he is re-
tained.  Thus, where a next friend was appointed in a suit filed by the 
county to obtain a deed to land to pay delinquent taxes, the next friend’s 
appointment required him to defend the tax suit, but he was not re-
quired to represent the minors in a cross action filed by the bank to fo-
reclose on the property for nonpayment of the mortgage.349  “A next 
friend is not an all-time and all-purpose representative . . . . The scope of 
his representation lies within and is determined by that purpose [for 
which he was appointed], the necessities of its prosecution and the pro-
cedure reasonably incident thereto.”350  Further, “the powers of a guar-
dian ad litem [are] limited to the particular case in which the GAL was 
appointed.”351  The GAL’s duties are complete at the time his purpose is 
accomplished.352 
There is some authority from other jurisdictions that the GAL 
should not take a very active role in the case, such as attending deposi-
tions.  “The GAL is not to serve as the attorney for the minor and dupli-
cate tasks already being performed competently by plaintiff’s attor-
 
 345. In re J.H.K., 365 N.C. 171, 177, 711 S.E.2d 118, 121 (2011) (“[W]e cannot agree 
that the General Assembly intended by the use of the word ‘represent’ to obligate the vo-
lunteer GAL to appear in court during the TPR hearing unless the attorney advocate or 
the trial court deems the GAL’s presence necessary to protect the minor’s best inter-
ests.”). 
 346. Franklin Cnty., 245 N.C. at 279, 95 S.E.2d at 868 (1957). 
 347. Tate v. Mott, 96 N.C. 19, 24, 2 S.E. 176, 178 (1887) (“The guardian ad litem or 
next friend must determine the necessity for and the propriety of bringing [the ac-
tion] . . . .”). 
 348. Teele v. Kerr, 261 N.C. 148, 134 S.E.2d 126 (1964) (holding that the ten year 
statute of limitations for collection of judgment did not begin to run until minor attained 
age of majority, even though minor had a next friend representing him in an action to 
obtain judgment); see also Byrd, 891 S.W.2d at 710 (“Typically, the guardian ad litem’s 
duties and powers end when a final judgment is entered.”). 
 349. Johnston Cnty. v. Ellis, 226 N.C. 268, 279, 38 S.E.2d 31, 38 (1946). 
 350. Id. at 278, 38 S.E.2d at 38. 
 351. Sharp v. Hanceville Nursing Home, Inc., 719 So. 2d 243, 244–45 (Ala. App. 
1998) (ruling that a GAL for an incompetent person in an action by a nursing home for 
non-payment did not have authority to release nursing home for ward’s claim for wrong-
fully discharging him from facility). 
 352. Johnston Cnty., 226 N.C. at 279, 38 S.E.2d at 38 (1946) (“Moreover, the record 
discloses that Ellis had successfully accomplished his mission as next friend, performed 
all the duty imposed upon him by law, and his office as next friend had become functus 
officio.”). 
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neys.”353  On the other hand, other authority states, “The guardian ad li-
tem participates in the case to the extent necessary to adequately protect 
the minor’s interests.  Accordingly, the guardian ad litem has considera-
ble latitude in determining what depositions, hearings, conferences, or 
other activities are necessary to that effort.”354 
North Carolina seems to have adopted the view that the GAL can be 
a full advocate for the minor.  In In re Clark,355 the Superior Court held 
that the North Carolina procedures for terminating a parent’s rights were 
unconstitutional because they did not provide for an attorney to be ap-
pointed to represent the parent and child.  At the trial level, the minor 
and her mother were represented by GALs who were attorneys.356  On 
appeal, the Supreme Court wrote:  
  Thus, in the case before us both the indigent respondent-mother and 
her minor child were in fact represented by competent and conscientious 
counsel and therefore were in no way deprived of the right to counsel.  
Where, as here, the guardians ad litem are licensed attorneys and actively 
defend their client’s interests, the resulting procedure is fundamentally 
fair and in accord with both the State and Federal Constitutions.357 
The Court in In re Clark essentially held that the GAL can simulta-
neously serve the role of GAL and attorney for the minor, but did not 
address the possibility that the minor’s lawyer and her GAL can have 
conflicting roles.358  Other jurisdictions have struggled with the issue of 
whether the GAL is a true advocate for the minor, or has a neutral role 
in investigating the matter and advising the court.359  Our cases recog-
 
 353. Jocson v. Crabb, 196 S.W.3d 302, 308 (Tex. App. 2006) The court further stated 
that “it is not necessary or appropriate for a guardian ad litem to review discovery mo-
tions and depositions and to participate in pretrial discovery and hearings without regard 
to their relevance, or irrelevance, to the potential conflict of interest regarding the set-
tlement proceeds.”  Id. 
 354. Byrd v. Woodruff, 891 S.W.2d 689, 706 (Tex. App. 1994). 
 355. In re Clark, 303 N.C. 592, 281 S.E.2d 47 (1981). 
 356. Id. at 595–96, 281 S.E.2d at 50–51. 
 357. Id. at 599, 281 S.E.2d at 53; see also id at 601, 281 S.E.2d at 54 (“Such entitle-
ment to counsel may ordinarily be satisfied by the appointment for said parent of a guar-
dian ad litem who is a licensed attorney.”). 
 358. Id. 
 359. See In re Christina M., 908 A.2d 1073, 1085 (Conn. 2006) (“Although there is 
often no bright line between the roles of a guardian ad litem and counsel for a minor 
child, the legal rights of a child may be distinct from the child’s best interest . . . the 
guardian ad litem should refrain from acting as a second attorney for the child.”); State v. 
Switzer, 656 N.W.2d 253, 261 (Neb. 2003) (“As counsel for the juvenile, the attorney is 
bound to advocate for the juvenile’s expressed interests; but, as guardian ad litem, the 
attorney is bound to present what he or she believes to be in the child’s best interests.  
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nize that “[t]he guardian ad litem is the officer of the court.”360  One case 
stated that the GAL in a TPR case had a “supervisory role[] in seeing to 
[the minor’s] best interests.”361  This language may suggest that the GAL 
has a more neutral role.  On the other hand, in another TPR case, the 
court wrote that the GAL “‘has a duty to represent the party he is ap-
pointed to represent to the fullest extent feasible and to do all things ne-
cessary to secure a judgment favorable to such party.’”362  Older authority 
also indicated that the next friend could take an active role in the case.363  
Further case law may be needed to expound on the role of the GAL, and 
the potential conflicts when she serves as the lawyer for the minor. 
The role between the GAL and her counsel is addressed briefly in 
2002 Formal Ethics Opinion 8, promulgated by the Council of the North 
Carolina State Bar.364  This opinion states: 
As a party, the guardian ad litem may choose to be represented by legal 
counsel and permit legal counsel to make decisions about the strategy 
for the litigation.  See Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2, cmt. [1] (“In 
questions of means, the lawyer should assume responsibility for technic-
 
Usually, when an actual conflict of interest develops between the two roles, separate 
counsel should be appointed for the child.”); In re Baby Girl Baxter, 479 N.E.2d 257 
(Ohio 1985) (“The role of guardian ad litem is to investigate the ward’s situation and 
then to ask the court to do what the guardian feels is in the ward’s best interest. The role 
of the attorney is to zealously represent his client within the bounds of the law.” (cita-
tions omitted)); see also Jennifer L. Anton, Comment, The Ambiguous Role and Responsi-
bilities of a Guardian ad Litem in Texas in Personal Injury Litigation, 51 SMU L. REV. 161, 
190 (1997) (“[T]he trend appears to lean toward requiring the GAL to act as a zealous 
advocate for the minor plaintiff. . . . The GAL should serve only as an officer of the court 
to ensure that the minor is represented fairly and responsibly. . . . The role as advocate is 
reserved for the attorney ad litem.”).  It should be noted that a GAL in a TPR case in 
North Carolina is bound to pursue the “best interests” of the minor, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1108(b) (2011), whereas in other states the GAL pursues the “expressed interests” of the 
minor. 
 360. Carraway v. Lassiter, 139 N.C. 145, 153, 51 S.E. 968, 970 (1905); see also Stan-
ton v. Sullivan, 4 A.2d 269, 270 (R.I. 1939) (“A guardian ad litem is not an attorney for 
the infant, but an officer appointed by the court to assist it in properly protecting the in-
terests of the infant.”). 
 361. In re J.G., 186 N.C. App. 496, 507, 652 S.E.2d 266, 273 (2007) (noting that mi-
nor’s GAL filed a motion to compel DSS to use minor’s social security benefits to pay for 
mortgage on and repairs to house). 
 362. In re A.S.Y., 703 S.E.2d 797, 802, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 2442, at *16 (2010) 
(quoting ALAN D. WOODLIEF, JR., SHUFORD NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
§ 17:20 (6th ed.2003)). 
 363. Teele v. Carr, 261 N.C. 148, 150, 134 S.E.2d 126, 128 (1964) (“It is his duty to 
represent the infant, see that the witnesses are present at the trial of the infant’s case, and 
to do all things which are required to secure a judgment favorable to the infant.”). 
 364. Council of N.C. State Bar, 2002 Formal Ethics Op. 8 (2003). 
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al and legal tactical issues. . . .”).  The fact that the guardian ad litem is a 
lawyer does not make him or her co-counsel for the purpose of litigating 
the case.365 
This opinion further states that where the GAL is a lawyer, she 
must “exercise professional judgment in making decisions about matters 
that are within the purview of the guardian ad litem such as whether a 
settlement proposal should be accepted.”366  Another ethics opinion sug-
gests that the lawyer is obligated to follow the strategy of the GAL, or 
else must withdraw.367   
A few cases address the powers of the GAL.  The GAL does not have 
the power to waive the minor’s rights, especially without considera-
tion.368  The GAL may hire legal counsel, but he cannot enter a binding 
contract for compensation.369  The issue of the minor’s attorney’s fees is 
addressed in Part II.D.2. of this Article. 
A case from 1904 held that the GAL may not submit the minor’s 
dispute to arbitration.370  It should be noted, however, that in modern 
 
 365. Id. 
 366. Id. 
 367. See Council of N.C. State Bar, 2006 Formal Ethics Op. 9 (2006).  The opinion 
states that when a minor’s mother is the GAL, and the GAL refuses to pursue a claim 
against the minor’s grandmother, but instead wishes to pursue a weak claim against 
another tortfeasor, “[i]f, based upon his expert’s analysis, Lawyer believes that Minor 
does not have a claim against the truck driver and the litigation against the truck driver 
is, therefore, frivolous, Lawyer must file a motion to withdraw.”  Id. The opinion also 
notes that the lawyer may attempt to remove the GAL.  Id. 
 368. See, e.g., Narron v. Musgrave, 236 N.C. 388, 73 S.E.2d 6 (1952) (“‘The duty of a 
GAL, and in fact the object of his appointment, is to protect the interest of his wards; and 
he has no power to waive any substantial right, especially when such waiver is entirely 
without consideration.’” (quoting Spence v. Goodwin, 128 N.C. 273, 38 S.E. 859 
(1901)); Deal v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 218 N.C. 483, 11 S.E.2d 464, (1940) (“A 
guardian ad litem has no authority, without valid consideration, to relinquish rights of 
the infant defendants whom he represents . . . even though the parents of the named in-
fants and unborn issue have assigned, transferred and conveyed to [plaintiff] . . . all of 
their contingent right, title, interest and estate in and to property in the trust in question, 
and even though the interest of such infants and unborn issue be remote, their guardians 
ad litem, in the absence of valid consideration therefor, are without authority to relin-
quish those rights to the immediate beneficiary of the trust estate.”). 
 369. In re Stone, 176 N.C. 336, 97 S.E. 216 (1918). 
 370. Millsaps v. Estes, 134 N.C. 486, 492, 46 S.E. 988, 990 (1904) The court over-
turned the ruling from the prior action, where a minor sued defendant to determine 
ownership of land, and parties consented to sending issue of value of land to arbitrators, 
and court entered judgment upon finding of arbitrators because “[t]he infants in this ac-
tion were the real parties to the suit, and . . . an infant cannot give his consent to a sub-
mission of his cause to arbitration, and any attempt to do so for him is absolutely void.”  
Id. at 491, 97 S.E. at 990. 
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times, agreements to arbitrate are favored, and the Court could reach the 
other conclusion if presented with this issue today.  Courts from other 
jurisdictions have recognized the parent’s ability to consent to arbitra-
tion,371 and thus a GAL presumably can consent to arbitration if the par-
ents can do so.  The GAL may waive a trial by jury.372 
5. Liability of GAL 
Most authority in North Carolina indicates that the GAL can be ful-
ly liable for a breach of his duties, including a duty to act with dili-
gence.373  Further, a breach of the duty of good faith can support a claim 
for fraud against the GAL.374  By statute, a GAL in a TPR case is immune 
from suit for mere negligence.375  Neither Rule 17 of North Carolina’s 
 
 371. Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 901 A.2d 381, 387 (N.J. 2006) (upholding arbi-
tration provision entered by parents, prior to injury, because “[a]s opposed to a pre-
injury release of liability, a pre-injury agreement to arbitrate does not require a minor to 
forego any substantive rights,” noting cases from other jurisdictions authorizing arbitra-
tion); see also Douglas P. Gerber, The Validity of Binding Arbitration Agreements and 
Children’s Personal Injury Claims in Florida after Shea v. Global Travel Marketing, Inc., 28 
NOVA L. REV. 167 (2003) (analyzing Shea v. Global Travel Mktg., Inc., 870 So. 2d 20 
(Fla. App. 2003), rev’d by Global Travel Mktg., Inc. v. Shea, 908 So. 2d 392, 405 (Fla. 
2005) (“[W]e hold that an arbitration agreement incorporated into a commercial travel 
contract is enforceable against the minor or minor’s estate in a tort action arising from 
the contract.”)). 
 372. Blades v. Spitzer, 252 N.C. 207, 213, 113 S.E.2d 315, 320 (1960) (“A GAL and 
his attorney may waive jury trial.”). 
 373. See Franklin Cnty. v. Jones, 245 N.C. 272, 279, 95 S.E.2d 863, 868 (1957) 
(“When [GAL] accepted the appointment, it was his duty not only to act in the utmost 
good faith, but to act diligently.  For any failure to properly perform the duty he under-
took, he became liable to those he represented for any loss that they might sustain.”); 
Travis v. Johnston, 244 N.C. 713, 722, 95 S.E.2d 94, 100 (1956) (“One who accepts ap-
pointment as guardian ad litem of a person under disability owes a high duty to his ward.  
He should carefully investigate the facts and must exercise diligence in the protection of 
the rights and estate of his ward.”); see also Bunch v. Foreman Blades Lumber Co., 174 
N.C. 8, 12, 93 S.E. 374, 376 (1917) (“If the compromise or release is made without justi-
fication or fraudulently or upon a grossly inadequate consideration, the guardian will be 
answerable for it in his accounts.”). 
 374. Graham v. Floyd, 214 N.C. 77, 82, 197 S.E. 873, 876 (1938) (ruling that where 
the GAL had conflict, the sale of land pursuant to court order was voidable unless pur-
chaser was innocent because if the GAL’s wife made a $500 bid “for the land, and he, act-
ing as guardian ad litem, knew that the real value of the land greatly exceeded that 
amount, and stood by and permitted it to be sold to his wife, this would be a breach of 
faith and considered on the issue of fraud”). 
 375. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1204 (2011) (“Any volunteer participating in a judicial 
proceeding pursuant to the program authorized by this Article shall not be civilly liable 
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Rules of Civil Procedure nor any other rule or statute addresses the lia-
bility of a GAL representing a minor in a personal injury claim. 
In a case from 2003, however, the Court of Appeals held that a GAL 
is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.376  In Dalenko v. Wake County 
Dep’t of Human Services, the court appointed a GAL for Mr. Dalenko in a 
proceeding to declare him incompetent.377  He later died and his estate 
sued his GAL, alleging that she “negligently failed to fulfill her duty to 
Dalenko as guardian ad litem by failing to advocate for his best inter-
ests.”378  The estate also alleged that the GAL presented false information 
to the court, that the GAL caused Dalenko to be separated from his 
daughter, and that the attempted removal of Dalenko from his daughter’s 
house caused emotional distress to Dalenko.379  The lower court dis-
missed the suit, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.380  The appellate 
court stated: 
Although the courts of this State have not yet specifically addressed 
whether guardians ad litem perform judicial functions such that they are 
entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, several other courts, including the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, have held that 
guardians ad litem are entitled to the absolute bar of quasi-judicial im-
munity.381 
The court concluded that the GAL was entitled to quasi-judicial 
immunity, and affirmed the dismissal of the case on this basis.382 
The court relied heavily on Fleming v. Asbill,383 from the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.  A review of that case, however, reveals that it 
ruled that a GAL has immunity for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
based on federal authority.  The court then held that the GAL was in fact 
not entitled to immunity under South Carolina law, stating, “[w]e con-
clude, then, that South Carolina yet adheres to the . . . line of cases 
[holding that] a paid guardian ad litem must answer to his ward if his 
 
for acts or omissions committed in connection with the proceeding if the volunteer acted 
in good faith and was not guilty of gross negligence.”). 
 376. Dalenko v. Wake Cnty. Dep’t of Human Servs., 157 N.C. App. 49, 578 S.E.2d 
599 (2003). 
 377. Id. at 52, 578 S.E.2d at 601. 
 378. Id. at 53, 578 S.E.2d at 602. 
 379. Id. at 52–53, 578 S.E.2d at 601–02. 
 380. Id. at 53, 578 S.E.2d at 602. 
 381. Id. at 57, 578 S.E.2d at 604. 
 382. Id. at 57-58, 578 S.E.2d at 604–05. 
 383. Fleming v. Asbill, 42 F.3d 886 (4th Cir. 1994). 
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negligent acts cause the ward damage.  We therefore reverse the dismis-
sal of Todd’s common-law claims against Asbill.”384 
Two of the six other cases cited by the Dalenko court support its 
conclusion.385  The remaining four cases cited do not, however, support 
the proposition that a GAL is immune from liability.386 
Some well-reasoned opinions from other jurisdictions hold that the 
GAL is not immune from suit.  One such court wrote, “[b]ecause the 
guardian ad litem is not acting as an agent of the court, the policy ratio-
nale for extending absolute immunity to the guardian ad litem is not 
present.”387  Many courts adopt a functional analysis in determining 
whether the GAL has immunity, based on the role of the GAL.388 
The Dalenko case is not necessarily applicable to a GAL 
representing a minor in a personal injury action, but there is nothing in 
the Dalenko opinion which would limit its holding to the liability of a 
GAL in incompetency proceedings.  In fact, Dalenko cited two cases ren-
dering the GAL immune in the context of a minor’s personal injury 
claim.389  Further, the Dalenko case does not distinguish the long line of 
cases in North Carolina stating that GALs, or next friends, are liable for 
 
 384. Id. at 890. 
 385. McKay v. Owens, 937 P.2d 1222, 1233 (Idaho 1997) (noting that a GAL for a 
minor in a lawsuit was entitled to immunity); Barr v. Day, 879 P.2d 912, 919 (Wash. 
1994) (ruling that a GAL in a settlement proceeding for an incompetent adult is immune 
from suit). 
 386. Miller v. Gammie, 292 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir. 2002) (ruling a child’s social 
worker and therapist have absolute immunity), rev’d en banc, Miller v. Gammie 335 F.3d 
889, 900 (2003) (ruling that whether social worker and therapist have absolute or quali-
fied immunity requires further factual showing); Lambert v. McGinnis, No. 2:99-CV-36-
BO(2), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11848, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 11, 2000) (noting that the 
Clerk of Court and the District Attorney are “entitled to absolute immunity from federal 
suits for damages involving their official duties”); Richards v. Bruce, 691 A.2d 1223, 
1225 (Me. 1997) (“No harm resulted from the guardian’s delayed arrival at the hear-
ing.”); Lythgoe v. Guinn, 884 P.2d 1085, 1088–89 (Alaska 1994) (holding that a court-
appointed psychologist was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity). 
 387. Byrd v. Woodruff, 891 S.W.2d 689, 708 (Tex. App. 1994) (“The guardian ad li-
tem is not an agent of the court and has no delegated authority to act in the name of the 
court.”). 
 388. See Susan L. Thomas, Annotation, Liability of Guardian Ad Litem for Infant Party 
to Civil Suit for Negligence in Connection with Suit, 14 A.L.R.5TH 929 (1993). 
 389. See McKay v. Owens, 937 P.2d 1222, 1233 (Idaho 1997) (noting that a GAL for a 
minor in a lawsuit was entitled to immunity); Barr v. Day, 879 P.2d 912, 919 (Wash. 
1994) (ruling that a GAL in a settlement proceeding for an incompetent adult is immune 
from suit). 
71
Kirby: Minor's Personal Injury Actions and Settlements in North Carolina
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2012
KIRBY- FINAL 4/12/2012  9:06 AM 
364 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:293 
failing to exercise diligence.390  The Dalenko case, as it appears to conflict 
with prior cases from the North Carolina Supreme Court, and as many 
of the cases cited for its holding do not support the holding, therefore 
appears to stand on shaky footing. 
6. Payment of GAL 
In many instances, the minor’s parent can serve as GAL, in which 
event the parent typically does not request a fee for serving as GAL.  
Where the dispute settles prior to suit being filed and a GAL who is not 
the parent is needed, the liability insurer can probably pay that fee.  The 
liability carrier can pay for an attorney to represent the minor unless the 
“payment arrangement will adversely affect [the GAL’s] representation of 
the minor and the minor’s family.”391 
The court has the authority to tax the fees of the GAL as costs.392  In 
one case involving the administration of an estate, the clerk appointed a 
GAL to represent minor heirs.393  The clerk ordered that the GAL fees be 
paid from the estate, and the Administratrix appealed.394  The court of 
Appeals affirmed, rejecting the notion that the Clerk “was powerless to 
compel the payment of the necessary expenses from the estate to which 
the heirs would potentially benefit.”395 
 
 390. See supra note 378 and accompanying text.  In the Dalenko plaintiff’s Reply Brief 
to the Court of Appeals, she expressly cited to and quoted from Franklin County v. Jones, 
245 N.C. 272, 95 S.E.2d 863 (1957), but the court did not address this case.  Responsive 
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 10, Dalenko v. Wake Cnty. Dep’t of Human Servs., 157 
N.C. App. 49, 578 S.E.2d 599 (2003) (No. COA02-377), available at 
http://www.ncappellatecourts.org/show-file.php?document_id=13174. 
 391. Council of N.C. State Bar, RPC 167 (1994). 
 392. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-20 (2011) (indicating that the court may “allow” costs in its 
discretion, pursuant to section 7A-305(d) of North Carolina’s General Statues); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 7A-305(d)(7) (“The following expenses, when incurred, are assessable or 
recoverable . . . [f]ees of . . . guardians ad litem . . . .”); see also Van Every v. McGuire, 
125 N.C. App. 578, 582, 481 S.E.2d 377, 379 (1997) (“Having properly appointed the 
GAL, the trial court was within its discretion to assess as an item of costs the fees of the 
GAL and to tax those fees to either party or apportion them between the parties.”); In re 
Clark, 303 N.C. 592, 601, 281 S.E.2d 47, 54 (1981) (noting that in a TPR action, fees for 
attorneys appointed as GAL are paid by the Administrative Office of the Courts); Council 
of N.C. State Bar, 2002 Formal Ethics Op. 8 (2003) (“Whether a GAL [representing a 
minor in a settlement hearing] who is a lawyer is entitled to a court-awarded fee is a 
question for the court and not for the Ethics Committee.”). 
 393. In re Estate of Sturman, 93 N.C. App. 473, 477, 378 S.E.2d 204, 206 (1989). 
 394. Id. at 474, 378 S.E.2d at 204. 
 395. Id. at 477, 378 S.E.2d at 206 (citing In Re Stone, 176 N.C. 336, 97 S.E. 216 
(1918)). 
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B. Joinder of Claims 
Under modern pleading rules, the parent and child can file their 
claims jointly.396  The parent and child are not, however, required to join 
their claims.397  Where the suit is filed by the child alone for his injuries, 
his parents are not parties to the minor’s suit.398 
One case has held that where the parent sues a first-party insurer to 
recover the child’s medical expenses, the minor is the real party in inter-
est and must be substituted for his parents.399  This ruling seems, howev-
er, to be at odds with the notion that the parents (and not the child) own 
the claim for medical expenses.  The court did not provide any analysis 
for its conclusion.  This case further appears to be contrary to an earlier 
case, which held that the child does not “incur” these expenses and thus 
he cannot sue to recover them from an insurance company.400 
C. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effect of Minor’s Action 
Where the minor’s case is litigated, he is bound by the judgment.401  
Several cases address the interplay between the parent’s action and the 
 
 396. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 20(a).  Under older procedural rules, the guardian 
and the parent could not assert their claims in the same action.  Ellington v. Bradford, 
242 N.C. 159, 161, 86 S.E.2d 925, 926 (1955) (“[T]o combine the two in one action 
would be a misjoinder.”).  If the parent and child joined their claims, then the defendant 
could require that they be brought separately, “provided he makes objection to the joind-
er in apt time.”  Id. at 162, 86 S.E.2d at 927.  This result is effectively abrogated by Rule 
20 of North Carolina’s Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 397. West ex rel Farris v. Tilley, 120 N.C. App. 145, 147–48, 461 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1995) 
(“[T]he interests of plaintiff and her mother were not so united as to require joinder of 
[the mother] under Rule 19(a).”); cf. Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 300 
N.C. 295, 303–04, 266 S.E.2d 818, 823 (1980) (“For all these reasons, we hold that a 
spouse may maintain a cause of action for loss of consortium due to the negligent actions 
of third parties so long as that action for loss of consortium is joined with any suit the 
other spouse may have instituted to recover for his or her personal injuries.”). 
 398. Stark v. Ford Motor Co., 204 N.C. App. 1, 12–13, 693 S.E.2d 253, 260 (2010) 
(ruling that where a minor sued an automobile manufacturer, and defendant argued that 
the minor’s father’s misuse of seatbelt barred the claim under section 99B-3, such a de-
fense was inapplicable because the father was not a “party,” which is required to invoke 
said defense). 
 399. Freeman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.C., 123 N.C. App. 260, 264, 472 
S.E.2d 595, 598 (1996). 
 400. Compare id., with Lane v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 48 N.C. App. 634, 642, 269 
S.E.2d 711, 716 (1980). 
 401. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 17(2) (“After the appointment of a GAL under any 
provision of this rule and after the service and filing of such pleadings as may be required 
by such GAL, the court may proceed to final judgment, order or decree against any party 
73
Kirby: Minor's Personal Injury Actions and Settlements in North Carolina
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2012
KIRBY- FINAL 4/12/2012  9:06 AM 
366 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:293 
minor’s action, and the effect of a judgment involving a minor on other 
claims of the minor or her parents. 
Where the parent files suit to recover for her own bodily injuries 
and the medical expenses of her child, and she receives an adverse ver-
dict, that verdict and judgment does not bar a subsequent suit by the 
minor to recover for the minor’s injuries, even if her mother serves as 
the GAL in her child’s suit.402  Similarly, in Rabil v. Farris,403 the father 
sued as the next friend for his minor and the jury returned a verdict 
against the minor.  The father then brought a second suit to recover 
medical expenses and loss of the minor’s services, and the court held 
that the father was not bound by the first verdict, because he was not a 
party in the first action.404  Where the child’s mother served as the next 
friend in the child’s action and lost at trial, the father was not barred 
from bringing a suit for medical expenses and lost earnings.405 
On the other hand, the court in Thompson v. Lassiter406 held that 
where the father serves as the GAL in the first suit, defending a claim 
against his son, an adverse verdict is binding on the father in a subse-
quent suit by the father to recover medical expenses of the minor.  The 
court emphasized that the father controlled the litigation in the first ac-
tion, and that he had an interest in the first action as he was potentially 
liable under the family purpose doctrine.407 
The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to persons who are not a 
party to the minor’s case.  Thus, where the minor’s first attorney was not 
a party to the action in which the minor’s claim was settled, findings as 
to the reasonableness of a second lawyer’s fee from that action were not 
binding on the first attorney when he filed an action against the second 
 
so represented as effectually and in the same manner as if said party had been under no 
legal disability, had been ascertained and in being, and had been present in court after 
legal notice in the action in which such final judgment, order or decree is entered.”). 
 402. York v. N. Hosp. Dist. of Surry Cnty., 96 N.C. App. 456, 461–62, 386 S.E.2d 99, 
102 (1989). 
 403. Rabil v. Farris, 213 N.C. 414, 196 S.E. 321 (1938). 
 404. Id. at 416, 196 S.E. at 322. 
 405. Kleibor v. Rogers, 265 N.C. 304, 307, 144 S.E.2d 27, 30 (1965). 
 406. Thompson v. Lassiter, 246 N.C. 34, 39–40, 97 S.E.2d 492, 497 (1957). 
 407. Id. at 39, 97 S.E.2d at 496.  The Thompson case distinguished Rabil on these fac-
tors.  Id.  It should be noted, however, that Rabil was a 4-3 decision, with a vigorous dis-
sent, and Thompson may reflect a desire to curb the result of Rabil.  See Rabil, 213 N.C. at 
418, 196 S.E. at 323 (Barnhill, J., dissenting) (“It appears to me as being unconscionable 
to now permit him [the father] to again undertake to establish negligence before another 
jury to the end that he personally may recover of the defendant.”). 
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law firm for a portion of the fees awarded.408  In a suit brought by a mi-
nor through a GAL, the minor (and not the GAL) is the “real party” for 
purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel.409 
Where a suit is filed against a minor who has a potential claim 
against another party in the case, and the plaintiff obtains a consent 
judgment, the consent judgment will not impair the minor defendant’s 
rights under the doctrine of res judicata unless the court made proper 
inquiry as to whether the judgment was fair to the minor defendant.410  
Such a judgment is voidable in order to protect the minor’s rights.411 
Where a minor obtains a judgment solely for the purpose of approv-
ing a settlement, satisfaction of the judgment will not bar the minor’s 
claims against other tortfeasors, even though satisfaction of a judgment 
generally precludes recovery against other persons.412 
A settlement made in good faith between the minor claimant and a 
tortfeasor generally will not bar the minor’s claims against other tortfea-
sors.413  Further, a finding at the minor’s settlement proceeding that the 
settlement was made in good faith for the purpose of approving that set-
tlement, may support a finding that the settlement was in good faith for 
the purpose of allowing the minor to pursue other tortfeasors.414 
 
 408. Pryor v. Merten, 127 N.C. App. 483, 487, 490 S.E.2d 590, 592–93 (1997).  Pryor 
might be better viewed as involving the companion doctrine of collateral estoppel, or is-
sue preclusion. 
 409. King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. 348, 357, 200 S.E.2d 799, 806 (1973); accord El-
lington v. Bradford, 242 N.C. 159, 160, 86 S.E.2d 925, 926 (1955) (“Neither a parent nor 
a stranger who acts as next friend in bringing a suit for an infant becomes thereby a party 
to the cause.”).  Similarly, hearsay statements of the father made at the scene of an acci-
dent are not admissible against the minor, even if the father serves as the GAL.  Cook v. 
Edwards, 198 N.C. 738, 739, 153 S.E. 323, 324 (1930). 
 410. Smith v. Price, 253 N.C. 285, 287, 116 S.E.2d 733, 734 (1960). 
 411. Id. 
 412. Payseur v. Rudisill, 15 N.C. App. 57, 63–64, 189 S.E.2d 562, 566 (1972) (hold-
ing that a judge-approved settlement against one defendant, where the judgment was en-
tered in docket and satisfied, did not constitute a satisfaction of judgment under section 
1B-3(e) of North Carolina’s General Statutes because the minor should not be penalized 
because his settlement must be approved by the court, when such a settlement by an 
adult would not bar further claims). 
 413. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-4(1) (2011). 
 414. See generally Sterling v. Gil Soucy Trucking, Ltd., 146 N.C. App. 173, 552 S.E.2d 
674 (2001). 
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D. Minor’s Attorney 
There is some authority that the GAL must hire an attorney.415  
Other jurisdictions have held that the minor must have an attorney.416  It 
is not clear, however, if this extends to a suit which is filed solely to ap-
prove a settlement.  Some authority seems to recognize the validity of a 
court-approved settlement where the minor does not have a lawyer.417  If 
the parents have settled the claim prior to suit, and suit is filed only to 
approve the settlement, then there seems to be little reason for a per se 
rule requiring the minor to have a lawyer, as the settlement is not bind-
ing unless it is approved by the court.418  Where the GAL is a lawyer, this 
should adequately serve to protect the minor’s interests.419 
The minor typically has an attorney to pursue his claims, especially 
in cases with significant injuries.  The authorities do not expressly ad-
dress the manner in which the attorney is retained.  Almost invariably, 
the minor’s parents will retain a lawyer to represent the minor, and also 
possibly to simultaneously represent the parents.  Presumably the par-
ents have this authority based on their general authority to act for the 
welfare of their child.420  The parents do not, however, have the authori-
ty to enter a binding agreement for legal fees.421 
 
 415. In re Stone, 176 N.C. 336, 338, 97 S.E. 216, 217 (1918) (“While the next friend 
has power to employ counsel to prosecute the action, and it is his duty to do so . . . [i]t is 
essential that he have the assistance of counsel learned in the law.”). 
 416. Shields v. Cape Fox Corp., 42 P.3d 1083, 1086 n.3 (Alaska 2002) (“‘While we 
have not addressed the question of whether a guardian ad litem can represent a child 
without retaining a lawyer, all other circuit courts addressing the issue have held that the 
guardian or parent cannot bring a lawsuit on behalf of a minor in federal court without 
retaining a lawyer.’”) (quoting Johns v. Cnty. of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876–77 (9th 
Cir. 1997)). 
 417. See, e.g., Patrick v. Bryan, 202 N.C. 62, 72, 162 S.E. 207, 212 (1932).  This opi-
nion held that a prior settlement, reached in a legal action, would bar a subsequent ac-
tion by minor if the settlement was “just and righteous.”  Id.  Although not expressly 
stated in the opinion, the inference is that the minor did not have an attorney in the 
prior action. 
 418. See infra Part III.B. 
 419. See discussion supra Part II.A.4; In re Clark, 303 N.C. 592, 602, 281 S.E.2d 47, 
54 (1981) (holding that providing the minor in a TPR case with a GAL who is an attor-
ney satisfies any obligation to provide her with a lawyer). 
 420. See discussion infra note 500 regarding parent’s general authority over minor; see 
also Dunkley v. Shoemate, 350 N.C. 573, 578, 515 S.E.2d 442, 445 (1999) (“[A] law firm 
or attorney may not represent a client without the client’s permission to do so.”). 
 421. See infra Part II.D.2. 
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After the parents retain the lawyer to represent the minor, the mi-
nor is the attorney’s client.422  Of course, the parents can also be the 
client for the purpose of pursuing the parents’ own claims, assuming that 
there are no conflicts. 
Even though the parents normally retain the lawyer for the minor, 
an ethics opinion suggests that a lawyer can represent the minor and 
pursue the minor’s claim contrary to the wishes of the parents.  An eth-
ics opinion by the North Carolina State Bar addresses a situation where a 
minor’s father originally hires a lawyer to pursue the minor’s claim aris-
ing from an automobile accident involving the child’s mother and anoth-
er motorist.423  The father later informs the lawyer that he does not want 
to pursue the claim because the lawyer will likely have to pursue a claim 
against the child’s mother (who is the father’s wife), and the parents are 
concerned that this will raise their insurance rates.424  The opinion states 
that the lawyer can satisfy his ethical duty by telling the father that the 
claim might not affect their rates and further advising the father that he 
(the father) “has an ethical and moral duty to proceed.”425  The opinion 
then states that it would be “permissible for Attorney X to seek the ap-
pointment of an independent guardian ad litem to represent A’s [mi-
nor’s] interests.  This would be consistent with Attorney X’s primary du-
ty to represent the interest of A, who is the real party in interest.”426  The 
opinion further states that the lawyer can “proceed with filing suit after 
the independent guardian ad litem has reviewed the case and agrees that 
Attorney X should proceed.”427  This opinion raises myriad issues, all of 
which cannot be addressed in this Article. 
This opinion could result in the lawyer representing the minor in a 
claim against his mother, contrary to the wishes of the minor’s parents.  
This would likely result in an untenable situation.  The minor presuma-
bly would give great deference to the wishes of his parents, and might 
not consent to pursuing the claim.  The minor might not be willing to 
communicate or cooperate with the lawyer or with the GAL, which 
would render it nearly impossible to pursue the claim; this could also 
 
 422. Branham v. Stewart, 307 S.W.3d 94, 101 (Ky. 2010) (“[T]he attorney retained by 
an individual in the capacity as a minor’s next friend or guardian establishes an attorney-
client relationship with the minor and owes the same professional duties to the minor 
that the attorney would owe to any other client.”). 
 423. Council of N.C. State Bar, RPC 163 (1994). 
 424. Id. 
 425. Id. 
 426. Id. 
 427. Id. 
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jeopardize the attorney-client relationship, assuming one to exist after 
the father terminates that relationship.428 
This opinion’s reference to a GAL raises further issues.  The opinion 
states that the lawyer may “seek the appointment of an independent 
guardian ad litem and proceed with filing suit after the independent 
guardian ad litem has reviewed the case and agrees that Attorney X 
should proceed.”429  First, it is questionable whether the attorney has the 
authority to seek the appointment of a GAL, as that must be done by a 
relative or “friend” of the minor, or by the court.430  Further, it is not 
clear how the lawyer can obtain a GAL for the minor prior to deciding 
whether to file suit.  The definition of “guardian ad litem” implies that 
the matter is already before the court.431  It is not clear how a civil action 
or a special proceeding could be filed for the sole purpose of appointing 
a GAL. 
Perhaps the opinion intends to mean that the lawyer should find a 
prospective GAL.  This would still result in the GAL attempting to 
represent the minor against the wishes of his parents, possibly against 
the wishes of the minor, and possibly without any consultation with the 
minor; it also leaves open the question of how the GAL could be ap-
pointed without a request from a relative or friend of the minor.432  If a 
 
 428. Dunkley v. Shumate, 350 N.C. 573, 578, 515 S.E.2d 442, 445 (1999) (“[A] law-
yer cannot properly represent a client with whom he has no contact.”). 
 429. Council of N.C. State Bar, RPC 163. 
 430. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 17(c)(1) (2011) (“When an infant or insane or in-
competent person is plaintiff, the appointment shall be made . . . upon the written appli-
cation of any relative or friend of said infant or insane or incompetent person or by the 
court on its own motion.”).  The lawyer could attempt to have the court appoint a GAL, 
but the court still needs some action or proceeding to have jurisdiction, and the ap-
pointment should be made before or at the time the action is filed.  Id.  There is thus a 
conundrum in attempting to have a court appoint a GAL when an action has not been 
filed. 
 431. Roberts v. Adventure Holdings, LLC, 703 S.E.2d 784, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 
2417 (2010); accord BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 774 (9th ed. 2009) (defining GAL as a 
“guardian . . . appointed by the court to appear in a lawsuit or on behalf of an incompe-
tent or minor party”); BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 540 (3rd ed. 1969) (defining GAL as 
a “person appointed by a court during the course of litigation, in which an infant or a 
person mentally incompetent is a party, to represent and protect the interests of the in-
fant or incompetent”); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 
1007 (2002) (defining GAL as “a guardian appointed by a court to represent in a particu-
lar lawsuit the interests of a party who is minor”). 
 432. Other puzzling aspects of this opinion include that the opinion also does not ad-
dress the father’s claim for medical expenses, which in practice would almost invariably 
be raised.  Further, the minor in this opinion is seventeen years old; hence in only one 
year he can make his own decisions about proceeding with a claim against his mother, 
78
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss2/3
KIRBY- FINAL 4/12/2012  9:06 AM 
2012] MINOR’S PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS  371 
lawsuit had already been filed and the GAL became adverse to the mi-
nor’s claim, then in that context it would make sense for the lawyer to 
seek to replace the GAL. 
Once the attorney-client relationship is established, the Rules of 
Professional Conduct provide some guidance for the lawyer who 
represents a minor.  Rule 1.14 addresses clients with a “diminished ca-
pacity,” which apparently includes minors.433  The rules and commen-
tary, however, seem to apply more to an incompetent client.  The “law-
yer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer 
relationship with the client” having a diminished capacity.434  Where the 
client’s interests are at risk and the client “cannot adequately act in the 
client’s own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protec-
tive action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have 
the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, 
seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem or guardian.”435  These 
rules are difficult to apply to a minor client because: the lawyer typically 
communicates with the minor’s parents and not with the minor, a GAL 
cannot be appointed in the absence of a lawsuit, and a general guardian 
cannot be appointed unless the minor does not have a natural guar-
dian.436 
The commentary to Rule 1.14 further provides, “[i]f a legal repre-
sentative has already been appointed for the client, the lawyer should 
ordinarily look to the representative for decisions on behalf of the 
client.”437  Where the client is a minor, the term “legal representative” 
presumably refers to a general guardian or a GAL.  “In matters involving 
a minor, whether the lawyer should look to the parents as natural guar-
 
without the introduction of a GAL, which could disrupt family harmony.  Comment 4 to 
Rule 1.14 states that, “[i]n taking any protective action, the lawyer should be guided 
by . . . respecting the client’s family and social connections.”  N.C. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R 1.14, cmt. 5 (2011).  The opinion seems to acknowledge implicitly that the 
father’s conduct terminates the attorney-client relationship, as it states that the lawyer 
has met his ethical duties by advising the father to proceed, and does not require the 
lawyer to continue pursuit of the claim.  Council of N.C. State Bar, RPC 163.  After the 
father discharges the lawyer, the minor is no longer a “client,” but instead a former client, 
and thus it is not clear how the lawyer has any authority to purport to act for the minor. 
 433. See N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.14(a) (“When a client’s capacity to make 
adequately considered decisions in connection with a representation is diminished, 
whether because of minority, mental impairment or for some other reason . . . .”). 
 434. Id. Rule 1.14(a). 
 435. Id. Rule 1.14(b). 
 436. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35A-1224(a) (“The clerk may appoint a guardian of the person 
or a general guardian only for a minor who has no natural guardian.”). 
 437. Id. Rule 1.14, cmt. 4. 
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dians may depend on the type of proceeding or matter in which the law-
yer is representing the minor.”438  The import of these rules and the 
commentary, which is consistent with common practice, seems to be 
that the lawyer should communicate with the minor as much as feasible 
regarding the status of the claim, but the lawyer will typically discuss the 
status of the case and make settlement decisions with the minor’s par-
ents.  The lawyer can therefore look to the minor (the client), his GAL, 
or his parents for decisions about settling or pursuing the minor’s claim.  
As discussed further in section III.A. of this Article, any of these persons 
can enter a tentative settlement of the minor’s claims. 
The extent to which the lawyer can withdraw from representing the 
minor in a pending action is not clear.  An ethics opinion from the 
North Carolina State Bar seems to suggest that the lawyer can simply file 
a motion to withdraw.439  The opinion in 2006 Formal Ethics Opinion 9 
addresses a situation where the minor’s GAL wants the lawyer to contin-
ue to pursue a case against a truck driver, even though an expert’s analy-
sis is favorable to the trucker.440  The GAL does not want to pursue a 
claim against the minor’s grandmother, even though that claim has me-
rit.441  The opinion states, “[i]f, based upon his expert’s analysis, Lawyer 
believes that Minor does not have a claim against the truck driver and 
the litigation against the truck driver is, therefore, frivolous, Lawyer 
must file a motion to withdraw.”442  This opinion does not, however, ad-
dress the implications of such a withdrawal.  Unless new counsel is ob-
tained, at a minimum the minor, to whom the lawyer owes his “primary 
duty,” will be left without skilled legal representation; his interests can-
not conceivably be adequately represented in a case involving experts 
and a GAL who refuses to pursue another tortfeasor against whom the 
case is stronger.  Further, such a withdrawal raises serious questions as 
to whether this would likely result in the unauthorized practice of law 
by the GAL.443 
 
 438. Id. 
 439. Council of N.C. State Bar, 2006 Formal Ethics Op. 9 (2006). 
 440. Id. 
 441. Id. 
 442. Id. 
 443. Some cases have recognized the problems arising from counsel withdrawing in 
this situation: 
The withdrawal of counsel as distinguished from the substitution of qualified 
counsel leaves the guardian ad litem in the untenable position of perhaps com-
mitting a misdemeanor: practicing law without a license.  Thus, a trial judge 
should not ordinarily permit an attorney to withdraw unless other qualified 
counsel has been obtained. 
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The minor’s lawyer can be liable to the minor for her negligence 
(malpractice) in handling the minor’s claim.  Further, a finding in the 
underlying case that the minor’s settlement was fair and reasonable 
probably will not protect the lawyer in a subsequent action by the mi-
nor.444 
1.  Conflicts of Interest 
The minor’s “attorney must be equally . . . disinterested [as the 
GAL], and a mere colorable interest is a sufficient disqualification for” 
the attorney.445  Further, the minor’s lawyer must be vigilant for a con-
flict of interest between his clients if he also represents the minor’s par-
ents or represents other injured persons arising out of the same incident. 
The North Carolina State Bar has issued a few ethics opinions ad-
dressing these conflicts.  In one opinion, where the tortfeasor makes a 
joint offer to the minor for personal injuries and to the parents for emo-
tional distress arising from the child’s injuries, without allocating the of-
fer among the claimants, the parents and the child have a conflict of in-
terest.446  In this same opinion, the tortfeasor “tells law firm A to disburse 
the funds between the parents and the child as the attorneys see fit.”447  
According to the opinion, the attorney cannot represent the parents and 
the child, and he must withdraw.448  The opinion further states that 
“[t]he attorneys may not continue representing either of their clients un-
less their continuing participation is intelligently consented to by the 
 
Torres v. Friedman, 215 Cal. Rptr. 604, 609 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (citation omitted); ac-
cord Mossanen v. Monfared, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 459, 464 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (“Here, with-
out counsel, Mateen’s guardian ad litem was powerless to oppose the motion for sum-
mary judgment.  She could not represent Mateen’s interests without counsel.”). 
 444. Byrd v. Woodruff, 891 S.W.2d 689, 699 (Tex. 1994) (“The parties [in the under-
lying case] did not litigate any issue about [the lawyer’s] legal representation of [the mi-
nor] in the prior suit.  Collateral estoppel does not apply.”); Cook v. Connolly, 366 
N.W.2d 287, 289 (Minn. 1985) (rejecting argument that “prior court order approving a 
minor personal injury settlement bars, by collateral estoppel, a subsequent malpractice 
suit by the injured person against her attorney for an allegedly inadequate settlement”); 
accord Beckwith v. Llewellyn, 326 N.C. 569, 574, 391 S.E.2d 189, 192 (1990) (noting 
that plaintiffs who sued lawyers for improper fee were not barred by a prior action in 
which settlement was approved by the court, because “[t]he focus in the prior case was 
not whether the attorneys had taken advantage of their client but whether the settlement 
reached with the opposing party was fair to the minors involved”). 
 445. Butler v. Winston, 223 N.C. 421, 423, 27 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1943). 
 446. Council of N.C. State Bar, RPC 109 (1992). 
 447. Id. 
 448. Id. 
81
Kirby: Minor's Personal Injury Actions and Settlements in North Carolina
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2012
KIRBY- FINAL 4/12/2012  9:06 AM 
374 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:293 
other client, and this is impossible under the facts stated.”449  Additional-
ly, the lawyer cannot “petition the court to hear evidence of the separate 
claims of parents and child and make a distribution of the funds.”450 
A similar fact pattern was addressed in another ethics opinion is-
sued on the same date, stating that a lawyer can represent both clients 
prior to the defendant making an offer.451  Regarding the situation pre-
sented when a joint offer is made, the opinion states:  
Should the defendant make a joint offer requiring the plaintiffs to divide 
the proceeds, the potential conflict of interest would become actual.  
Given the fact that the attorney’s clients are bound by family ties and 
would have economic interests which would not be necessarily antago-
nistic, the conflict of interest would not automatically disqualify the at-
torney from continuing the joint representation.  In some instances it 
may also be appropriate for an attorney to attempt to assist his clients in 
evaluating their respective claims and in amicably agreeing to an equita-
ble and appropriate division which could then be presented to the court 
for its approval.  Under no circumstances may the attorney, while 
representing both clients, assume a role of advocacy for one as opposed 
to the other.452 
This opinion further states, “[i]t is conceivable that the attorney 
may continue to represent one or the other with the consent of the for-
mer client whose case he relinquishes.”453  Although this opinion ex-
pressly states that it is “not intended to contradict the advice given in re-
sponse to the specific facts recited in RPC 109,”454 it is difficult to 
reconcile these two opinions.  Pursuant to RPC 109, where the tortfeasor 
makes a joint offer for the claims of the parents and the minor, there is a 
conflict requiring the attorney to withdraw from the case.455  Pursuant to 
RPC 123, the lawyer apparently has some discretion in continuing to 
represent all of the claimants after a joint offer is made.456  It is not clear 
whether the approach under RPC 123 is contingent upon the settlement 
being approved by a court.457  
 
 449. Id. 
 450. Id. 
 451. Council of N.C. State Bar, RPC 123 (1992). 
 452. Id. 
 453. Id. (citation omitted). 
 454. Id. 
 455. Council of N.C. State Bar, RPC 109. 
 456. Council of N.C. State Bar, RPC 123. 
 457. There is a slight distinction in the manner in which the offer is made in these 
two opinions, but this distinction should not make a difference.  Where the lawyer is 
asked to allocate the settlement funds among his clients, he clearly cannot do this.  He 
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Another ethics opinion states that a lawyer can represent several 
minors (and can represent a minor and his parents) even though the in-
surance proceeds are insufficient to pay all of the claims.458  The parents 
must give informed consent to the multiple representation at the outset.  
The opinion further states that the minor must have an independent 
GAL who consents to the multiple representation.459  The presence of a 
true GAL implies that a suit has been filed, or at least that suit is immi-
nent as the GAL has been appointed for the purpose of prosecuting the 
action.  This leaves the question of whether the lawyer can represent 
these persons prior to the filing of a lawsuit, which is required to give 
the court jurisdiction to appoint a GAL.  One logical interpretation of 
this is that the attorney can represent these parties prior to the appoint-
ment of a GAL, and that a GAL who is later appointed (after suit is filed) 
can ratify the representation.  Another interpretation would be that the 
lawyer should find a prospective GAL, who consents to the multiple re-
presentation, prior to his appointment as the GAL. 
2.  Attorney’s Fees 
It is generally understood that the court can review the fee paid to 
the lawyer from the settlement for the minor.460  Determining the appro-
priate legal fee is a complex issue. 
The common practice is for the minor’s parents to sign an agree-
ment with the lawyer that authorizes the lawyer to represent the minor.  
This agreement sets for the fee arrangement, which is typically a contin-
gent fee.  The case law indicates, however, that the GAL cannot enter a 
binding agreement for compensation of the lawyer.461  Presumably the 
parents likewise cannot enter such a binding contract. 
In In re Stone, the minor obtained a settlement of a claim arising 
from the death of his father.462  The minor’s lawyer had been retained “by 
 
should, however, be able to simply convey this information to his clients, or to instruct 
the offeror that the offeror must either allocate the settlement amount or rephrase the 
offer, which yield the same result as if the offer was simply a joint offer (without asking 
the attorney to allocate the offer). 
 458. Council of N.C. State Bar, RPC 251 (1997). 
 459. Id. 
 460. See E.D.N.C., LOCAL RULES OF PRAC. & PROC., R 17.1(c) (2011) (“[T]he court 
shall approve or fix the amount of the fee to be paid to counsel for the minor or incom-
petent parties.”). 
 461. In re Stone, 176 N.C. 336, 338, 97 S.E. 216, 217 (1918) (“While the next friend 
has power to employ counsel to prosecute the action, and it is his duty to do so . . . he 
cannot make a binding contract for compensation.”). 
 462. Id. 
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direction of the court,”463 and the minor’s funds were held by his mother, 
as his guardian.464  The minor’s attorney then filed a motion for an award 
of legal fees.465  The attorney had obtained $6,500 for the minor, and the 
Superior Court awarded $1,000 to the lawyer.466  On appeal, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court wrote, “The court may fix the attorney’s com-
pensation without regard to any contract.”467  The Supreme Court re-
duced the fee to $500.468  The court wrote: 
  Attorneys, being officers of the court, are sometimes compelled to 
render laborious service for no fee, and to the credit of the legal profes-
sion be it said such service is rendered most willingly.  When serving 
under the direction of the court to protect the rights of an infant, their 
compensation is to be measured by the standard of official emoluments 
rather than by that of the prices demanded and paid between individuals 
free to contract at will.469 
The court also wrote, “There is no place here for the doctrine of an 
implied promise upon a quantum meruit.”470  It is not clear whether 
some of the court’s holdings in this case are dependent on the attorney 
being retained “by direction of the court.”  The portion of the case stating 
that the GAL cannot enter a binding contract for fees should, however, 
adhere even where the minor’s parents retain the lawyer. 
In another case, the minor’s first attorney (who was discharged) 
sued the second attorney (who received the legal fee), and the court held 
that the first attorney had a claim against the second attorney based on a 
theory of quantum meruit.471  This case therefore could suggest that 
quantum meruit is an acceptable measure of fees to be awarded to the 
 
 463. Id. at 339, 97 S.E. at 218. 
 464. Id. at 337, 97 S.E. at 217. 
 465. Id. 
 466. Id. 
 467. Id. at 338–39, 97 S.E. at 217. 
 468. Id. at 340, 97 S.E. at 218. 
 469. Id. at 339–40, 97 S.E. at 218.  In this case, the mother had been appointed as a 
general guardian for her son, and she received the settlement funds and invested them in 
real estate.  Id. at 340, 97 S.E. at 218 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).  She was ordered to pay 
legal fees to the court from the minor’s funds.  Id. at 338, 97 S.E. at 217.  She was also 
ordered to pay the costs of the appeal personally, and not from the minor’s funds.  Id. at 
340, 97 S.E. at 218. 
 470. Id. at 339, 97 S.E. at 217 (citing Cole v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 63 Cal. 
86, 90 (Cal. 1883)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 471. Pryor v. Merten, 127 N.C. App. 483, 487–88, 490 S.E.2d 590, 593 (1997) (“We 
believe the more equitable result is to allow the discharged attorney to proceed against 
the new attorney for the prior attorney’s rightful share of the total attorney’s fees.”). 
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attorney from the minor’s recovery.472  These two cases are the only 
North Carolina cases addressing the method for computing the minor’s 
attorney’s fee to be taken from the minor’s settlement.  Neither of these 
cases involved a routine minor’s settlement, in which the two parties 
have simply settled the case and are presenting the tentative settlement 
to the court for review.  Therefore, cases from other jurisdictions ad-
dressing this issue are useful. 
In In re Abram & Abrams, the Fourth Circuit held that the district 
court has the “discretion to review the settlement here, including the 
contingency fee, for reasonableness.”473  In that case, the attorneys 
reached a settlement for the minor for $18,000,000.474  The attorneys 
had entered a fee agreement with the parents providing for a fee of one-
third of the recovery.475  The settlement was presented to the Eastern 
District Court of North Carolina, in which the attorneys sought a fee of 
$6,000,000.476  The district court awarded the attorneys $600,000 based 
on their hours invested in the case at an hourly rate of $300 per hour.477  
The district court wrote, “The proposed legal fee of $6,000,000.00 would 
be unconscionable in light of the work performed and the lack of adver-
sity in pursuing this claim.”478  On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed, concluding that the district court abused its discretion 
in failing to give due weight to the contingency agreement, stating: “The 
chief error in the district court’s analysis was its failure to recognize the 
significance of the contingency fee in this case.”479 
Although this case was apparently decided under federal law,480 the 
court stated, “We are not convinced, however, that the law of either state 
 
 472. Under “quantum meruit,” the plaintiff recovers the “reasonable value of material 
and services rendered by the plaintiff.”  Potter v. Homestead Pres. Ass’n, 330 N.C. 569, 
578, 412 S.E.2d 1, 7 (1992). 
 473. In re Abrams & Abrams, P.A., 605 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 474. Id. at 242. 
 475. Id. at 241. 
 476. Id. at 242. 
 477. Id. at 242–43. 
 478. Pellegrin v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 598 F. Supp. 2d 724, 731 (E.D.N.C. 2009), 
rev’d, 605 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 479. In re Abrams, 605 F.2d at 245. 
 480. There is ample authority that the issues decided in a hearing to approve a mi-
nor’s settlement are governed by state law.  See, e.g., Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 
1266 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Alabama law requiring a fairness hearing in order to bind a mi-
nor to a settlement agreement is a matter of state substantive law.”).  The Burke court 
also cited to cases from the Ninth and Sixth Circuits for the conclusion that state law go-
verns the issue presented.  Id. at 1266 n.8.  The lower court properly applied state law in 
allowing relief from prior dismissal, in which court had not determined whether dismis-
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[North Carolina or Louisiana] is so different from the federal standard as 
to make a difference.”481  The court wrote that the fee should be reviewed 
pursuant to twelve factors, derived from federal cases awarding fees to 
the plaintiff.482  Those twelve factors are:  
(1) the time and labor required in the case, (2) the novelty and difficulty 
of the questions presented, (3) the skill required to perform the neces-
sary legal services, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the lawyer 
due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee for similar work, (6) 
the contingency of a fee, (7) the time pressures imposed in the case, (8) 
the award involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputa-
tion, and ability of the lawyer, (10) the “undesirability” of the case, (11) 
the nature and length of the professional relationship between the lawyer 
and the client, and (12) the fee awards made in similar cases.483 
The court focused its analysis on whether the contingent agreement 
was reasonable, stating: “The proper question involved, not some hourly 
rate in the abstract, but whether thirty-three percent was an acceptable 
fee for the contingency-based personal injury work performed by Pelle-
grin’s counsel.”484  The court remanded for further proceedings, to con-
sider other factors.485  The federal court therefore presumably held that 
the contractual fee arrangement was binding, subject only to an analysis 
of whether that contingent fee arrangement was reasonable. 
Many courts disregard the fee agreement altogether, on the basis 
that neither the minor, his parents, nor his GAL can enter a binding con-
tract for fees.486  “The attorney and next friend should simply recognize 
 
sal and settlement were fair to minors.  Id. at 1266.  Most of the federal cases cited in this 
subsection regarding the manner of determining attorneys’ fees were based on state, and 
not federal, law. 
 481. In re Abrams, 605 F.2d at 244.  This Article suggests that North Carolina and the 
majority of other jurisdictions give little or no weight to the fee agreement between the 
attorney and the minor’s parents.  The law of Louisiana, however, is generally to the con-
trary, and appears to readily enforce such agreements.  See S. Shipbuilding Corp. v. Rich-
ardson, 372 So. 2d 1188, 1191 (La. 1979) (enforcing contingent fee entered by mother of 
minor beneficiaries, prior to formal appointment to represent estate, based on practical 
considerations). 
 482. In re Abrams, 605 F.2d at 244. 
 483. Id. 
 484. Id. at 248. 
 485. Id. at 249. 
 486. Wright ex rel. Wright v. Wright, 337 S.W.3d 166, 185 (Tenn. 2011).  The court 
wrote: 
Therefore, the trial court shall not consider the fee agreement between the at-
torney and the minor’s next friend, because any such agreement does not bind 
the minor.  In determining the fee, attorneys representing minors must, on the 
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that the court will disregard any agreement concerning fees and set a 
reasonable fee at the conclusion of the case.”487  The courts reject argu-
ments that such action by the court “interferes with the right of the at-
torney and his client to establish the attorney’s fee by mutual agree-
ment.”488  The North Carolina Supreme Court in In re Stone cited to a 
California case which stated that the GAL “has no power by specific 
agreement with the attorney to fix such compensation absolutely.  An 
attorney accepting employment, and rendering services under such cir-
cumstances, must rely upon the subsequent action of the court in ascer-
taining and adjudging proper compensation.”489 
The approach taken by the Fourth Circuit in In re Abrams is pecu-
liar in a few respects.  As noted in the preceding paragraph, its emphasis 
on the fee arrangement is at odds with other federal authority.  Reliance 
on cases regarding statutory fees for a prevailing plaintiff may be inap-
plicable in a case where fees are taken from a minor’s tort settlement.  
Further, those cases utilizing the twelve factors cited in In re Abrams 
tend to diminish the fee arrangement in setting legal fees.  The origin of 
the twelve factors in the Abrams case is Johnson v. Georgia Highway Ex-
press, Inc.490  Regarding the role of the contingent fee agreement, that 
court wrote: 
The fee quoted to the client or the percentage of the recovery agreed to is 
helpful in demonstrating the attorney’s fee expectations when he ac-
cepted the case.  But . . . [s]uch arrangements should not determine the 
 
one hand, receive sufficiently reasonable fees to ensure that they have the ne-
cessary incentive to accept such cases in the future. 
Id.  The court affirmed an award of attorneys’ fees which was based on ten factors for de-
termining reasonableness of fee from rules of professional conduct.  Id.  See Johnson v. 
Clearfield Area School District, 319 F. Supp. 2d 583, 589 (W.D. Pa. 2004), where the 
court held: “Thus, even though a contingency agreement exists, the Court will still fol-
low the [Pennsylvania process for determining fees].”  In this case, the court denied a 
proposed settlement where, inter alia, the petition did not adequately describe services 
rendered and counsel’s hourly rate.  Id.  See also Dean v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 860 F.2d 
670, 673 (6th Cir. 1988) (reversing approval of settlement where lower court looked on-
ly at fee agreement in awarding legal fees).  “When a court is called upon to approve the 
settlement as is in the best interest of the minor, it must consider and then determine 
what constitutes fair and reasonable compensation to the attorney regardless of any 
agreement specifying an amount, whether contingent or otherwise.”  Id. 
 487. Wright, 337 S.W.3d at 186. 
 488. Cappel v. Adams, 434 F.2d 1278, 1280 (5th Cir. 1970).  The lower court 
awarded a fee of one-fifth, rather than one-third, for the lawyer’s services.  Id. at 1279.  
The court rejected the lawyer’s argument because the court has discretion to set a fee, 
which must be reasonable.  Id. at 1280–81. 
 489. Cole v. Super. Ct. of San Francisco, 63 Cal. 86, 89–90 (Cal. 1883). 
 490. Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). 
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court’s decision.  The criterion for the court is not what the parties 
agreed but what is reasonable.491 
Ironically, the Johnson case was later overturned by the United 
States Supreme Court, which held that a prevailing plaintiff in a case un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 1988 was entitled to legal fees based on the attorney’s ac-
tual time in the case (which is exactly what the District Court did in In 
re Abrams), subject to an adjustment based on the other factors noted in 
Johnson, rather than a contingent amount.492  Thus, the federal authority 
in fact seems to diminish the significance of the contingent fee agree-
ment in setting a legal fee for the plaintiff’s counsel, in a case in which 
fees are awarded by statute, which accords with North Carolina law.493 
Some courts recognize the fee agreement as a presumptive award 
for the minor’s attorney’s fees, but then deviate from the agreement 
based on other factors.494  Where the court honors the contingent fee 
 
 491. Id. at 718. 
 492. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 93 (1989) (holding that the District Court 
erred in limiting fee to contingent amount).  The Court said, “The Johnson factors may be 
relevant in adjusting the lodestar amount, but no one factor is a substitute for multiply-
ing reasonable billing rates by a reasonable estimation of the number of hours expended 
on the litigation.”  Id. at 94.  “Johnson’s ‘list of 12’ thus provides a useful catalog of the 
many factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of an award of attorney’s 
fees; but the one factor at issue here, the attorney’s private fee arrangement, standing 
alone, is not dispositive.”  Id. at 93. 
 493. See, e.g., Epps v. Ewers, 90 N.C. App. 597, 600, 369 S.E.2d 104, 105 (1988) 
(“This Court has twice held, however, that a contingent fee contract does not control the 
trial court’s determination and, when a statute provides for a ‘reasonable’ fee, the amount 
of the fee should be based upon the actual work performed by the attorney.”). 
 494. Donnarumma v. Barracuda Tanker Corp., 79 F.R.D. 455, 461 (C.D. Cal. 1978) 
(noting that a fee is determined by principles of quantum meruit and rules of profession-
al conduct and imposing a “downward modification” on contractual one-third recovery 
to fifteen percent based on (1) lack of attorney’s time records, (2) duplicate services for 
multiple clients arising from the same incident, and (3) negligible risk of nonrecovery).  
The court acknowledged that plaintiff’s counsel often does not maintain records of time 
devoted to a case.  Id. at 465.  See also Abel v. Tisdale, 619 P.2d 608, 609 (Okla. 1980), 
where in a wrongful death suit the deceased had a wife and two minor children, and the 
lower court approved a settlement reducing attorney’s fees for each minor by $27,720 to 
$32,000.  The court noted, “[C]ourts have refused to enforce contingent fee arrange-
ments when the amount of the fee seemed excessive.”  Id. at 611.  The court remanded 
for an evidentiary hearing on the reduction of attorneys’ fees for each child, saying: 
The record, while containing evidence of the fairness of the contracted fee and 
the amount of work done by the attorneys, is void of evidence upon which the 
trial court could base his fee reduction.  While the trial court has the authority 
to reduce a child’s attorney fee, such reduction must be supported by evidence; 
it cannot be arbitrary and must be as a result of an adversary proceeding. 
Id. at 612. 
88
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss2/3
KIRBY- FINAL 4/12/2012  9:06 AM 
2012] MINOR’S PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS  381 
and the minor’s recovery includes an annuity, one court held that the fee 
should be based on the amount used to purchase the annuity, rather 
than the present value of the annuity.495 
Most cases evaluate the reasonableness of the lawyer’s fee in relation 
to the amount received by the minor.  One court, however, suggested 
that the focus should be on whether the “net recovery” to the minor was 
reasonable, rather than on the amount of the legal fee.496 
Where the fee agreement is unlawful, it will not be honored.  Thus, 
a fee arrangement which includes improper fee-splitting is not enforcea-
ble, and the court will not award fees pursuant to such an agreement.497 
A finding that the attorneys’ fees are reasonable, contained in the 
order approving the settlement, does not necessarily preclude the client 
from challenging those fees in a later claim against the lawyer.498 
 
 495. Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 436 A.2d 675 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (reversing 
the lower court’s award of an attorney’s fee based on one-third of present value of pro-
jected future annuity payments).  The court held, “We find that the most equitable me-
thod of valuing an annuity for the purpose of determining the amount of attorneys’ fees 
due is by the cost of the annuity.”  Id. at 630. 
 496. Robidoux v. Rosengren, 638 F.3d 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the 
lower court erred when it found that a fee of 56% of recovery for minors and adults was 
unreasonable because the lower court erroneously followed California procedures which 
place “undue emphasis” on legal fees rather than net recovery).  The court noted, “If the 
net recovery of each minor plaintiff under the proposed settlement is fair and reasonable, 
the district court should approve the settlement as presented, regardless of the amount 
the parties agree to designate for adult co-plaintiffs and attorney’s fees.”  Id. 
 497. Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & 
Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that the district court could look 
beyond contingency agreement with plaintiffs and consider the fee splitting agreements 
among the attorney and firms in determining the appropriateness of attorneys’ fees); In re 
Estate of Brandon, 902 P.2d 1299, 1317 (Alaska 1995) (remanding for further findings 
on whether minors’ attorneys had impermissible conflicts and improperly split fees).  
The court in Brandon noted, “[T]he general rule has been that once a conflict of interest 
or other ethical violation has been established, the attorney is prohibited from collecting 
fees for his or her services.”  Id. 
 498. Barr v. Day, 879 P.2d 912, 915–16 (Wash. 1994).  In Barr, where an incompe-
tent adult settled a claim which was approved by the court, including approval of attor-
neys’ fees, and adult’s spouse later sued lawyers for, inter alia, charging excessive fees in 
said proceeding, she was not precluded by collateral estoppel from asserting that fees 
were excessive.  Id. at 913, 916.  The court noted: 
The issues presented in the two proceedings were not identical since the main 
issue in the settlement hearing was whether the proposed settlement as a 
whole, including attorney fees, was reasonable.  Whether the attorneys made a 
full and fair disclosure to the Barrs on all matters relating to the fees, or wheth-
er any fiduciary duties were violated, are distinct issues. 
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III. SETTLEMENT OF MINOR’S CLAIM 
The settlement of a minor’s claim raises issues that are not present 
with an adult claimant.  This includes identifying those persons having 
authority to settle the minor’s claim, the need for court-approval of the 
settlement, and the handling of the minor’s settlement funds. 
A. Persons Having Authority to Enter Settlement for Minor 
There is scant legal authority identifying those persons having the 
power to settle a claim for a minor, revealing the source of that power, 
and addressing the potential conflicts between the various persons in-
volved in the settlement decision.  As noted in the next section of this 
Article, a settlement is not binding unless it is approved by a court.499  In 
order for a court to approve a settlement, however, there must be some 
tentative settlement in the first instance. 
The decision to settle a minor’s claim is typically made by the mi-
nor’s parents.  The parent’s ability to settle the minor’s claim is consis-
tent with the general authority given to parents to handle the affairs of 
their children.  A parent can, for example, make important decisions 
about schooling and medical treatment, and the State cannot intervene 
in these decisions, unless the parent’s conduct amounts to abuse or neg-
lect.500 
 
Id. at 915–16; accord Beckwith v. Llewellyn, 326 N.C. 569, 574, 391 S.E.2d 189, 192 
(1990).  In Beckwith, a plaintiff who sued her lawyers for improper fee was not barred by 
prior action in which the settlement was approved by the court, because “[t]he focus in 
the prior case was not whether the attorneys had taken advantage of their client but 
whether the settlement reached with the opposing party was fair to the minors involved.”  
Id. at 574, 391 S.E.2d at 191–92. 
 499. Sell v. Hotchkiss, 264 N.C. 185, 191, 141 S.E.2d 259, 264 (1965) (holding set-
tlement by mother is not binding); Hagins v. Phipps, 1 N.C. App. 63, 159 S.E.2d 601 
(1968) (holding GAL’s settlement is not binding). 
 500. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-3400 (2011) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, any juvenile under 18 years of age, except as provided in N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-3402 
and N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-3403, shall be subject to the supervision and control of the juve-
nile’s parents.”); In re R.T.W., 359 N.C. 539, 543, 614 S.E.2d 489, 492 (2005) (“Parents 
have a fundamental right to the custody, care, and control of their children.”); Price v. 
Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 79, 484 S.E.2d 528, 534–35 (1997) (“A natural parent’s constitu-
tionally protected paramount interest in the companionship, custody, care, and control 
of his or her child is a counterpart of the parental responsibilities the parent has assumed 
and is based on a presumption that he or she will act in the best interest of the child.”). 
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Both the GAL501 and a general guardian have authority to settle the 
minor’s claim.502  There are also instances where the minor directly en-
ters such a settlement, but this is fairly rare.503  
In a few cases from other jurisdictions, the minor’s attorney has at-
tempted to settle a case without the consent of the parents or the GAL.  
Courts have consistently overturned settlements made in this manner.504  
In one case, the court removed the father as the GAL and proceeded to 
settle the case.505  The appellate court reversed, stating, “The guardian ad 
litem under the circumstances here must of necessity have the sole right 
to accept or reject a settlement offer.  Our rules and practice do not con-
template that the court can or should force a settlement on either 
 
 501. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N.C. 578, 621, 182 S.E. 341, 367 (1935) (“When in-
fant’s property rights are involved in litigation, the general guardian or guardian ad litem 
may negotiate for a compromise of the litigation, and, if the court approves it after an 
examination of the facts, the judgment or decree will be binding on the infants.”) (cita-
tion omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 502. Bunch v. Foreman Blades Lumber Co., 174 N.C. 8, 12, 93 S.E. 374, 376 (1917).  
In Bunch, the court wrote, “He [guardian] stands in the same position as any other trus-
tee, who may, generally, acting in good faith, compound and release a debt due the trust 
estate; and such composition or release for a valuable consideration is prima facie valid 
and effectual.”  Id. at 12, 93 S.E. at 376 (quoting Ordinary v. Dean, 44 N.J.L. 64 (N.J. 
1882)).  The court found settlement of the minor’s claim by the guardian fraudulent, and 
therefore ineffectual.  Id. at 12, 93 S.E. at 376.  The court also noted that the effect of 
such a settlement of a minor’s claim, without court approval, was suspect.  Id. 
 503. Daubert v. Mosley, 487 P.2d 353, 356 (Okla. 1971) (holding release by emanci-
pated minor was binding as it pertained to necessaries).  “Generally, however, emancipa-
tion does not make an infant sui juris for all purposes . . . .”  Id.  Under Oklahoma law, 
an emancipated minor can enter into a binding contract, including a release, only for ne-
cessaries.  Id. 
 504. Blake v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Lyons, 740 P.2d 79, 82 (Kan. 1987) (holding 
that minor’s attorney did not have authority to accept settlement, where “conservators” 
had not agreed to settlement, and hence attorneys’ purported acceptance of offer was 
invalid).  In Blake, the defendant sought court approval of settlement with minor’s attor-
ney prompting minor and new attorneys and conservators to object to the settlement at 
the hearing.  Id. at 81.  The appeals court noted, “The district court, in effect, forced an 
unwanted settlement upon the plaintiff and her conservators.  Such is clearly not the 
purpose of a hearing seeking court approval of the settlement of a minor’s personal in-
jury litigation.”  Id. at 82; see Edionwe v. Hussain, 777 N.Y.S.2d 520, 522 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2004).  In Edionwe, the court reversed approval of a minor’s settlement noting, “Out-
going counsel is seeking to enforce a settlement contrary to the wishes of his former 
clients . . . .”  Id.; see also Speights v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 348 N.Y.S.2d 
691, 693 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973) (“It is clear that there is no statutory right of the attorney 
to compel settlement of any infant’s claim without the consent of the infant’s parent or 
guardian.”). 
 505. Zukerman ex rel Zuckerman v. Piper Pools, Inc., 556 A.2d 775, 787 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1989). 
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side.”506  If the GAL recommends a settlement over the parents’ objec-
tion, the court can approve the settlement.507  The ethics opinion RPC 
163 from the North Carolina State Bar, discussed earlier in Part II.D., 
likewise indicates that a GAL can file a lawsuit for the minor contrary to 
the wishes of the parents; this suggests that the GAL could likewise set-
tle the case against the parents’ wishes.508  There is authority that the 
court can appoint a GAL who can accept a settlement offer over the par-
ents’ objections.509  Fortunately, however, disputes between the parents, 
GAL, and attorney are rare. 
B. Need for Court Approval 
A minor’s claim can be conclusively settled only with the approval 
of the court.  “Judgment or compromise settlement negotiated by next 
friend or guardian ad litem without investigation and approval of court is 
invalid.”510  There is no true requirement that a minor’s settlement be 
approved by the court.  There is, thus, no illegality or unethical conduct 
in settling a minor’s claim without court approval,511 and this practice is 
 
 506. Id.; see also id. at 786 (noting the mere rejection of settlement offers does not 
warrant removal of GAL).  The court said,  
[A] mere difference of opinion, such as existed in this case, as to whether or 
not a proposed settlement offer was sufficient, or should be accepted because of 
the inherent risks of a trial on liability or damages, or both, is neither miscon-
duct nor such conflict of interest as would warrant the court’s interference to in 
effect compel a settlement. 
Id. 
 507. Roberts v. Parrish, 567 S.W.2d 581, 584–85 (Tex. App. 1978) (“The GAL is ap-
pointed in cases of this nature to assist the court in protecting the rights and effecting the 
best interests of the minor plaintiff.”).  In Roberts, the parents, as next friends, sued a mo-
torist for injuries to mother and to child and the judge appointed a GAL due to potential 
conflict.  Id. at 581–82.  The GAL recommended a settlement of $1,500, even though the 
parents sued for $250,000 and objected to the settlement.  Id. at 582–83.  Approval of the 
settlement was affirmed, even though the parents’ attorney offered to pay $1,500 into a 
fund for the minor to ensure that the minor was not harmed by a trial of the action.  Id. 
at 583–85.  The court reasoned, “[I]n the absence of the complete record made on that 
hearing, we must presume the record supported the court’s refusal to accept the parents’ 
$1,500.00 tender and non-suit the child’s case, and its approval of the settlement agree-
ment, as being in the best interests of the child.”).  Id. at 585. 
 508. Accord Council of N.C. State Bar, 2006 Formal Ethics Opinion 9 (2006) (noting 
that a lawyer can seek to remove a minor’s mother as GAL, in order to sue GAL’s mother 
for the minor). 
 509. See Ott v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 652 N.E.2d 1051 (Ill. App. 1995). 
 510. Ballard v. Hunter, 12 N.C. App. 613, 619, 184 S.E.2d 423 (1971). 
 511. In other jurisdictions, approval of the minor’s settlement might be required, and 
the failure to obtain court-approval might constitute misconduct.  See Disciplinary 
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common when claims are settled for fairly small amounts.  Such a set-
tlement may, however, be rescinded by the minor.  In such a case, the 
tortfeasor is entitled to a credit for the amounts paid in settlement.512 
Whether the court approves the settlement is determined variously 
by whether the settlement is “fair,”513 “reasonable,”514 in the “best interest” 
of the minor,515 or “just and righteous.”516  Some cases say only that there 
must be a judicial “adjudication” of the settlement.517  Other cases say 
that the settlement is binding only if it has the “sanction and approval” of 
the court.518  The modern trend is to approve the settlement if it is fair, 
reasonable, and in the best interests of the minor.519 
 
Counsel v. Folwell, 951 N.E.2d 775, 777 (Ohio 2011) (per curiam) (suspending an at-
torney who, inter alia, settled minor’s claim without court approval, and disbursed the 
fees to himself).  The court noted, “Respondent had not represented a minor in a person-
al-injury action before and did not know that an attorney for a minor cannot settle a mi-
nor’s claim without probate court approval.”  Id. 
 512. Bunch v. Foreman Blades Lumber Co., 174 N.C. 8, 93 S.E. 374 (involving pay-
ment to general guardian who apparently had a bond).  See also Ambrose v. Graziani, 247 
S.W. 953, 954 (Ky. 1923), where a minor’s lawyer was obligated to reimburse a tortfea-
sor for payment on a settlement that was not approved by court, when the minor later 
repudiated settlement.  The court remarked: 
Assuming his motives were of the best, and that he intended to have a GAL 
qualify for the infant and pay the money to the guardian ad litem and thereby 
effectuate the settlement, upon his failure to do so, he knew this appellant had 
parted with his money without consideration and must have known it was his 
duty to repay the same to him. 
Id. at 954. 
 513. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N.C. 578, 631–32, 182 S.E. 341, 374 (1935) (affirm-
ing settlement that was found to be “fair, just, and equitable in regard to the property 
rights of these infants”). 
 514. Oates v. Tex. Co., 203 N.C. 474, 478, 166 S.E. 317, 318 (1932) (affirming settle-
ment that was found to be “just and reasonable”). 
 515. Sigmund Sternberger Found., Inc. v. Tannenbaum, 273 N.C. 658, 677, 161 
S.E.2d 116, 130 (1968) (affirming settlement that was “for the best interests of the infant 
defendants”); Gillikin II, 252 N.C. 1, 4–6, 113 S.E.2d 38, 41–42 (1960) (affirming dis-
missal of suit where the lower court found that a prior settlement amount was “equal to 
or more than would have been awarded by a jury under the facts disclosed to the court,” 
and the court that originally approved the settlement found that “the interest of the mi-
nor, Clyde O’Neal Gillikin, would be promoted by authorizing the proposed compro-
mise”). 
 516. Patrick v. Bryan, 202 N.C. 62, 72, 162 S.E. 207, 212 (1932) (noting that a prior 
settlement will bar a subsequent action by the minor if the settlement was “just and righ-
teous”). 
 517. Sell v. Hotchkiss, 264 N.C. 185, 191, 141 S.E.2d 259, 264 (1965). 
 518. Rector v. Laurel River Logging Co., 179 N.C. 59, 62, 101 S.E. 502, 504 (1919) 
(“[A] next friend is without authority to compromise and adjust a claim of this character 
without the sanction and approval of the court on investigation of the facts.”).  The court 
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The rule that renders the settlement of a minor’s claim, without 
court approval, voidable derives from a desire to protect the rights of 
minors.  “From our earliest history infants have been regarded as entitled 
to the especial protection of the State and as wards of the court.”520  “The 
court looks closely into contracts or settlements materially affecting the 
rights of infants.”521 
Thus, where a minor plaintiff accepted and filed a confession of 
judgment, the judgment “could not bind the minor plaintiff unless ac-
cepted on her behalf by someone authorized and empowered by law to 
do so.”522  “‘In the case of infant parties, the next friend, guardian ad litem 
or guardian cannot consent to a judgment or compromise without the 
investigation and approval by the court.’”523  A verdict entered with the 
consent of the parties, and without inquiry by the court, is not bind-
ing.524  A voluntary nonsuit by the court in connection with a settlement 
is not effective without proper court approval.525 
 
held that whether prior judgment, entered by consent, precludes later action by the mi-
nor required a further hearing.  Id. 
 519. See, e.g., M.D.N.C. RULES OF PRAC. & PROC., R. 17.1(e)(2) (2011) (“The judgment 
presented should provide . . . that the Court has found that the proposed compromise 
settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the best interest of the minor or incompetent . . . .”). 
 520. Latta v. Trustees of General Assembly of Presbyterian Church, 213 N.C. 462, 
469, 196 S.E.2d 862, 866 (1938). 
 521. Sigmund Sternberger Found., Inc. v. Tannenbaum, 273 N.C. 658, 674, 161 
S.E.2d 116, 128 (1968). 
 522. Ballard v. Hunter, 12 N.C. App. 613, 618, 184 S.E.2d 426 (1971). 
 523. Id. at 618, 184 S.E.2d at 426–27 (citation omitted).  In Ballard, a minor’s accep-
tance of confession of judgment from one defendant, which was recorded as a judgment, 
did not constitute a true judgment, and a second tortfeasor could not argue that the mi-
nor’s claim against the second defendant was extinguished by satisfaction of the judg-
ment.  Id.  The court noted that the result is the same even if the judgment results from 
an offer of judgment or a consent judgment.  Id. at 618, 184 S.E.2d at 426. 
 524. Ferrell v. Broadway, 126 N.C. 258, 261, 35 S.E. 467, 467 (1900).  The court 
noted that where parties reach settlement and do not present facts to court, “[T]he court 
would have no knowledge of the facts, and therefore could not exercise any supervision 
over the interest of the infants.”  Id.  The plaintiffs alleged that the prior judgment, dur-
ing minority, adjudicating their rights to property was by consent, and the court re-
manded for findings as to what issues were submitted to the jury and as to the land-
purchaser’s knowledge of proceedings.  Id. 
 525. Hagins v. Phipps, 1 N.C. App. 63, 65, 159 S.E.2d 601, 602–03 (1968).  The trial 
court entered judgment of voluntary nonsuit, upon the motion of the next friend.  Id. at 
64, 159 S.E.2d at 602.  The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, saying, “This 
judgment reveals that it is a consent judgment.  There is no finding or adjudication that 
it was investigated or approved by the court.  We hold that the next friend in this case 
had no more, nor less, authority than the next friend of an infant.”  Id. at 65, 159 S.E.2d 
at 602–03.   Nonsuit was error because “[i]n the case of infant parties, the next friend, 
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An interesting example of this rule was presented in Creech v. Mel-
nik.526  In this case, the minor’s attorney was exploring a potential medi-
cal malpractice case and spoke with one of the minor’s treating doc-
tors.527  The doctor contended that during the conversation, the minor’s 
attorney “assured her that if she spoke with him concerning the events 
surrounding Justin’s birth, plaintiffs would not sue her.528  She stated 
that with that assurance, she gave information and opinions concerning 
the care provided for Justin.”529  The minor later sued that doctor.530  The 
jury ruled for the doctor based on a theory that the minor impliedly con-
tracted not to sue the doctor.531  The Court of Appeals reversed, finding 
that the promise was not enforceable because it was not approved by the 
court.532  The court noted: 
Since it is well established in North Carolina that a covenant not to sue 
negotiated for a minor is invalid without investigation and approval by 
the trial court, we must reverse the jury’s finding of a contract on behalf 
of the minor not to sue Dr. Melnik, and remand for a new trial.533 
Where the court approves the settlement, the settlement is binding, 
and the minor may not litigate the claim.534  This assumes, of course, 
that the court has jurisdiction.  This also assumes that the tortfeasor 
consummates the settlement with payment.535  Further, an order approv-
ing such a settlement, as with any order, is subject to further review by 
appropriate motion or appeal.  These challenges to such a settlement are 
addressed primarily in Part III.F. of this Article. 
 
GAL, or guardian cannot consent to a judgment or compromise without the investigation 
and approval by the Court.”  Id. at 65, 159 S.E.2d at 603. 
 526. Creech v. Melnik, 147 N.C. App. 471, 556 S.E.2d 587 (2001). 
 527. Id. at 472, 556 S.E.2d at 589. 
 528. Id. at 473, 556 S.E.2d at 589. 
 529. Id. at 473, 556 S.E.2d at 589. 
 530. Id. at 472, 556 S.E.2d at 588. 
 531. Id. at 473, 556 S.E.2d at 589.  The jury rejected an argument that the minor was 
equitably estopped from suing the doctor.  Id. at 473 n.1, 556 S.E.2d at 589 n.1. 
 532. Id. at 475, 556 S.E.2d at 590. 
 533. Id. at 478, 556 S.E.2d at 592. 
 534. Gillikin II, 252 N.C. 1, 6, 113 S.E.2d 38, 42 (1960) (holding that where court 
approved settlement for $7,000, and insurer paid funds to clerk, the settlement was valid 
and binding and barred subsequent action by a minor filed after the minor reached ma-
jority). 
 535. Gillikin v. Gillikin (Gillikin I), 248 N.C. 710, 713–14, 104 S.E.2d 861, 863–64 
(1958) (holding that dismissal of action based on prior settlement was error where the 
record did not show whether the settlement amount had been paid by the tortfeasor). 
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One of the leading cases recognizing the binding effect of a settle-
ment approved by the court is Gillikin II.536  In this case, the minor was 
injured in an automobile accident when he was seventeen years old.537  
His father retained a lawyer, and the lawyer settled the claim, which set-
tlement was approved by the court.538  The minor turned the age of ma-
jority and sued the defendant (tortfeasor), and the defendant raised the 
previous settlement as a bar to the action.539  The plaintiff’s primary re-
sponse seems to have been that the petition seeking judicial approval of 
the settlement in the prior action was not verified by the next friend.540  
The court held that the action was barred because of the previous set-
tlement, which had been approved by the court, and rejected the chal-
lenges to the procedure used to approve the settlement.541 
The cases do not always clearly indicate the theory upon which a 
prior settlement, approved by the court, precludes a second claim by the 
minor.  In some of the cases, the defendant asserted the doctrines of “res 
judicata” and “estoppel by judgment.”542  Other cases simply refer to a 
“settlement,”543 and other cases refer to “pleading the judgment.”544  
Where the defendant defends an action based on a prior settlement, this 
is an affirmative defense, and the burden is on the defendant to “‘estab-
lish all facts necessary to support such plea.’”545 
The rule that the settlement of a minor’s claim is not binding unless 
approved by the court applies to any settlement affecting a minor’s claim 
for damages.  Thus, where the minor agrees to split the future proceeds 
of a pending wrongful death action with other potential beneficiaries, 
 
 536. Gillikin II, 252 N.C. 1, 113 S.E.2d 38. 
 537. Id. 
 538. Id. 
 539. Id. 
 540. Id. at 7, 113 S.E.2d at 43 (concluding that verification is not required). 
 541. Id. at 8–9, 113 S.E.2d at 44. 
 542. Id. at 6, 113 S.E.2d at 42.  In Gillikin II, the minor settled action, with court ap-
proval, and then brought suit for damages.  Id. at 2, 113 S.E.2d at 39.  The court noted, 
“Defendant’s plea in bar, whether considered as a plea of estoppel by compromise and 
settlement, or as a plea of res judicata, or a combination of both, is an affirmative de-
fense.”  Id. at 6, S.E.2d at 42 (citations omitted). 
 543. Patrick v. Bryan, 202 N.C. 62, 68, 162 S.E. 207, 210 (1932) (holding that where 
minor settled an action with court approval and brought a second action for injuries, the 
second claim was barred by “compromise settlement”). 
 544. Oates v. Tex. Co., 203 N.C. 474, 477, 166 S.E. 317, 318 (1932) (holding that 
where minor settled a claim with court approval and filed a suit for damages, the claim is 
barred on Defendant’s “pleading in bar the judgment”). 
 545. Gillikin II, 252 N.C. at 6, 113 S.E.2d at 42 (citation omitted). 
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that settlement (in addition to the wrongful death settlement) must be 
approved by the court.546 
By statute, the settlement of a wrongful death claim in which a be-
neficiary is a minor must be approved by the court.547  In one case, the 
lawyer for an estate settled a wrongful death claim with a tortfeasor, and 
did not obtain such court approval, even though a minor was a benefi-
ciary. 548  The estate later sued the tortfeasor, who raised the two-year 
statute of limitations.549  The estate attempted to argue that the tortfeasor 
was estopped from asserting the statute of limitations because he failed 
to have the settlement approved.550  The court disagreed on the basis that 
the administrator, not the tortfeasor, “has a duty to seek judicial approv-
al.”551 
Although the settlement of the minor’s claim requires court approv-
al, other decisions short of settlement that can impair the minor’s rights 
are binding even if not approved by the court.  For example, when the 
minor’s attorney fails to object to the introduction of evidence at trial, 
the minor waives any challenge to the admissibility of the evidence on 
appeal.552  The trial court is not required to approve such a decision, 
even though it can impair the minor’s rights. 
A related issue is whether the court can review a decision by the 
minor’s parents or attorney to reject a settlement offer, and whether the 
court has any authority to refuse to allow the minor’s attorney and par-
 
 546. In re Estate of Brandon, 902 P.2d 1299,1314 (Alaska 1995) (concluding that 
where decedent died in airplane crash, and his putative minor daughter and his parents 
reached settlement regarding distribution of wrongful death proceeds from pending liti-
gation, and said allocation was not specifically approved by court in paternity action, 
said allocation was not binding following settlement of wrongful death action).  In this 
case, the lower court erred in failing to determine if purported allocation was fair and 
reasonable.  Id. at 1309.  The appellate court indicated that unless decedent’s parents had 
more than a negligible chance of defeating minor’s claim for paternity, minor should re-
ceive entire settlement.  Id. at 1314. 
 547. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-13-3(a)(23) (2011). 
 548. Boomer v. Caraway, 116 N.C. App. 723, 724–25, 449 S.E.2d 215, 216–
217 (1994), aff’d, 342 N.C. 186, 463 S.E.2d 230 (1995) (clarifying that determination of 
which party has a duty to seek judicial approval is matter of law, and cannot be shown 
by production of evidence). 
 549. Id. at 724, 449 S.E.2d at 216. 
 550. Id. at 725, 449 S.E.2d at 216. 
 551. Id. at 725, 449 S.E.2d at 217. 
 552. Sterling v. Gil Soucy Trucking, Ltd., 146 N.C. App. 173, 178, 552 S.E.2d 674, 
677 (“[B]y not objecting to . . . publication [of school records] to the jury the [minor] 
plaintiffs forfeited the right to appeal the question of the admissibility of the school 
records.”). 
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ents to reject a settlement offer.  The rejection of a settlement offer can 
affect the minor’s interests as much as a decision to accept a settlement 
offer and release the tortfeasor.553 
In a case from another jurisdiction, the minor’s medical malpractice 
trial began, and during trial the judge procured an offer from the defen-
dant to settle for two million dollars, after stating that he (the judge) 
would settle the case for that amount.554  The minor plaintiff, through 
his attorney and parents (one of whom was the “next friend”) had de-
manded four and a half million dollars and objected to the proposed set-
tlement.555  The judge met with the parents and their lawyer, but they 
would not agree to the settlement.556  The judge then stated, “This case is 
settled for two million dollars according to a revised structured settle-
ment, which I find satisfactory, and a guardian ad litem will be appointed 
in place of the father to accept the settlement.”557  The judge then told 
the parents that he could not “let anybody, no matter how well-
intentioned or sincere in their convictions, gamble for this child.”558 
The court-appointed GAL reviewed the proposed settlement and 
found that it was in the minor’s best interest.559  The judge approved the 
settlement.560  The appellate court affirmed, stating, “when the court be-
lieves settlement to be in the minor’s best interest, the court may order a 
prior-appointed guardian or conservator to effectuate settlement, and if 
that person refuses, may appoint a guardian ad litem to settle the case on 
the minor’s behalf.”561  The court further wrote: 
In the case of a minor, as noted above, however, the trial court has a du-
ty to prevent the rejection of settlement offers which in the minor’s best 
interests should be accepted.  This duty necessarily impedes upon the 
minor’s parents/guardians ad litem’s ability to control direction of the 
case as well as to choose the vehicle for ultimate determination of the 
minor’s rights of recovery. 
  . . . When the court has made such an examination and has deter-
mined that settlement, rather than the uncertainties of trial, is in the best 
 
 553. See Ott v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 652 N.E.2d 1051 (Ill. App. 1995). 
 554. Id. at 1054. 
 555. Id. at 1054–55. 
 556. Id. at 1055. 
 557. Id. 
 558. Id. 
 559. Id. at 1055–56. 
 560. Id. at 1056. 
 561. Id. at 1057. 
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interest of the minor; and when that determination is supported by the 
record, it will be affirmed.562 
The result in this case is rather extreme in that the minor’s claim 
was settled contrary to the wishes of his parents and his lawyer, but it is 
a logical result of the principles that the court can appoint a GAL, that 
the GAL can recommend a settlement, that the court reviews a proposed 
settlement in the best interest of the minor, and that the court’s decision 
is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  If the GAL had recommended that 
the settlement be rejected, then presumably the court could not have 
imposed the settlement.563  It is not clear whether the reasoning of this 
case implies that the court should be apprised of all significant settle-
ment offers, so that that the court can review the rejection of the offer. 
C. Repudiation of Settlement Pending Approval  
Most of the law in North Carolina indicates that until the settlement 
is approved by the court, the minor can repudiate the settlement.  In 
other words, the settlement is not binding if the minor repudiates the 
settlement prior to the court’s approval of the settlement.  North Caroli-
na does not have any cases specifically addressing whether the minor can 
repudiate the settlement once the parties have begun the process for 
seeking court approval.  More broadly, North Carolina does not have 
any case law addressing the time in which the parties should seek ap-
proval of the settlement.  In one case, however, the court held that a set-
tlement, which was not approved by a court, could be reviewed for its 
reasonableness and approved after the minor attempted to repudiate it. 
In Patrick v. Bryan, the minor was injured and her father settled the 
claim with the defendant’s insurance company.564  The insurance com-
pany hired an attorney to represent the defendant, and this attorney ar-
ranged for the filing of a “friendly lawsuit” by a next friend against the 
defendant.565  A jury rendered a verdict in accord with the settlement.566  
 
 562. Id. at 1058. 
 563. See cases discussed supra Part III.B, regarding the court’s inability to settle the 
minor’s claim without the consent of the parents or the GAL. 
 564. Patrick v. Bryan, 202 N.C. 62, 68, 162 S.E. 207, 210 (1932). 
 565. Id. 
 566. This process appears in some of these older cases.  Although research has re-
vealed no discussion of this process, it appears that a jury was empanelled, the case was 
submitted to the jury, the lawyers informed the jury of the amount of the settlement, and 
the jury returned a verdict for the amount of the tentative settlement.  A similar proce-
dure occurred in Ferrell v. Broadway, 126 N.C. 258, 35 S.E. 467 (1900). 
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The liability carrier then paid money to fund the settlement.567  There is 
no indication that the court conducted any investigation into the settle-
ment, and the court did not find that the settlement was fair or reasona-
ble.568  Eighteen months after this settlement, a new lawyer, appearing 
for the minor, filed a motion asking that the prior judgment be vacated 
as irregular and void.569  The precise basis for the motion is not entirely 
clear, but it appears that the lawyer contended that the insurance com-
pany’s lawyer exercised undue influence over the minor’s parents, that 
the trial court had not been apprised of all the facts, and that the pro-
ceeding was “contrary to the course and practice of our courts.”570  The 
lower court allowed the motion and vacated the judgment.571  The de-
fendant appealed, and the Supreme Court remanded.572  The court in Pa-
trick wrote,  
[T]his real fact should be found: Was the compromise settlement made 
by the father of the minor for the minor, and the insurance company for 
the defendants, a just and righteous one?  Has the minor suffered no 
substantial injustice?  Why set aside a compromise settlement made by 
the father of the minor if it is just and righteous and not prejudicial to 
the interest of the minor?573  
The court thus implicitly held that the minor could not repudiate the 
settlement, even though the settlement had not been approved by the 
trial court. 
In all other cases in North Carolina, however, the courts allow the 
minor to repudiate the settlement at any time prior to approval by the 
court.  For example, in Creech v. Melnik, the minor’s attorney agreed not 
to sue a doctor for malpractice, in exchange for which the doctor spoke 
with the minor’s attorney.574  The Court of Appeals held that this agree-
ment was unenforceable because it had not been approved by the 
court.575  The appellate court did not remand the case for a determina-
tion as to whether that agreement was fair and reasonable.576  In all of 
the cases cited in this Article in which the court declared a settlement 
 
 567. Patrick, 202 N.C. at 72, 162 S.E. at 212. 
 568. Id. at 70, 162 S.E. at 211. 
 569. Id. at 65, 162 S.E. at 208. 
 570. Id. 70, 162 S.E. at 211. 
 571. Id. at 69–70, 162 S.E. at 210–11. 
 572. Id. at 72, at 162 S.E. at 212. 
 573. Id. 
 574. Creech v. Melnik, 147 N.C. App. 471, 472–73, 556 S.E.2d 587, 589 (2001). 
 575. Id. at 475, 556 S.E.2d at 590. 
 576. See id. at 478, S.E.2d at 592. 
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invalid due to the absence of court approval, the court did not hold that 
the settlement could nevertheless be approved after the minor repu-
diated it.577 
In most jurisdictions, the minor can repudiate the settlement at any 
time before it is approved by the court.578  One court, however, held that 
the settlement is in a “suspended” state pending approval by the court, 
and the minor cannot void the settlement.579  Another court held that if 
the GAL repudiates the settlement arbitrarily or capriciously, the court 
may nevertheless approve the settlement if it is in the best interest of the 
minor.580 
Where the minor settles with the tortfeasor and then files suit 
against the tortfeasor, the courts generally regard this as a repudiation of 
the settlement by the minor.581  It is therefore difficult to square the Pa-
trick case, which permits the settlement to be approved after the minor 
attempts to repudiate it, with other cases that simply hold that if the mi-
nor’s settlement is not approved by the court, the minor can repudiate it. 
 
 577. See, e.g., Rector v. Laurel River Logging Co., 179 N.C. 59, 62, 101 S.E. 502, 
504 (1919) (holding that a prior consent judgment does not bar a subsequent action un-
less said judgment was with “sanction and approval of the court on investigation of the 
facts”). 
 578. White v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 31 P.3d 328, 330 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (“And 
courts in other jurisdictions have applied this rule to permit minors to repudiate or 
withdraw from a settlement prior to its approval by the court.”). 
 579. Danes v. Auto. Underwriters, Inc., 307 N.E.2d 902, 906 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974).  
Danes, the minor, filed suit to declare void the release of his claims against an uninsured 
motorist insurer, pursuant to settlement entered by his parents.  Id. at 903.  However, the 
evidence did not compel the conclusion that fraud, actual or constructive, was present in 
obtaining the release; and the court only suspended enforceability of the compromise 
and the release accompanying it pending approval of the settlement by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction.  Id. at 906; see also Hansen v. Bussman, 601 P.2d 794 (Or. 1979).  In 
Hanson, the minor obtained judgment for $500,000 and defendant appealed; on appeal, 
parties entered into a high-low agreement in which defendant would pay $450,000 if 
judgment were affirmed.  Id. at 795.  Prior to the hearing to approve the high-low agree-
ment, which parties planned, the tort verdict was affirmed, and the minor sought to re-
cover entire $500,000, while defendant sought to pay only $450,000.  Id.  The court held 
that the parties reached a binding agreement, based in part on statute that gave the mi-
nor’s conservator authority to settle the claim without court approval.  Id. at 796–97.  
The court also noted that the conservator had a duty to follow through with the settle-
ment, as “it is well established that a party to a contract cannot take advantage of his own 
failure to perform,” and the settlement likely would have been approved.  Id. at 797. 
 580. Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 581. Iverson v. Scholl Inc., 483 N.E.2d 893, 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (“[T]he filing of 
suit is sufficient evidence of plaintiff’s desire to disaffirm any purported discharge given 
by her under the cajoling influence of her father.”). 
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It is noteworthy that the tortfeasor cannot repudiate the settlement.  
The minor can repudiate the settlement prior to approval by a court, but 
the tortfeasor is bound by the settlement.582  Where the tortfeasor is con-
cerned that the minor might await other developments to decide wheth-
er to rescind the settlement, prior to approval by the court, the tortfeasor 
can condition the settlement upon a prompt judicial approval.583 
D. Release of Claims 
In a typical personal injury claim, upon a settlement of the claim, 
the tortfeasor (or his insurer) will insist that the claimant sign a release, 
which is essentially a contractual agreement that the claimant will not 
pursue other claims against the tortfeasor arising out of the incident giv-
ing rise to the claimant’s injuries.  Most of the cases addressing the valid-
ity and preclusive effect of a minor’s settlement focus on whether the set-
tlement was approved by the court, while only a couple of cases address 
the role of the release in the settlement process.  The cases in North 
Carolina that have held that the settlement of a minor’s claim, with court 
approval, bars a subsequent action by the minor do not even make refer-
ence to a release.584  
 
 582. Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Kay, 589 S.E.2d 711, 715 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (holding 
that an insurer cannot avoid settlement prior to approval of the settlement by the court).  
The court noted that “the procedural protections afforded to minors . . . are intended for 
their benefit, not for the benefit of third parties seeking to avoid contracts with them.”  
Id. at 715; see also White, 31 P.3d at 332 (“The executory accord is binding on Allied, . . . 
[but] the resulting agreement was not binding on Elizabeth until a court approved it, 
[and] Allied was bound not to revoke or attempt to withdraw its offer prior to the friend-
ly hearing that it undertook to schedule.”); Dengler ex rel. Dengler v. Crisman, 516 A.2d 
1231, 1233 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (“Such a settlement is binding on the negotiators but 
voidable as to the minor, pursuant to Rule 2039 [which requires that a GAL represent the 
minor’s interests].”). 
 583. Shelton v. Sloan, 977 P.2d 1012, 1020–21 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a 
minor can repudiate a settlement where the case is tried to a jury verdict before the set-
tlement is approved by court). The court further stated that: 
[T]he non-minor can, to a great extent, protect itself against the vicissitudes of 
intervening events.  If the settlement is pursuant to [an offer of judgment], the 
non-minor can promptly submit the settlement to the court for approval.  Out-
side the Rule [for an offer of judgment], the non-minor can condition its 
agreement to settle upon prompt judicial approval of the settlement. 
Id. 
 584. See Sell v. Hotchkiss, 264 N.C. 185, 141 S.E.2d 259 (1965); Patrick v. Bryan, 202 
N.C. 62, 162 S.E. 207 (1932); Rector v. Laurel River Logging Co., 179 N.C. 59, 101 S.E. 
502 (1919). 
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It thus appears that a release is not needed to effectuate the settle-
ment.  Where the settlement results in a judgment, a release is not ne-
cessary, as the doctrine of res judicata would bar a subsequent action.585  
Further, where the court simply approves a settlement, not resulting in a 
judgment, and the defendant complies with its duty to pay the amount 
of the settlement, the doctrine of accord and satisfaction should protect 
the defendant, even in the absence of an express release.586  One case 
from another jurisdiction stated that a court-approved settlement of a 
minor’s claim is akin to a release.587 
In the two cases in North Carolina addressing the role of the release 
in a minor’s settlement, the release was relevant for determining the abil-
ity of the minor to pursue other tortfeasors.  In one case,588 a lower court 
approved a minor’s settlement with one tortfeasor and entered a judg-
ment for the amount of the settlement.  That court also ordered the 
mother—acting as the minor’s GAL—to sign a release.589  The release 
applied only to the claims against the settling tortfeasor, and stated that 
a second tortfeasor would receive a credit for the amount of the settle-
ment.590  The judgment was paid, and the second tortfeasor then argued 
that the minor’s claims against the second tortfeasor were extinguished 
against him, due to satisfaction of the judgment.591  The court rejected 
this argument, and stated, “The release agreement executed pursuant to 
 
 585. See Bernstein v. Kapneck, 417 A.2d 456, 464 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980) (affirm-
ing lower court’s decision not to vacate prior settlement, which resulted in a judgment).  
The court rejected an argument that the lower court should have declared the release 
void, because “even if, arguendo, we adopted the appellant’s position, the most we could 
do would be to rescind the release and settlement agreement.  We would still be left with 
a judgment which was enrolled for eleven months before this proceeding began.”  Id. 
 586. Dobias v. White, 239 N.C. 409, 413, 80 S.E.2d 23, 27 (1954).  The court noted 
that 
[a]n “accord” is an agreement whereby one of the parties undertakes to give or 
perform, and the other to accept, in satisfaction of a claim, liquidated or in dis-
pute, and arising either from contract or tort, something other than or different 
from what he is, or considers himself, entitled to; and a “satisfaction” is the ex-
ecution or performance, of such agreement . . . . If the accord is fully per-
formed, the performance satisfies the original claim, and bars a subsequent ac-
tion to enforce it. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 587. Allianz Ins. Co. v. Garrett, 153 F.R.D. 89, 93 (E.D. Va. 1994) (“[T]he effect of 
the court approved infants’ settlement [with Whalen] was a release of Whalen even 
though the court’s order nowhere uses the word ‘release.’”). 
 588. Payseur v. Rudisill, 15 N.C. App. 57, 189 S.E.2d 562 (1972). 
 589. Id. at 60–61, 189 S.E.2d at 564–65. 
 590. Id. at 61, 189 S.E.2d at 565. 
 591. Id. at 62, 189 S.E.2d at 566. 
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the order is the controlling factor.”592  Because the release applied only to 
the settling tortfeasor, the court held that the minor could pursue the 
second tortfeasor.593  The court thus essentially held that the terms of the 
release trumped a statute, which otherwise would have meant that satis-
faction of the judgment extinguished the claims against other tortfea-
sors.594 
In another case, the court looked to the settlement document (and 
not the order approving the settlement) to determine whether the minor 
could pursue a second tortfeasor.595  The issue was whether the docu-
ment signed by the minor and his GAL was a release or a “covenant not 
to sue.”596  This was relevant because if the minor’s settlement had been 
consummated through a release, then it could have had the effect of re-
leasing claims against other tortfeasors.597  The court held that the order 
approving the settlement provided for the execution of a covenant, and 
that, in fact, the parties had used a covenant, and thus the minor’s claim 
against other tortfeasors was not barred.598  Regarding the effect of the 
order approving the settlement, the court wrote, “Without the subse-
quent execution of the ‘Covenant not to Sue,’ it [the order approving the 
settlement] would have been of no effect.”599  The court further noted 
that “The actual instrument executed pursuant to the order is the con-
trolling factor in this situation.”600  The only true holding of this case is 
that the settling tortfeasor entered into a covenant, and therefore the mi-
nor could pursue a second tortfeasor.  The impact of this holding was 
 
 592. Id. at 63, 189 S.E.2d at 566. 
 593. Id. at 63–64, 189 S.E.2d at 566. 
 594. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-3(e) (2011).  This section provides: 
  The recovery of judgment against one tort-feasor for the injury or wrongful 
death does not of itself discharge the other tort-feasors from liability to the 
claimant.  The satisfaction of the judgment discharges the other tort-feasors 
from liability to the claimant for the same injury or wrongful death, but does 
not impair any right of contribution. 
Id. 
 595. McNair v. Goodwin, 262 N.C. 1, 136 S.E.2d 218 (1964). 
 596. Id. at 4, 136 S.E.2d at 220. 
 597. Id. at 3–4, 136 S.E.2d at 220. 
 598. Id. at 4–5, 136 S.E.2d at 220. 
 599. Id. at 5, 136 S.E.2d at 221.  Read in context, the court simply meant that the tort-
feasor would not be obligated to pay the settlement unless the GAL executed the cove-
nant.  See id.  The order was not, however, without effect in the absence of a covenant; at 
a minimum, the tortfeasor could enforce the settlement and require the minor’s GAL to 
sign the covenant.  Id.  
 600. Id. 
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largely diminished by case law holding that a court-approved settlement 
with one tortfeasor does not discharge other tortfeasors.601 
The tortfeasor should generally try to obtain a release signed by the 
parents and the GAL—as well as the minor where feasible.602  The terms 
of the release are more likely to be upheld if they are also approved by 
the court.  As noted earlier, however, a release does not appear to be ne-
cessary to protect the tortfeasor from further liability. 
A settlement of the parents’ claims is, of course, not required to be 
submitted to the court for approval.603  The settling parents should there-
fore sign a release upon settling their claims.  The father historically is 
deemed to have the claim for medical expenses, but the mother can also 
acquire this claim if she supports the child.604  It is therefore preferable 
to obtain the signature of both parents on the release, but this is not al-
ways possible.  Due to the peculiar nature of the parents’ claims, the in-
surer should be careful in its representations to the parents as to the 
scope of the release.605 
 
 601. See supra Part II.C. 
 602. Some authority indicates that the GAL, and not the parent, should sign the re-
lease.  See Julian v. Zayre Corp., 388 A.2d 813, 816 (R.I. 1978) (holding that where a re-
lease was not signed by the GAL and was not approved by the court, the release was not 
binding).  In this case, the minor reached a court-approved settlement with one tortfea-
sor and the minor’s mother signed a release, which released all persons, including the 
second tortfeasor.  Id. at 814–15.  The court explained that “in order to make the release 
valid and binding as to the rights of the minor it must be executed on the minor’s behalf 
by a court-appointed guardian ad litem and approved by a court.”  Id. at 816.  The release 
was effective to bar the mother’s claim.  Id.  Other authority indicates that the GAL 
should not sign the release.  Anton, supra note 359, at 182 (“As a caveat, the guardian ad 
litem should approve the settlement agreement as to form only and should not sign it on 
behalf of the minor.”).  The best practice would seem to be to have the GAL and the par-
ents sign the release.  There is no indication in North Carolina that it would be inappro-
priate for a GAL to sign the release. 
 603. See Donnarumma v. Barracuda Tanker Corp., 79 F.R.D. 455, 460 (C.D. Cal. 
1978) (“The Court concludes that the portions of the D’Asaro and Donnarumma pro-
posed compromise orders dealing with the settlement of the claims of the widows 
brought in their own behalf and the entire Scarogni proposed compromise order [in 
which minors have attained age of majority] are not properly before the Court for ap-
proval.”). 
 604. See discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
 605. Gast v. Ebert, 739 S.W.2d 545 (Mo. 1987) (en banc) (noting that the minor’s 
parents “sought to rescind the settlement agreement, to obtain damages for medical ex-
penses paid, and to obtain damages for the loss of their daughter’s services[,] [t]hey al-
leg[ed] the agreement was the product of fraudulent misrepresentation,” consisting of 
the insurer’s alleged statement that payment to parents was for medical expenses only). 
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A release signed by a minor raises additional considerations.  Re-
gardless of the validity of a release signed by a minor, however, where 
the court approves the settlement, the minor cannot thereafter pursue 
her claim.606 
As a general matter, a release signed by a minor is voidable at the 
election of the minor.607  Even with an “executed” contract, the minor 
can void or rescind (or “undo”) the contract.608  Thus, where the minor 
bought a mule for $375, he could sue the seller three years later for the 
return of his money.609  In another case, the minor was allowed to return 
a vehicle to the seller, and obtain a full refund, despite the fact that the 
vehicle was destroyed in a wreck.610  Thus, a minor who settles his claim 
and accepts payment can still rescind the settlement.  Even if the minor 
misrepresents his age, he can still disaffirm the contract.611  The other 
party to the contract cannot assert a claim for fraud or negligent repre-
sentation, because this is viewed as an end-run around the minor’s ina-
bility to contract.612  
The minor cannot render a contract void if he attains the age of ma-
jority and does not repudiate the settlement within a reasonable time.613  
It is therefore possible that a settlement by a minor could be binding, 
notwithstanding the absence of court approval, if the minor does not re-
 
 606. See Sell v. Hotchkiss, 264 N.C. 185, 141 S.E.2d 259 (1965); Patrick v. Bryan, 202 
N.C. 62, 162 S.E. 207 (1932); Rector v. Laurel River Logging Co., 179 N.C. 59, 101 S.E. 
502 (1919). 
 607. Hight v. Harris, 188 N.C. 328, 330, 124 S.E. 623, 624 (1924). 
 608. Id.  North Carolina now allows minors to enter into certain entertainment and 
other contracts that are binding.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48A-12(a) (2011) (providing that 
a minor cannot disaffirm certain entertainment, sports, and other specified contracts ap-
proved by a court).  Even these, however, require approval by the court to be binding.  
See id. 
 609. Hight, 188 N.C. at 330, 124 S.E. at 624 (noting also that a minor “must restore 
the consideration received if he still has the same in hand”). 
 610. Collins v. Norfleet-Baggs, 197 N.C. 659, 150 S.E. 177 (1929). 
 611. Greensboro Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer, 185 N.C. 109, 111, 116 S.E. 261, 262 
(1923).  Where a party lacks the capacity to enter a contract due to his mental condition 
(and not due to his minority), the agreement is voidable only if the other party to the 
contract knew that the individual lacked mental capacity and that the agreement was un-
fair.  West v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 69 S.E. 676, 678 (1910). 
 612. Palmer, 185 N.C. at 118, 116 S.E. at 265. 
 613. Creech v. Melnik, 147 N.C. App. 471, 476, 556 S.E.2d 587, 591 (2001) (holding 
that the minor’s attorney could not agree—on behalf of the minor—not to sue the doc-
tor who provided information to the attorney based on the agreement not to sue).  The 
court noted, “What is a reasonable time depends upon the circumstances of each case, no 
hard-and-fast rule regarding precise time limits being capable of definition.”  Id. 
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pudiate the settlement within a reasonable time after attaining the age of 
eighteen. 
We rarely see a claim involving an emancipated minor.  A minor is 
emancipated by court order or by marriage.614  There is little legal au-
thority regarding the effect of emancipation on a minor’s claim.615  Pur-
suant to statute, the emancipated minor “has the same right to make 
contracts and conveyances, to sue and to be sued, and to transact busi-
ness as if the petitioner were an adult.”616  The emancipated minor there-
fore can presumably sign a release and does not need a GAL in a court 
proceeding.  It is not clear, however, whether the requirement that a mi-
nor’s settlement be approved by the court is affected by the minor’s 
emancipation. 
E. Procedural considerations 
There are several procedural issues that arise in connection with the 
settlement of a minor’s claim. 
1.  Procedural Vehicles 
There are no rigid rules regarding the type of proceeding that the 
parties should use to present the proposed settlement to the court.  The 
court must of course have jurisdiction over the parties and over the pro-
ceeding.  Where the parties have not properly invoked the jurisdiction of 
the court, the court cannot rule on the matter.617  The cases generally 
recognize that the trial court (i.e., the General Court of Justice, consist-
ing of the Superior and District Courts) has jurisdiction to review the 
settlement of minors’ claims.618 
 
 614. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7B-3500, -3505 (2011) (allowing emancipation to be afforded 
to a minor 16 or older if it is in her best interests); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-3509 (“A mar-
ried juvenile is emancipated by this Article.”). 
 615. Daubert v. Mosley, 487 P.2d 353, 356 (Okla. 1971) (“Generally, however, eman-
cipation does not make an infant sui juris for all purposes . . . .”).  Under Oklahoma law, 
emancipated minors can enter binding contract, including a release, only for necessaries.  
Id. 
 616. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-3507(1). 
 617. N.C. Trust Co. v. Taylor, 131 N.C. App. 690, 693–94, 508 S.E.2d 809, 811–12 
(1998) (holding that the parties did not properly invoke jurisdiction of the Court of Ap-
peals where appellant was not an “aggrieved party,” as appellant, who was minor’s GAL, 
did not really contest lower court ruling directing payment of proceeds). 
 618. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Buchan, 256 N.C. 142, 153, 123 S.E.2d 489, 
496 (1962) (“[T]he superior court of Wilkes County in the exercise of its equity jurisdic-
tion has jurisdiction over the parties and over the subject matter of this suit concerning 
the trust property of the infant Mary Elizabeth Buchan, whether vested or contingent, 
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Most commonly, a settlement is effectuated through a “friendly 
suit.”  This is an action that commences as a typical lawsuit for damages.  
The minor is the plaintiff, appearing through a GAL, and sues the defen-
dant, who is the tortfeasor.  The minor’s parents can also be plaintiffs in 
the action.  After a hearing, the court then enters an order approving the 
settlement, as addressed in a subsequent section.  The approval of the 
settlement can be entered as a judgment against the defendant, which 
typically is then satisfied by the defendant’s payment into the clerk’s of-
fice.  More commonly, however, the order simply recites the terms of the 
settlement and provides that the defendant, or its insurance company, 
will pay the settlement to the minor’s attorney, and gives instructions re-
garding the disbursement of the proceeds.  In this situation, there should 
not be a true “judgment” against the defendant.  There are other varia-
tions on the logistics of consummating the settlement. 
A minor settlement can also be effectuated by a petition in a “special 
proceeding” pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, section1-
400.619  Section 1-402 states that an order of the clerk affecting a minor-
petitioner’s rights is not “valid, unless submitted to and approved by the 
judge resident or holding court in the district.”620 Under this procedure, 
the settlement should first be submitted to the Clerk of Court and then 
to a judge for approval.621  The use of this proceeding does not result in a 
“judgment” against the tortfeasor.622 
There are no strict pleading requirements in these cases.623  Under 
older procedural rules, allegations about medical bills were improper in 
 
and over the suit.”).  Where the parties consent to the settlement proceeding, either the 
District Court or the Superior Court should be able to rule on the motion to approve the 
settlement, regardless of the amount in controversy.  See id. at 152, 123 S.E.2d at 496.  
The parties should also be able to select their venue.  Any irregularities in the selection of 
venue are readily waivable. 
 619. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-400 (“If all the parties in interest join in the proceeding and 
ask the same relief, the commencement of the proceedings shall be by petition, setting 
forth the facts entitling the petitioners to relief, and the nature of the relief demanded.”); 
see also Gillikin II, 252 N.C. 1, 113 S.E.2d 38 (1960) (approving a minor’s settlement 
which was filed pursuant to section 1-400 of the North Carolina General Statutes). 
 620. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-402 (2011). 
 621. See, e.g., Gillikin II, 252 N.C. at 6, 113 S.E.2d at 42 (noting that the clerk heard 
testimony and found that the settlement was in the minor’s interest and that the settle-
ment was then approved by the judge). 
 622. Gillikin I, 248 N.C. 710, 712, 104 S.E.2d 861, 863 (1958) (“The judgment of 
January 27, 1955 [approving the minor’s settlement in an ex parte special proceeding], 
does not purport to be a judgment against defendant.”). 
 623. Gillikin II, 252 N.C. at 7, 113 S.E.2d at 43 (noting that the petition need not be 
verified). 
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an action by the minor, upon a motion to strike by the defendant.624  
This doctrine likely does not remain under modern procedural rules.625 
2.  Notice of Proceeding 
There are no North Carolina cases addressing the notice required of 
a hearing to approve a minor’s settlement.  Where the hearing is held by 
consent of the parties, which is typical, the parties do not need formal 
notice.  The minor is not entitled to notice of the proceeding itself,626 
and thus arguably is not entitled to notice of the hearing.  The minor 
and his parents will usually be present at the hearing in any event.627 
Where a party to the settlement is not properly notified of the hear-
ing, the resulting order is subject to being vacated.628  Other jurisdictions 
have held that a first-party insurer having subrogation rights to the mi-
nor’s proceeds should be notified of the proceeding so that it can protect 
its subrogation rights.629  Where the insurer does not have notice of the 
proceedings, the order approving the settlement can be vacated.630  There 
is no authority in North Carolina indicating whether an insurer or health 
care provider with a subrogation right or a lien has a right to be heard at 
the minor’s settlement hearing. 
 
 624. Ellington v. Bradford, 242 N.C. 159, 162, 86 S.E.2d 925, 927 (1955) (“In a suit 
on behalf of the child in the absence of a waiver of the parent’s right, such allegations are 
not proper in the complaint, and evidence with respect to such expenses is incompe-
tent.”). 
 625. See discussion supra Part I.A.3.a.ii. 
 626. Gillikin II, 252 N.C. at 6–7, 113 S.E.2d at 42 (“It is not necessary, however, for 
such minor to know that an action or special proceeding is brought in his behalf.”). 
 627. See discussion supra Part III.E.3. 
 628. Scott v. Lipman & Katz, P.A., 648 A.2d 969, 976 (Me. 1994) (explaining the 
Maine rule providing that a minor’s settlement without a hearing must be accompanied 
by movant’s (i.e., parent’s) affidavit stating that movant was informed of the right to at-
tend a hearing, and that the right to attend the hearing is waived).  Where said affidavit 
was not filed, the parent’s Rule 60(b) motion for relief from an order approving settle-
ment should have been allowed; the parents challenged the award of legal fees in excess 
of the statutory presumptive amount.  Id. 
 629. Riley ex rel. Swanson v. Herbes, 524 N.W.2d 523, 527–28 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) 
(holding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in vacating the order approving 
the settlement and allowing the insurer to assert a subrogation claim, where the insurer 
did not receive timely notice of the minor’s settlement hearing).  The court rejected the 
argument that a settlement did not include medical expenses, based on language from 
the policy.  Id. 
 630. Vachon v. Halford, 484 A.2d 1127, 1129–30 (N.H. 1984) (holding that the lower 
court erred in striking language pertaining to the insurer’s subrogation claim from de-
crees approving the minor’s settlements, where the settlement included medical ex-
pense). 
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3.  Presentation of Evidence at Hearing 
The are no rigid rules regarding the presentation of evidence or ar-
gument at the hearing to approve the minor’s settlement.  The parties 
normally consent to the settlement, and hence the formal rules are typi-
cally waived; however, the court must make some investigation into the 
settlement.631  It is difficult to develop bright-line rules regarding the 
manner in which the court should inquire into the settlement.  The 
court should be afforded great discretion in the manner of proceeding 
with the settlement hearing. 
The cases do not require that the hearing be recorded: many hear-
ings are conducted in chambers, and are not recorded.  Some counties 
have local rules requiring that the hearing be in open court,632 and some 
counties have rules requiring that the hearing be recorded.633 
The circumstances bearing on the reasonableness of the settlement 
should be presented at the hearing.  This would largely consist of facts 
pertaining to liability and damages.  The court can also consider the 
burden of litigation.634  In a case that settles for the limits of the tortfea-
sor’s liability policy, the court can also consider whether other insurance 
or assets are available.635  Some counties have local rules requiring a 
presentation of the defendant’s insurance limits and other assets.636  
 
 631. Ballard v. Hunter, 12 N.C. App. 613, 619, 184 S.E.2d 423, 427 (1971) (noting 
that a judgment or compromise settlement of a minor’s claim, handled by next friend, is 
not valid unless the court investigates and approves the settlement). 
 632. See, e.g., N.C. JUDICIAL DIST. 15B, RULES FOR CIV. SUP. CT., R. 20.1 (“All hearings 
for judicial approval of minor/ incompetent settlements shall be held in open court.”). 
 633. N.C. 26TH JUDICIAL DIST., SUP. CT. DIV. CIV. R. 20.2, available at 
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Policies/LocalRules/Documents/813.pdf (“All set-
tlements will be recorded, either by a Court Reporter or by the audio/video record-
er . . . .”). 
 634. Redwine v. Clodfelter, 226 N.C. 366, 370, 38 S.E.2d 203, 206 (1946) (affirming 
lower court’s approval of settlement of distribution of estate to minors, and in doing so, 
noting that here was an impending caveat that would disrupt the family “and, in all 
probability, involve long, costly, and asset-consuming litigation”). 
 635. Edionwe v. Hussain, 777 N.Y.S.2d 520, 522 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (reversing the 
approval of a settlement of $1,000,000 for a minor with eye an injury, which was made 
contrary to the wishes of the minor’s father, where the record did not contain sufficient 
facts regarding further medical procedures needed for the minor’s face, did not reflect 
“additional insurance or assets against which the infant plaintiff might collect, or con-
cerns about liability if the case is tried”).  The settlement was reversed for findings and 
appointment of new GAL.  Id. 
 636. See N.C. 26TH JUDICIAL DIST. SUP. CT. DIV. R. 20.4 (“Defense counsel shall state 
on the record the total and complete amount of insurance coverage afforded to a Defen-
dant in the situation in question.”); id. at R. 20.5 (“To the extent potential damages ex-
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Whether the settlement is fair should be based on the information avail-
able at the time of the settlement hearing, even if that information was 
not present when the settlement was reached.637 
The court can also review documents, such as the accident report 
and the medical records.  The minor is usually present at the hearing, 
but case law does not require her presence.  The court may inquire of 
the minor, his parents, and the GAL as to his physical condition.  Some 
counties have local rules requiring—or strongly encouraging—the pres-
ence of the minor and both parents at the hearing.638  Where the child is 
old enough to have meaningful input, presumably the court should as-
certain whether the child deems the settlement reasonable.639   
Where an annuity is used,640 some counties have a local rule requir-
ing the plaintiff to “certify” the present value of the settlement.641  Some 
 
ceed insurance coverage, Plaintiff’s counsel shall make independent inquiry of Defen-
dant’s other assets that are reasonably available, other than insurance, and be prepared to 
report his or her findings to the Court.”). 
 637. Shelton v. Sloan, 977 P.2d 1012, 1020 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (“Although there is 
scant authority on the matter, the case law supports the view that the fairness of the set-
tlement should be determined as of the time the matter is presented to the court for deci-
sion.”).  In Shelton, the parties settled the case, and then the case was tried to a jury, but 
there was apparent confusion as to whether the case had in fact settled.  Id. at 1013–15.  
The case had in fact tentatively settled based on acceptance of offer of judgment, and the 
court, in reviewing reasonableness of the settlement, could look at the actual jury ver-
dict, which was far in excess of the settlement.  Id. at 1013, 1020.  The case was re-
manded for findings on reasonableness based on factors, including jury’s verdict.  Id. at 
1021. 
 638. N.C. 26TH JUDICIAL DIST., SUP. CT. DIV. CIV. R. 20.3 (“The Minor and his/her 
Guardian ad Litem shall be present at the minor settlement, absent prior excusal by the 
Court.”); N.C. JUDICIAL DIST. 30B, RULES FOR CIV. SUP. CT., R. 21.3 (“The Mi-
nor/Incompetent and his or her Guardian Ad Litem must be present at the hearing absent 
prior excusal by the Court.”). 
 639. See N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 1 (2011) (“For example, children 
as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as 
having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custo-
dy.”). 
 640. See discussion of annuities or “structured settlements” infra Part III.E.6.b.iii. 
 641. N.C. JUDICIAL DIST. 15B, RULES FOR CIV. SUP. CT., R. 21.5 (“To the extent a Mi-
nor/Incompetent settlement is to be structured, Plaintiff’s counsel shall certify to the 
Court the present value of the settlement to the minor/incompetent.”); N.C. JUDICIAL 
DIST. 30B, RULES FOR CIV. SUP. CT., R. 21.5; N.C. 14TH JUDICIAL DIST., LOCAL R. AND P. FOR 
THE CALENDARING OF CIV. CASES IN THE 14TH JUDICIAL DIST. SUP. CT. DIV., R. 9.6, available 
at http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Policies/LocalRules/Documents/1513.pdf (“To 
the extent a Minor or other settlement is to be structured, Plaintiff’s counsel shall certify 
to the Court the present value of the settlement . . . .”). 
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counties also require or encourage presentation of evidence of the tax 
liability to the child arising from the settlement.642 
Those instances in which a minor’s settlement can be vacated are 
addressed elsewhere in this Article.643  The settlement is generally more 
likely to be upheld in a later proceeding challenging the settlement if 
more information is provided to the judge.  This information includes 
records from doctors, other information as to the child’s injuries, and 
potential conflicts between the parents and the child that bear on the 
fairness of the settlement. 
4.  Rulings on Motion for Approval of Settlement 
The court has a few options when faced with a proposed settlement.  
The court can, of course, approve the proposed settlement.644  Further, 
“[t]he power of the court to approve such settlements must necessarily 
imply also the reciprocal power not to approve where it is made to ap-
pear to the court that the rights and interests of minor or unborn benefi-
ciaries are not protected.”645  In one case, the administrator of a trust set-
tled a claim by a potential creditor, which had the effect of impairing the 
interests of minors and unborn heirs in the property of the testator.646  
The court appointed a GAL for the unborn heirs, and this GAL opposed 
the settlement.647  The court, rather than simply approving or rejecting 
the settlement, determined that the creditor’s claim was not valid and 
ordered that the heirs were entitled to the property pursuant to the 
will.648  In a personal injury case, however, the court will likely have to 
 
 642. Memorandum from Senior Resident Superior Court Judge, 26th Judicial Dist., to 
Members of Mecklenburg County Bar, available at 
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/99356382/293 (reflecting procedures “followed by many 
Superior Court Judges in Mecklenburg County,” and “attorneys may wish to be ac-
quainted with and follow them”).  The memorandum provides, “If the settlement is 
‘structured’, provide an opinion from a tax lawyer or CPA indicating the settlement 
creates no tax liability to the child.”  Id. ¶ D; see also N.C. 14TH JUDICIAL DIST., LOCAL R. 
AND P. FOR THE CALENDARING OF CIV. CASES IN THE 14TH JUDICIAL DIST. SUP. CT. DIV., R. 
9.6 (“To the extent a Minor or other settlement is to be structured, Plaintiff’s counsel 
shall certify to the Court . . . the tax liability, if any, to the Minor.”). 
 643. See infra Part III.F. 
 644. Hunter v. Newsom, 121 N.C. App. 564, 568, 468 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1996) (“There 
can be no question in North Carolina that a court of equity has the power to approve an 
agreement affecting the rights of infants and unborn beneficiaries in trust funds.”). 
 645. Id. 
 646. Id. at 566, 468 S.E.2d at 804. 
 647. Id. at 566, 468 S.E.2d at 804–05. 
 648. Id. at 570, 468 S.E.2d at 807 (holding that the lower court did not err in deter-
mining that the settlement agreement, which provided for payment to a party who was 
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either simply accept or reject the settlement as proposed, and the court 
cannot modify the settlement.649 
The general rule is that the trial court must approve or reject the 
settlement as proposed: “If, after [the judge] weighs the appropriate fac-
tors, he determines it [was] not [in the minor’s best interest], he may re-
ject it and schedule the matter for trial.”650  Thus, the court cannot re-
quire the defendant to settle by purchasing an annuity for the minor 
where the defendant agreed to a cash settlement.651  The court can, of 
course, simply reject the settlement and await a further proposed settle-
ment. 
Aside from accepting or rejecting the settlement, the court presum-
ably has broad powers in ruling on such a motion.  This includes, for ex-
ample, requiring that further evidence be submitted, or that a new GAL 
be appointed where appropriate. 
5.  Order Approving Settlement 
 Where the order states that the court made an investigation and 
that the settlement is just and reasonable, the order is probably sufficient 
to bind the minor.652  In one case, the Superior Court recited that it 
made an investigation and that the settlement was reasonable, but the 
mother later challenged the settlement on the basis that “no evidence 
was offered or proof made at the trial either as to the extent of the plain-
tiff’s injuries or as to the question whether the judgment was for the wel-
fare of the plaintiff . . . .”653  The court held that the settlement was bind-
ing absent proof of fraud, and a mere contention that the claim was 
 
not a valid creditor, would be unfair to the interests of the unborn and unknown heirs of 
the decedent, or in ordering the estate to be administered according to the will). 
 649. See cases discussed supra Part II.D.2.  Some courts will approve the global set-
tlement, but modify the award of legal fees.  Such a ruling is nevertheless an acceptance 
of the proposed settlement between the parties, subject to the court’s authority to oversee 
the award of legal fees, and such a ruling does not increase the defendant’s liability. 
 650. Impink v. Reynes, 935 A.2d 808, 815 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007). 
 651. Id. at 813 (“[I]f the parties do not consent to [the court’s] suggestions [for set-
tlement], the court’s parens patriae jurisdiction, as evidenced in the rule, does not au-
thorize it to require one party to the settlement contract to accept a change in the settle-
ment terms without its consent.”).  In Impink, the court held that the lower court erred in 
this case where a minor, who was injured by a paint ball, settled for $300,000, and the 
court, over the defendant’s objection, directed the liability insurer to pay settlement 
funds to obtain structured settlement for the minor.  Id. at 814–15. 
 652. Oates v. Tex. Co., 203 N.C. 474, 474, 166 S.E. 317, 318 (1932) (holding the 
judgment was binding where “the judgment recites an investigation by the trial court and 
a finding that the settlement was just and reasonable.”). 
 653. Id. 
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worth more than the settlement amount was insufficient to render the 
order approving the settlement void.654 
The order should address issues that are highly relevant to the rea-
sonableness of the settlement.655  The findings should be supported by 
the record.656 
One issue that often arises regarding the order approving the set-
tlement is whether it should recite that the medical bills have been or 
will be paid.  Although the claim for medical expenses is presumptively 
the claim of the parent, and not the child, there are many cases in which 
the court has confirmed the settlement of a minor’s claim that included 
the payment of medical bills.657  Where the parent has paid the medical 
bills, and the tortfeasor pays the minor for the medical bills, the parent 
should have a claim for reimbursement from those funds;658 thus, there 
is no impropriety in an order approving a minor’s settlement that pro-
vides for payment of the medical bills, either to the parent or to the 
health care provider. 
 
 654. Id. at 474, 166 S.E. at 319. 
 655. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Buchan, 256 N.C. 142, 153–54, 123 S.E.2d 489, 
497 (remanding the case where various parties argued that settlement of the estate 
should be affirmed, based in part on tax savings to the estate that were based on an esti-
mate of the taxable value of estate, but the minor’s GAL contested the settlement because 
the findings of fact and the record “give no definite answer” as to value of estate and the 
amount of taxes payable). 
 656. O’Neil v. O’Neil, 271 N.C. 106, 113, 155 S.E.2d 495, 501 (1967) (“We are con-
strained to hold the record submitted does not contain evidence sufficient to support the 
crucial factual findings upon which the validity of the ‘family settlement agreement’ de-
pends.”).  The court vacated the order and remanded the case, which was an action to 
approve a family settlement pertaining to an estate, where the minors would recover un-
der the will, but the testator’s capacity was challenged, and the lower court approved the 
settlement of the estate, reducing the minors’ recovery, based on bona fide controversy as 
to the validity of the will, but the record was not sufficient to raise a question as to testa-
tor’s capacity.  Id. at 107–110, 113, 155 S.E.2d at 496–498, 501. 
 657. See, e.g., Gillikin II, 252 N.C. 1, 9, 113 S.E.2d 38, 44 (1960) (approving a settle-
ment of $7,000 in a special proceeding by a minor through the father-next-friend, from 
which medical expenses were paid, and the remainder was to be paid to the minor); Pa-
trick v. Bryan, 202 N.C. 62, 71, 162 S.E. 207, 211 (1932) (“Practically all of the 
$1,049.91 except $255.00 paid to John Patrick, the father and natural guardian of the 
child, was hospital and doctors’ bills.”).  The court remanded the case, which approved 
the settlement for $1049.41, and ordered medical expenses to be paid from that amount.  
Id. at 72–73, 162 S.E. at 212. 
 658. See State v. Kornegay, 313 N.C. 1, 27, 326 S.E.2d 881, 900 (1859) (recognizing 
that in a criminal action against an attorney for embezzlement from a GAL for her in-
competent husband, “Mrs. Stallings [GAL] had been paying her husband’s bills, which 
would give her a claim for reimbursement from the funds deposited in the trust account, 
and was a ‘person in loco parentis’ . . . .”). 
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The objection to including the medical bills in the order approving 
the settlement seems to derive from a concern that the minor’s funds will 
be used to pay the expenses of the parents.659  Where the order recites 
that the bills have been or will be paid, however, the order should be 
construed to mean that these amounts are paid from the parents’ portion 
of the settlement, and not from the minor’s funds.  Alternatively, where 
the order recites that the health care provider will be paid from the set-
tlement funds, the order could be viewed to mean that the parent has 
transferred the claim for medical bills to the child, and thus it would 
make sense for the child to pay the medical bills.  Case law clearly estab-
lishes that the minor can recover the medical bills where the parent 
serves as GAL and waives those claims.660  Where the court perceives a 
conflict of interest between the parents and the child that might be af-
fecting the child’s best interest, the focus should be on the potential con-
flict, rather than on whether the order refers to the medical bills.  The 
only situation where it would be patently inappropriate for the order to 
recite that the tortfeasor will pay the medical bills, either to the parents 
or to the provider, is where the parents do not have a valid claim for 
those expenses,661 and the health care provider does not have a lien 
against the settlement proceeds.662  In this situation, the minor’s settle-
ment proceeds should not be used to pay the debt of her parents, and the 
tortfeasor is not liable for the medical expenses.  One advantage of hav-
ing the order refer to the medical bills, or at least in having the parties 
inform the court of whether the bills have been paid, is that the court is 
vigilant to the possibility of a lien against the minor’s recovery: ignoring 
 
 659. See, e.g., Memorandum from Senior Resident Superior Court Judge, 26th Judicial 
Dist., to Members of Mecklenburg County Bar ¶ H, available at 
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/99356382/293.  The memorandum indicates: 
  Parents are responsible for the medical expenses of their minor children. No 
money will be paid to the parent(s) out of the child’s settlement—not even to 
reimburse the parent(s) for miscellaneous expenses.  The only money to be de-
ducted from the minor’s settlement is the attorney’s fee.  If the insurance com-
pany wants to settle the parent’s claim for medical expenses, o.k.  But [i]t will 
not come out of the money approved by the court as the minor’s settlement. 
Id. 
 660. See supra Part I.A.3.a.ii. 
 661. The parents would not have a claim if, for example, their statute of limitations 
had expired, or if they were contributorily negligent. 
 662. The provider would not have a lien for unpaid expenses if, for example, it relied 
on the parents’ credit in providing services to the child, or if it failed to perfect their lien.  
See discussion of liens supra Part I.A.3.a.i., and discussion of the “necessaries” doctrine 
supra Part I.A.3.a.i. 
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the possibility of a lien against the minor’s recovery is not in the minor’s 
best interest. 
6. Handling of Minor’s Proceeds 
The means of handling the minor’s proceeds depends on several fac-
tors, including: whether the claim is tried or settled, the preferences of 
the court, and the minor’s representatives regarding investment of the 
funds. 
a. Judgments 
Where the minor’s claim results in a judgment, the funds should be 
paid to the court or to the child’s legal guardian.  The North Carolina 
Supreme Court has explained: 
Under our statutes only the clerk or the legal guardian of an infant has 
authority to receive payment and satisfy a judgment rendered in favor of 
an infant.  In practice, the defendant pays the judgment to the Clerk of 
the Superior Court who holds the funds until the minor becomes [the 
age of majority] . . . .663 
The GAL (or next friend) generally will not receive the funds.664 
The clerk may be liable for wrongful payment of the minor’s 
funds.665  The clerk cannot use the minor’s funds to pay the debts of 
another person unless the minor is represented by a GAL in the proceed-
ing, even if the minor consents to the distribution.666  Where such a 
payment is wrongfully made, the minor has a claim against the recipient 
for unjust enrichment.667 
 
 663. Teele v. Kerr, 261 N.C. 148, 151, 134 S.E.2d 126, 128 (1964) (citations omitted). 
 664. Id. at 150–51, 134 S.E.2d at 128 (“In the absence of a special statute it is the gen-
eral rule that the next friend of an infant has no authority to receive payment of the 
judgment he has secured for the infant.”).  The court held that the guardian’s duties end 
with litigation, and a bond might be required to receive funds. Id. at 151–152, 134 S.E.2d 
at 128–129. 
 665. Page v. Sawyer, 223 N.C. 102, 105, 25 S.E.2d 443, 445 (1943) (holding that even 
where the court orders payment to the guardian, the clerk may be exposed to liability 
where the order of appointment of the guardian was improper). 
 666. Parker v. Moore, 263 N.C. 89, 91, 138 S.E.2d 821, 822 (1964) (“The court can-
not authorize such diversion until the infant or incompetent is represented in the man-
ner provided by law.”). 
 667. Id. (holding that a minor was entitled to restitution where the parents and the 
minor filed a petition with the clerk, and the court approved, a payment of $500 of the 
minor’s funds to pay for funeral expenses, when she repudiated the payment promptly 
after attaining the age of majority). 
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b.  Settlements 
Where the minor’s claim results in a settlement, rather than a 
judgment, there are more options for handling of the proceeds.  The 
court’s role is again to protect the best interests of the minor. 
 i. Payment to Clerk 
Where the minor receives $25,000 or less in settlement, the clerk is 
statutorily authorized to receive the funds.668 This statute applies to 
“funds from the settlement of a minor’s personal injury suit.”669  Funds 
received under this statute are subject to several statutory provisions.  
The clerk is authorized to disburse the funds as follows: 
  The clerk is authorized under this section to receive, to administer 
and to disburse the monies held in such sum or sums and at such time 
or times as in his judgment is in the best interest of the child, except that 
the clerk must first determine that the parents or other persons respon-
sible for the child’s support and maintenance are financially unable to 
provide the necessities for such child, and also that the child is in need 
of maintenance and support or other necessities, including, when appro-
priate, education.  The clerk shall require receipts or paid vouchers 
showing that the monies disbursed under this section were used for the 
exclusive use and benefit of the child.670 
In theory, the funds belong to the minor and should not be used to 
pay for the obligations of others (including the parents), absent a need 
by the minor for such a disbursement.  “The property of minors can only 
be used for their support when the parents are unable to properly pro-
vide such support.”671 
The clerk has broad discretion in determining whether to disburse 
funds under this statute.672  The clerk might want information about 
 
 668. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-111(a) (2011) (“Any person having in his possession twen-
ty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or less for any minor under 18 years of age for whom 
there is no guardian ad litem, may pay such moneys into the office of the public guardian 
ad litem, if any, or the office of the clerk of superior court of the county of the recipient’s 
domicile.”). 
 669. 2 JOAN G. BRANNON & JAN S. SIMMONS, NORTH CAROLINA CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT 
PROCEDURES MANUAL I.B.1(a)(2)(b), at 88.1 (2003). 
 670. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-111(a). 
 671. Lee v. Coffield, 245 N.C. 570, 573, 96 S.E.2d 726, 728–29 (1957) (holding that 
the father’s duty to pay for his children’s medical expenses terminated upon his death, 
and their mother, and not the father’s estate, was liable for those expenses after his death 
because the father’s estate was property of the minors, and payment from estate would 
wrongly deplete minors’ funds). 
 672. See generally BRANNON & SIMMONS, supra note 669, at 88.1–88.8. 
117
Kirby: Minor's Personal Injury Actions and Settlements in North Carolina
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2012
KIRBY- FINAL 4/12/2012  9:06 AM 
410 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:293 
whether there are other means of paying for these necessities, such as 
Medicaid. 
Where the minor receives more than $25,000, there is no statute 
authorizing the clerk to receive the funds, but it is generally understood 
that the clerk can receive these funds.  These funds are expressly not 
subject to the requirements for funds received under North Carolina 
General Statutes, section 7A-111.673  “Funds in excess of $25,000 re-
ceived by the clerk for a minor pursuant to a court order are not 7A-111 
funds.”674  There is no statutory authority regarding the clerk’s ability to 
disburse these funds.  Even though the provisions of section 7A-111(a) 
do not apply to these funds, it is reasonable for the clerk to apply those 
provisions when deciding whether to disburse these funds.675 
There is no authority concerning whether instructions contained in 
the order approving the settlement from the judge who approved the set-
tlement are binding on the clerk in making disbursements.  Section 7A-
111 states that the clerk can make those decisions, subject to review for 
abuse of discretion.676  This suggests that the spending of funds of 
$25,000 or less cannot be directed by the judge, but only by the clerk; 
the clerk would nevertheless presumably give great weight to the opi-
nions of the judge who approved the settlement.  For settlements over 
$25,000, section 7A-111 of North Carolina’s General Statutes does not 
strictly apply, and therefore the judge may have the ability to direct fu-
ture payments.677 
For funds deposited with the clerk (both under and over $25,000), 
the clerk charges a one-time fee.678  Statutes set forth how the funds can 
be invested.679  Funds invested by the clerk are typically invested very 
safely, and thus “[f]unds invested by the clerk do not generally yield a 
high rate of return.”680 
 
 673. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-111(a). 
 674. BRANNON & SIMMONS, supra note 669, at 88.1. 
 675. Id. at 88.9 (“Some clerks may allow disbursements after application of the stan-
dards in G.S. § 7A-111.”). 
 676. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-111(a). 
 677. See id. 
 678. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-308.1(2) (setting fee at five percent of amount deposited, 
ultimately to be paid by interest earned on funds, with fee capped at $1,000). 
 679. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-112 to -112.1. 
 680. BRANNON & SIMMONS, supra note 669, at 88.11. 
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 ii. Structured Settlements 
The settlement funds can be used to purchase an annuity pursuant 
to a “structured settlement.”  A structured settlement provides that the 
settlement funds will be paid to a third-party and the third-party will 
make guaranteed681 payments to the minor in the future.  The payment 
to the minor can be one lump sum payment, or a stream of payments, 
and there is great flexibility in the payout arrangement. 
Such a settlement generally provides tax advantages.682  “A properly 
configured structured settlement will provide tax-free future payments 
to the plaintiff.  Both the principal and accumulated interest can be ex-
cluded from the plaintiff’s gross income, because the plaintiff doesn’t 
own or control the funding asset.”683  The plaintiff’s attorney should en-
sure that the settlement complies with all requirements to preserve the 
tax-free aspects of the settlement.  In general, the minor’s settlement 
funds should not be sent to the minor’s attorney.684 
The use of annuities is especially beneficial in a minor’s settlement 
where there are often concerns that the minor might spend the money 
unwisely upon attaining the age of majority.685  The court will sometimes 
inquire into the financial stability of the company issuing the annuity 
and the court might inquire as to the present value of the annuity pay-
ments.686  Once the annuity is purchased, it can be sold by the benefi-
 
 681. The term “guaranteed” in this context means that the return is not dependent on 
the success of a particular investment or the stock market; those risks are borne by the 
company agreeing to make the annuity payments.  The future payments are, however, 
subject to the solvency of the entity promising to make the payments.  For many such 
entities, however, the obligation from the structured settlement will be covered by the 
North Carolina Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Association, up to $1,000,000, in the 
event that the entity cannot make the payments.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-62-21(d)(5) 
(applying to annuities issued by member entities). 
 682. See generally I.R.C. § 104 (2006) (stating that compensation for injuries or sick-
ness is not included in taxable income); id. § 5891(stating that income from a structured 
settlement is not taxable). 
 683. PAUL J. LESTI, STRUCTURED SETTLEMENTS § 2:8, at 2–4 (2d ed. 1993). 
 684. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.451-2 (2011) (regarding “constructive receipt of income”). 
 685. See LESTI, supra note 683, § 3:11, at 3-9 to 3-10 (“New cars and other material 
trappings are strong temptations.”). 
 686. See N.C. JUDICIAL DIST. 15B, RULES FOR CIV. SUP. CT., R. 21.5; N.C. JUDICIAL DIST. 
30B, RULES FOR CIV. SUP. CT., R. 21.5; N.C. 14TH JUDICIAL DIST., LOCAL R. AND P. FOR THE 
CALENDARING OF CIV. CASES IN THE 14TH JUDICIAL DIST. SUP. CT. DIV., R. 9.6. 
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ciary only as allowed by statute.687  An annuity can be used only if the 
defendant consents to the use of an annuity.688 
 iii. Payment to Guardian or others 
The clerk can appoint a guardian of the estate to handle the minor’s 
settlement funds.689  The cases recognize that payment may be made to a 
general guardian.690  The funds of the guardian are subject to collection 
by a creditor.691 
A guardian of the estate generally must obtain a bond.692  The guar-
dian of the estate has broad power to handle the minor’s funds.693  The 
guardian can spend estate income on the minor’s behalf, but has to peti-
tion the court to spend the principal.694  The statute also allows the 
guardian to pay specific expenses, such as insurance, taxes, and legal 
fees.695  The guardian must file periodic inventories with the clerk.696  
The guardian is required to use skill in handling the minor’s property.697 
 
 687. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-543.10 to -543.15 (2011). 
 688. See Impink v. Reynes, 935 A.2d 808, 814 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (stat-
ing that a court cannot force defendant’s insurer to fund annuity for minor).  In Impink, 
the insurer expressed “a general concern that it may still be liable at some time in the fu-
ture should the structure fail.”  Id. at 814.  Whether the minor can utilize a “qualified set-
tlement fund” and retain the tax-free aspects of the earnings is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  See I.R.C. § 468B; 26 C.F.R. § 1.468B-1 (2006).  One commentator asserts that 
the use of a qualified settlement fund (“QSF”) is permissible.  Jeremy Babener, Note, 
Structured Settlements and Single-Claimant Qualified Settlement Funds: Regulating in Accor-
dance with Structured Settlement History, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 60 (2010) 
(“By utilizing a QSF, a claimant can control the purchase of the annuity for their struc-
tured settlement, capturing some or all of the benefits of structuring.”); see also Richard 
B. Risk, Jr., A Case for the Urgent Need to Clarify Tax Treatment of a Qualified Settlement 
Fund Created for a Single Claimant, 23 VA. TAX REV. 639 (2004). 
 689. Valles de Portillo ex rel. Portillo Valles v. D.H. Griffin Wrecking Co., 134 N.C. 
App. 714, 717–18, 518 S.E.2d 555, 557 (1999) (stating that the clerk can appoint a 
guardian of the estate under Chapter 35A to receive death benefits under workers com-
pensation law); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35A-1221 (regarding application for appointment of 
guardian of the estate and guardian of the person). 
 690. See In re Stone, 176 N.C. 336, 337, 97 S.E. 216, 217 (1918) (noting that mother 
received $6,500 as guardian, and that she had obtained a bond as guardian); Bunch v. 
Foreman Blades Lumber Co., 174 N.C. 8, 12, 93 S.E. 374, 376 (1917). 
 691. Bitting v. Goss, 203 N.C. 424, 427–28, 166 S.E. 302, 303 (1932) (ordering mon-
ey held by a guardian, arising from a minor’s settlement, to be paid for the child’s medi-
cal bills even though the recovery did not include medical bills). 
 692. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35A-1230. 
 693. Id. § 35A-1252. 
 694. Id. § 35A-1252(9). 
 695. Id. §§ 35A-1252(6), (7), (11). 
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The settlement funds can probably be paid into an account for the 
use of the minor, subject to the control of the parent.  Such an arrange-
ment must of course be found to be in the best interest of the minor.  
This can probably be accomplished through the provisions of Chapter 
33A, consisting of North Carolina’s adoption of the Uniform Transfer to 
Minors Act.698  The custodian of the funds has broad ability to spend the 
funds,699 and is not required to obtain a bond.700 
There is in fact no case law or statute that specifically prohibits the 
payment of the minor’s settlement funds directly to the parents for the 
use and benefit of the minor.  In a claim paid to a minor under the 
worker’s compensation laws, the rules specifically provide that the mi-
nor’s funds may be paid directly to the parents.701  A court should, of 
course, exercise caution in authorizing such a distribution.  With all de-
cisions of the court regarding the handling of the minor’s funds, preser-
vation of the funds generally takes priority over a greater rate of re-
turn.702 
c.  Implications of Settlement on Minor’s Eligibility for Government 
Programs 
Where the minor has been severely injured, the minor’s representa-
tives might want to consider whether the funds received by the minor 
will affect his ability to receive benefits under government programs.  
One’s eligibility for benefits under government programs, such as Medi-
 
 696. Id. §§ 35A-1261, -1264. 
 697. Id. § 33A-12(b) (“In dealing with custodial property, a custodian shall observe 
the standard of care that would be observed by a prudent person dealing with property of 
another and is not limited by any other statute restricting investments by fiduciaries.”). 
 698. See id. § 35A-1227(d).  Section 35A-1227(d) is entitled “Funds owed to minors” 
and provides, “Inter vivos or testamentary transfers to minors may be made and adminis-
tered according to the North Carolina Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, Chapter 33A of 
the General Statutes.”  Id.; see also Thomas E. Simmons, Using Trusts to Settle Lawsuits, 
19 PROB. & PROP. 52, 54 (2005) (“The use of an UTMA or conservatorship to manage a 
minor’s settlement funds is tax neutral.”). 
 699. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33A-14(a) (“A custodian may . . . [spend funds] without 
court order and without regard to (i) the duty or ability of the custodian personally or of 
any other person to support the minor, or (ii) any other income or property of the minor 
which may be applicable or available for that purpose.”). 
 700. Id. § 33A-15(c). 
 701. 4 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 10A.0409(e)(1)(A) (2011) (“[A]ny benefits due to a mi-
nor . . . may be paid directly to the parent as natural guardian or the minor for the use 
and benefit of the minor . . . .”). 
 702. See In re Estate of Mede, 177 Misc. 2d 974, 983 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1998) (“[A] desire 
to obtain a higher rate of return of an infant’s investments is of secondary importance.”). 
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caid or Supplemental Security Income (SSI), may be dependent on the 
assets or resources of the applicant.  While the broad issue of eligibility 
under these programs is beyond the scope of this Article, the minor’s re-
ceipt of settlement funds can affect his eligibility for these programs.  
One case held that monthly payments from a settlement constituted “un-
earned income” of the minor that affected his SSI benefits.703  The judge 
ruled against the minor, notwithstanding that “[t]he court recognizes 
that plaintiff may well have entered into the settlement provision with 
the understanding that his economic losses would continue to be com-
pensated by receipt of his SSI benefits.”704  Another case held that the 
proceeds of the minor’s settlement were available as an asset of the mi-
nor for the purpose of determining his eligibility for Medicaid.705 
Some disabled persons can place their settlement proceeds in a trust 
such that they will not be counted as resources for purposes of calculat-
ing SSI or Medicaid.706  This is often called a Supplemental Needs Trust 
(or Special Needs Trust) and will apply only if the applicant meets a cer-
tain definition of disability.  For purposes of SSI, a minor is disabled if he 
“has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which re-
sults in marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be ex-
 
 703. LaBeaux v. Sullivan, 760 F. Supp. 761, 762–63 (N.D. Iowa 1991) (holding that 
where a minor settled a medical malpractice claim that included monthly payments of 
$550 and HHS determined that the minor was eligible for SSI benefits because of his se-
vere mental retardation, began making payments, and later learned of settlement, the 
payments were “unearned income,” and the minor had been overpaid; HHS’s determina-
tion was reasonable and was affirmed). 
 704. Id. at 765. 
 705. See, e.g., In re Welfare of K.S., 427 N.W.2d 653 (Minn. 1988) (holding where 
child received a settlement paid into a savings account to be distributed when the minor 
reached eighteen, and child was placed in county institution, said funds could be used to 
determine Medicaid eligibility).  The court also held that funds could be used to reim-
burse the county pursuant to statute authorizing the county to be paid by “resources at-
tributable to the child.”  Id. at 660; accord In re Welfare of Sayles, 407 N.W.2d 414 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that funds are “liquid assets” of a minor pursuant to sta-
tute for determination of public medical assistance where the minor’s settlement funds 
were in a savings account and parents had previously successfully petitioned the court 
for release of funds for child’s medical needs). 
 706. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) (2006) (exempting “[a] trust containing the assets of 
an individual under age 65 who is disabled (as defined in section 1614(a)(3)) and which 
is established for the benefit of such individual by a parent, grandparent, legal guardian 
of the individual, or a court if the State will receive all amounts remaining in the trust 
upon the death of such individual up to an amount equal to the total medical assistance 
paid on behalf of the individual under a State plan under this title”); id. § 
1396p(d)(4)(C) (regarding “pooled trusts,” which is an alternative to a Supplemental 
Needs Trust). 
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pected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last 
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”707  Care must be 
taken in establishing such a trust.  Unless the trust strictly complies with 
the statutory requirements, the assets will be deemed resources of the 
minor (either during minority or upon attaining the age of majority), 
and these resources can affect his right to benefits under government 
programs.708 
F. When Order Approving Minor’s Settlement may be Reversed, 
Overturned or Vacated 
Whether an order approving the settlement of a minor’s claim can 
be overturned or vacated requires an analysis of the grounds and proce-
dure for challenging such an order.  North Carolina cases addressing the 
validity of a proceeding determining a minor’s claim, whether by adjudi-
cation or by settlement, tend to fall into three categories: judgments that 
are void, judgments that are voidable due to fraud, and judgments that 
are voidable due to irregularities in the proceeding.  Most of these cases 
were decided before our current Rules of Civil Procedure, but they 
should nevertheless be instructive in analyzing whether an order approv-
ing a settlement may be vacated. 
Where the court lacks jurisdiction over the proceeding affecting the 
minor’s rights, the judgment is void.709  Such a judgment can be chal-
lenged at any time, and can be challenged collaterally in a subsequent 
proceeding.710 
Some cases hold that the absence of a GAL for the minor renders 
the court without jurisdiction.711  One case, involving a deed to land, 
 
 707. Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i).  A minor who “engages in substantial gainful activity” is 
not disabled.  Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(ii). 
 708. See, e.g., Hunt v. Astrue, 581 F. Supp. 2d 238, 243 (D. Mass. 2008) (affirming 
ruling that proceeds from a minor’s settlement are deemed a resource of an applicant for 
SSI).  In Hunt, the applicant had the ability to revoke the trust and thus the trust did not 
qualify as exempt property.  Id. at 241–42. 
 709. See Johnston County v. Ellis, 226 N.C. 268, 279–80, 38 S.E.2d 31, 38–39 (1946) 
(holding order void where lower court lacked jurisdiction over foreclosure proceeding, 
which affected minors’ interest in property, and minors did not have a GAL); Butler v. 
Winston, 223 N.C. 421, 427, 27 S.E.2d 124, 127 (1943) (holding judgment for the sale 
of real property void where a minor with an interest in the property was not appointed a 
GAL until the next day). 
 710. Ellis, 226 N.C. at 279, 38 S.E.2d. at 39. 
 711. See Part II.A. 
123
Kirby: Minor's Personal Injury Actions and Settlements in North Carolina
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2012
KIRBY- FINAL 4/12/2012  9:06 AM 
416 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:293 
held that where the GAL did not adequately present the minor’s position 
to the court, the resulting order was void.712 
A judgment affecting the minor’s rights can also be challenged for 
irregularities that do not affect jurisdiction.  Where a court that adjudi-
cated the minor’s settlement has jurisdiction, its judgment can be voided 
only if there was an irregularity that harmed the minor.713  The party 
challenging the voidable judgment must also timely assert his rights; the 
failure to do so will defeat his motion to invalidate the judgment.714 
The judgment can be challenged for irregularities only by a motion 
in the action in which the settlement was approved; such a judgment 
may not be challenged collaterally.715  In Gillikin II, the court held that 
the absence of a GAL for the minor renders the judgment only voida-
ble.716 
 
 712. Wyatt v. Berry, 205 N.C. 118, 123, 170 S.E. 131, 133 (1933) (holding that a 
prior action determining the validity of a deed, which affected minor’s interest in land, 
was void).  In Wyatt, the minor could recover the land, and was not bound by prior a 
consent judgment.  Id.  “[I]f it be conceded that the plaintiff was a party defendant [in 
the prior action] by virtue of the order of the court, and the appointment of the guardian 
ad litem for her, the judgment is void.”  Id.  A settlement for a minor is binding only with 
“investigation and approval by the court.”  Id.  Where the GAL’s answer in prior action 
did not describe the minor’s interest in land, “the interests of the infant in the subject-
matter of the action were not presented to the court in good faith by the guardian ad li-
tem, and passed upon by the court.”  Id. 
 713. Tate v. Mott, 96 N.C. 27, 28, 2 S.E. 176, 180 (1887) (holding that where minors 
filed a petition to sell land, the court should have appointed next friends for them, but 
the court’s ruling requiring the sale of the property was not void).  The court indicated 
further, “nothing is alleged or proven, that could warrant the court in setting them aside.  
It is not alleged that . . . the infants suffered injury or prejudice by them.”  Id.; see also 
Cherry v. Woolard, 244 N.C. 603, 94 S.E.2d 562 (1956) (holding that where a father was 
appointed GAL for his children, the father refused to serve as GAL and was removed, and 
minors were then served with process and a second GAL was appointed, any irregularity 
resulting from the appointment of the father as GAL before any of the infants were 
served was cured). 
 714. McRorie v. Shinn, 11 N.C. App. 475, 482, 181 S.E.2d 773, 777 (1971) (where 
minors did not show that a motion in the cause was filed in a timely manner, they could 
not render the judgment void). 
 715. Gillikin II, 252 N.C. 1, 8, 113 S.E.2d 38, 44 (“If the court had jurisdiction of the 
subject-matter, and the parties, it is altogether immaterial how grossly irregular, or mani-
festly erroneous, its proceedings may have been; its final order cannot be regarded as a 
nullity, and cannot, therefore, be collaterally impeached.”).  The court also noted that 
fraud was not alleged at the court below.  Id. 
 716. Id. at 8, 113 S.E.2d at 43. 
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Where the judgment affirming the settlement is “procured by 
fraud,” it may be challenged in a collateral action.717  The cases are 
somewhat unclear as to what constitutes “fraud” in this context.  One 
case held that fraud was shown where the court failed to investigate and 
approve the consent judgment affecting the minor’s rights.718  Another 
case, however, held that even if the “facts necessary for a fair, just and 
legal determination of the rights of the infant . . . were withheld” from 
the court that entered a judgment on the settlement, this was not an 
“imposition on the court” justifying setting the order aside, because “it 
was merely an error of judgment on the part of the attorney.”719 
Under modern procedural rules, an order approving a settlement 
can be vacated on a motion for relief under Rule 60(b) of the North Car-
olina Rules of Civil Procedure.720  A judgment that was “voidable” under 
the older procedure is presumably subject to a motion for relief under 
Rule 60.721 
Under this rule, a party may obtain “relief” from a judgment or or-
der based on, inter alia: 
(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;  
(2) Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); 
(3) Fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), mi-
srepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; [or]  
 
 717. Houser v. W.R. Bonsal & Co., 149 N.C. 51, 58, 62 S.E. 776, 778 (1908) (explain-
ing that where the minor’s claim was settled before a justice of peace, and then the minor 
instituted a new action for injuries alleging that the previous judgment was procured by 
fraud, “the present action should be considered and held as a direct proceeding to assail 
the judgment, and the issues arising on the pleadings should have been submitted to a 
jury”); accord Menzel v. Menzel, 250 N.C. 649, 655, 110 S.E.2d 333, 337 (1959) (“When 
it is sought to set aside a judgment for fraud, that must be done by an independent ac-
tion, because it depends upon extraneous facts, which the parties are entitled to have 
found by a jury.  The judgment is not void for fraud, but voidable.”). 
 718. See Rector v. Laurel River Logging Co., 179 N.C. 59, 63, 101 S.E. 502, 504 
(1919) (“The issue of fraud is sufficiently raised in the pleadings . . . .”). 
 719. Patrick v. Bryan, 202 N.C. 62, 73, 162 S.E. 207, 212 (1932). 
 720. The phrase “motion in the cause” was used more frequently prior to the current 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  The better terminology today is probably a “motion for relief” 
pursuant to Rule 60(b), but the cases use these phrases somewhat interchangeably.  See, 
e.g., Brady v. Chapel Hill, 277 N.C. 720, 723, 178 S.E.2d 446, 448 (1971) (“[P]laintiff’s 
remedy—if any—was by a motion in the cause under N.C. Gen. Stat. 1A-1, Rule 60(b), 
and not by appeal.”). 
 721. See Butler v. Weisler, 23 N.C. App. 233, 240, 208 S.E.2d 905, 909 (1974) (ex-
plaining that orders were not void, but “were voidable and were subject to be set aside 
upon a timely motion under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure”). 
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(6) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judg-
ment.722 
A Rule 60 motion must be made “within a reasonable time, and for 
reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, or-
der, or proceeding was entered or taken.”723  The order may also be set 
aside if it is void.724  “[A] void judgment can also be challenged collate-
rally.  As we have long held, a void judgment has no legal effect; it is a 
legal nullity that may be challenged at any time.”725 
The only North Carolina case addressing a Rule 60 motion to vacate 
a settlement involving a minor’s claim is Goodwin v. Cashwell.726  In this 
case, the parties settled a wrongful death claim, where the settlement in-
cluded the funding of an annuity to make various periodic payments to a 
minor who was the daughter of the decedent.727  After the court ap-
proved the settlement, the defendant discovered that the annuity com-
pany made a mistake regarding the minor’s age and that the annuity pre-
sented to the court would cost $130,000 more than the defendant 
anticipated.728  The defendant filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(1) assert-
ing that the settlement was the result of a mistake.729  The lower court 
denied the motion, and the appellate court affirmed, on the basis that the 
mistake was not mutual.730 
A few cases from other jurisdictions are instructive on those in-
stances where an order approving a minor’s settlement can be set aside 
on a motion by the minor.731  Where the consequences of the injury are 
 
 722. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(2011). 
 723. Id. 
 724. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(4). 
 725. Boseman v. Jarrell, 364 N.C. 537, 547, 704 S.E.2d 494, 501 (2010) (holding that 
an order from an adoption proceeding entered by a court that was lacking jurisdiction 
did not bind a subsequent court ruling on visitation). 
 726. Goodwin v. Cashwell, 102 N.C. App. 275, 401 S.E.2d 840 (1991). 
 727. Id. at 276, 401 S.E.2d at 841. 
 728. Id. 
 729. Id. at 277, 401 S.E.2d at 842. 
 730. Id. at 277–78, 401 S.E.2d at 842. 
 731. See Vachon v. Halford, 484 A.2d 1127, 1129–30 (N.H. 1984) (holding that the 
lower court erred in striking language pertaining to the insurer’s subrogation claim from 
decrees approving the minor’s settlements, where settlement included medical expense); 
Riley ex rel. Swanson v. Herbes, 524 N.W.2d 523, 527–28 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (hold-
ing that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in vacating the order approving the 
settlement and allowing the insurer to assert a subrogation claim, where the insurer did 
not receive timely notice of the minor’s settlement hearing). 
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greater than the parents contemplated at the time of the settlement, the 
order approving the settlement generally will not be set aside.732  Minors 
have been successful, however, in vacating a settlement where the court 
that approved the settlement was not sufficiently apprised of the facts 
bearing on the reasonableness of the settlement. 
In one case, the judge was not provided with a letter from a doctor 
indicating that the child sustained a cognitive injury, and the judge ap-
proved the settlement.733  The child later sought to rescind the settle-
ment, and argued, inter alia, the he should be allowed to revive his claim 
because the judge had not been given all of the relevant information.734  
The judge who approved the settlement filed an affidavit stating that he 
would have appointed a GAL if he had known of this injury.735  The low-
er court denied the motion for relief, and the appellate court held that 
the lower court abused its discretion and that the minor was entitled to 
have the judgment approving the settlement vacated.736 
In another case, the judge was not given any information about the 
extent of injuries or the defendant’s potential liability in a medical mal-
practice case and the settlement was later set aside.737  “Evidence before 
the [court below] showed that the prior proceedings were flawed and 
not in the best interest of the minor child.  Specifically, the petition for 
settlement was incomplete, and there was no witness testimony on the 
minor’s injury or damages.”738 
 
 732. See Myers v. Fecker Co., 252 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1977)  (stating that the lower 
court did not err in denying parents’ motion to vacate settlement based on consequences 
to known injury, but that the result could be different if the minor sustained an injury 
that was unknown at time of settlement). 
 733. See In re Guardianship of Matyaszek, 824 N.E.2d 132, 137 (Ohio App. 2004). 
 734. Id. at 138. 
 735. Id. at 149–50.  Pursuant to the rule, the settlement did not require a GAL due to 
the amount of the settlement.  Id. 
 736. Id. at 150 (noting also that the father did not deposit the settlement check into a 
bank account as ordered, but instead used the proceeds for the child’s expenses, and that 
the judge was not aware of a separate and slightly generous settlement of the father for 
property damage, and that the father did not provide meaningful representation to the 
minor at the settlement hearing). 
 737. Carpenter v. Berry, 58 So.3d 1158, 1164 (Miss. 2011) (affirming the decision to 
set aside an order pursuant to Rule 60(b) where a minor settled a medical malpractice 
claim for $25,000 against one of several defendants, but his attorney provided no infor-
mation to the judge as to the substance of the claim or the damages incurred, other than 
that the bills were $400,000 and that the defendant’s involvement was “negligible,” and 
the judge approved the settlement).  The parents primarily argued that they were not 
aware of a larger insurance policy covering the defendant.  Id. at 1160. 
 738. Id. at 1164 (requiring a petition for approval of settlement to include the reason 
for the settlement, and requiring witnesses to be present at the hearing). 
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In another case,739 a minor sustained an aortal aneurysm in a motor 
vehicle accident, which his own doctors did not diagnose.  The defen-
dant’s lawyers, however, hired a doctor to review the medical records, 
and he found the aneurysm.740  The parties then settled the case, with 
the court’s approval, but the minor and his attorneys did not know about 
the aneurysm.741  When the minor later discovered the aneurysm, he 
filed a motion to vacate the prior order approving the settlement.742  The 
court held that even though the defendant’s lawyer did not have an ethi-
cal duty to disclose the aneurysm, their knowledge of this condition 
“opened the way for the court to later exercise its discretion in vacating 
the settlement.”743  The lower court’s decision to vacate the settlement 
was approved.744 
An order approving a settlement can be appealed directly as long as 
a timely notice of appeal is filed and the objections to the settlement are 
preserved.  In such an appeal, if the order does not address issues that 
are highly relevant to the reasonableness of the settlement, then the case 
may be remanded for further findings.745  Where the evidence in the 
record does not support the findings of the court approving the settle-
ment, the case on appeal likewise may be remanded for further find-
ings.746 
On appeal, errors of law by the lower court in approving a settle-
ment should be reviewed de novo.  The review of the lower court’s deci-
sion to approve a settlement should be reviewed for abuse of discre-
 
 739. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962). 
 740. Id. at 707. 
 741. Id. at 708. 
 742. Id. at 707. 
 743. Id. at 710. 
 744. Id.  The court explained: 
[T]he court in its discretion may vacate such a settlement, even though it is not 
induced by fraud or bad faith, where it is shown that in the accident the minor 
sustained separate and distinct injuries which were not known or considered 
by the court at the time settlement was approved. 
Id. at 709.  The lower court also set aside releases signed by the minor and his parents.  
Id. at 711; see also Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co. v. Pluto, 156 S.W.2d 265, 267 (1941) (allow-
ing settlement to be set aside where “the minor’s case was not properly laid before the 
court, by collusion, neglect, or mistake”).  After the minor’s claim was settled, the minor 
filed suit for injuries, and the jury found that the minor’s injuries had not been fully dis-
closed to the court at the hearing, next friend negligently failed to disclose injuries, and 
tortfeasor knew or had reason to know the extent of the injuries.  Id. at 266–67. 
 745. See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Buchan, 256 N.C. 142, 153–54, 123 S.E.2d 
489, 497 (1962). 
 746. See O’Neil v. O’Neil, 271 N.C. 110, 113, 155 S.E.2d 495, 501 (1967). 
128
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss2/3
KIRBY- FINAL 4/12/2012  9:06 AM 
2012] MINOR’S PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS  421 
tion.747  There is also authority that the appellate courts can take an ac-
tive role in protecting the interests of a minor,748 and that the appellate 
court can actually review and weigh evidence.749  Absent compelling cir-
cumstances, however, the appellate court should generally defer to the 
trial court on issues involving the weight of evidence and the best inter-
ests of the minor. 
CONCLUSION 
Minor’s claims and settlements continue to present complex issues 
for the practitioner and for the courts.  The practitioner must be aware 
of the potential claims of the minor and of his parents, and the defenses 
to these claims.  Further, she must be familiar with the procedural issues 
arising in suits by minors.  The lawyer must also be vigilant to identify 
any conflicts of interest between the minor and his parents.  The courts 
must ensure that the minor’s interests are fully protected.  Ongoing de-
velopments in case law from North Carolina courts as well as rulings 
from the North Carolina State Bar should continue to provide guidance 
on these issues.  Many of these issues can also be addressed by legisla-
tion. 
 
 
 747. See Robidoux v. Rosengren, 638 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2011) (“This court 
reviews a district court’s decision to approve or reject a proposed settlement for abuse of 
discretion.”); Shelton v. Sloan, 977 P.2d 1012, 1021 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (“We defer to 
the trial judge in assessing fairness to the children.”). 
 748. See Buchan, 256 N.C. at 154, 123 S.E.2d at 497.  The court explained: 
The Supreme Court in the exercise of its supervisory powers, and acting ex me-
ro motu is of the opinion that a GAL should be appointed to represent the poss-
ible issue of Mary Elizabeth Buchan, and a GAL should be appointed to 
represent the heirs at law of H. C. Buchan, Jr., so that their contingent interests 
can be protected. 
Id. 
 749. Id. at 153–54, 123 S.E.2d at 497 (“Assuming that in this equity proceeding we 
have the right to review and weigh all the evidence in the case and find the facts . . . .”). 
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